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Abstract 
A considerable amount of literature examines the impact of the Internet and 
social media on the practice of democracy in liberal democratic contexts and on the 
democratization process in nondemocratic contexts. However, little is known about the 
rise and implications of using the Internet and social media platforms for 
democratization process in a hybrid political system, like that of Iraqi Kurdistan, which 
combines elements of both democracy and authoritarianism. This study asks: how does 
the rise of the Internet and social media platforms influence democracy and 
democratization in Iraqi Kurdistan? To this end, the study assesses both the relationship 
between the use of social media platforms by citizens, politicians, electoral candidates, 
and political parties, as well as political participation and political communication, 
which are selected as important elements of democratization. It specifically examines 
the use of social media through three case studies: the Slemani protest movement in 
2011; political discussion between citizens and party leaders of two political parties, the 
Patriotic union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU); and the 
2013 parliamentary elections. The study is based on original qualitative interviews with 
activists, politicians, and party leaders, and an analysis of relevant social media content 
in the Kurdish language, especially on the social media platform, Facebook. The thesis 
finds that social media platforms facilitate political participation and political 
communication in terms of reducing the constraints for organizing and coordinating 
collective action. They also facilitate political discussion between party leaders and 
citizens, and provide more access to relevant information for citizens. Furthermore, they 
expand the scope of freedom of speech by providing opportunities to discuss political 
	 ii	
issues and other issues of common interest, and facilitate the dissemination of 
information by electoral candidates and reduce campaign costs. However, the thesis 
argues that the increasing ease of political participation and political communication, as 
a result of social media usage, should not be equated with democratization. This is 
because those in power also use social media but in ways that are counter-productive to 
democratization. For example, security forces use social media to monitor and gather 
information about citizens and social movement activists; Political parties and their 
leaders also use online and social media platforms to distribute pro-party propaganda 
and to launch online attacks on political rivals, spreading a culture of hatred, violence 
and nondemocratic values, rather than promoting the discussion of policy issues and 
government decisions. Election candidates use online resources primarily to win a seat 
in parliament and empower their campaign rather than engaging with voters in a way 
that generates productive, healthy, rational, and deep political conversation.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This study examines the implications of social media usage for the 
democratization process in Iraqi Kurdistan (IK). Over the last decade, IK has witnessed 
a rise in the use of social media and digital platforms, which have begun to influence 
various aspects of the Kurdish society. Since 1991, the Iraqi-Kurdistan region has faced 
many challenges in the process of consolidating the democratization process. Despite 
the interest in social media and democracy in the Middle East that has resulted from the 
Arab uprisings of 2011, thus far, there have been no studies assessing the role of social 
media in the process of democratization and democratic consolidation in IK. This 
chapter contains four sections: 1) a background to the research subject and the rationale 
for this study; 2) statement of the research questions and objectives; 3) a statement of 
the thesis argument; and 4) a brief outline of each chapter.     
1 The Research Background and Rationale 
This section provides an introduction to Iraqi Kurdistan, its political institutions 
and processes, and the significance of social media in political life. It then discusses the 
rationale for this study. 
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1.1 A Background to Iraqi Kurdistan and Politics 
IK is not an independent state; according to article 4 of the Iraqi constitution, it 
is a federal region within Iraq, and consists of three provinces (Erbil, Slemani, and 
Duhok). In practice however, the region operates like an independent state and Deniz 
Natali (2010) described it as the ‘Kurdish Quasi-State’ (Natali, 2010). The region has 
great authority in arranging its economic and commercial policies and activities with 
many states around the world independently of the Iraqi central government (ICG). 
Most recently, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) entered into contracts with 
several giant energy companies, such as ExxonMobil, to extract and sell oil and gas 
from the region, bypassing the Iraqi central government (Invest in Group, 2015). The 
region has its own army, known as Peshmerga, which does not operate under the 
command of the Iraqi central government. However, Peshmerga forces are still not 
nationalized and it is under the control of the two main political parties, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party – PDK, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – PUK. The region has 
its own representatives in many states, which act like ministries of foreign affairs. They 
can offer visa entry to the region independently of the Iraqi government. In terms of 
military cooperation, many states deal with IK independently of the Iraqi government. 
The war between the Kurdistan region and Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 
is a prominent example of such cooperation.  
  The political system of IK is not consolidated yet, and because the region has 
not ratified a constitution, it is hard to clearly and formally identify the nature of its 
political system. Since 1991, the region has operated according to a parliamentary 
system, with its own parliament, government (prime minister and president), and 
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judiciary system. Additionally, every province has its own local government, known as 
the council of governorate. Citizens in the region elect these local governorates. 
The major political parties in IK are divided into secularists and Islamists. The 
secularist parties are: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), and the Change Movement (Goran). The Islamist parties are: the 
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG). As well as 
these major parties, there are other small parties, which have a very limited influence on 
the political landscape in IK. 
Since the Kurdish uprising against the Baathist regime in 1991, IK began to 
establish democratic governance. The first step of the process towards this was 
organizing the first parliamentary election in 1992 in order to establish the Kurdistan 
Regional government (KRG). 
An examination of the political landscape in IK has shown that the region has 
elements of both democratic and authoritarian rule, a political regime best described as a 
‘hybrid regime’. Scholars disagree on what exactly defines a hybrid regime. Different 
terminologies such as ‘pseudodemocratic’ (Diamond, 2002), ‘competitive authoritarian’ 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010), defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism (Bogaards, 
2009) dominate academic literature. In conceptualising this type of political regime, 
Larry Diamond argues that it combines both democratic and authoritarian elements 
(Diamond, 2002). According to Levitsky and Way, competitive regimes combine 
electoral competition with varying degrees of authoritarianism. In these type of regimes, 
opposition forces have the opportunity and freedom to use democratic institutions to 
compete and contest with incumbents. However, they were not truly democratic because 
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the competition is unfair and electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state 
resources, and depending on violence and harassment during political game in favour of 
incumbents is rife throughout the system (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Furthermore, 
Bogaards argues that there are some essential norms for democracy and fundamental 
democratic institutions: freedom, equality, and control and limitation of political power. 
Moreover, democratic institutions are decision-making intermediations, communication, 
legal guarantees, and rulemaking and implementation. If these norms and institutions 
are not fully in existence and achieved by a political regime, then the regime can be 
described as ‘defective democracy’ (Bogaards, 2009). Additionally, Ottaway defined 
hybrid regimes as “ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal 
democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions and respect for a 
limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even 
authoritarian traits” (Ottaway, 2003:10). A common understanding among scholars for 
the concept rests on idea that this type of regime contains features of democracy and 
authoritarianism simultaneously. 
Empirically, in regard to its political pluralism, elections, democratic 
institutions, civil society groups, and media corporations, IK appears to be democratic. 
There is freedom for forming political groups and civil societies, organising elections, 
although they are not conducted regularly, separation of powers between legislation, 
executive, and judiciary, diversity in media. However, in other aspects, IK is closer to 
an authoritarian system. The accesses to state resources are not equally accessible to all 
political parties. The two main political parties, the KDP and the PUK dominate key 
sectors of government resources and institutions, namely finance, economy, the media, 
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police, and armed forces, to the exclusion of other political parties. This domination 
reflects on many aspects of the region’s democratic process. For example, the two main 
parties rigged elections many times in their favour. The democratic consolidation 
process in IK was also challenged by the outbreak of civil war between the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which divided the 
Kurdistan region into two separate political administrations. Other challenges to the 
process include the intervention of political parties in government institutions which 
weakened the rule of law and spread corruption and nepotism; monopolisation of 
economic, natural, and financial resources by the two main parties; human rights and 
freedom of speech violations; and the politicization of the media and civil society 
(Orsam, 2013). 
In practice, political power is monopolised by the KDP and the PUK. 
Government institutions are politicized and strongly intertwined with the two parties. 
According to Qadir (2007):  
In IK today, political party control extends down into the 
high schools and universities. Student unions are financed 
by political parties and act as their extensions. The KDP 
and PUK student groups act as eyes and ears for the 
security services of the two parties. They observe students 
and professors and submit reports of activities to their 
supervisors (Qadir, 2007: 21).  
Both parties have their own militaries and security apparatus are not 
nationalized. The KDP and the PUK still control economic activities. They use these 
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government resources to promote their political agenda, strengthening the economic and 
political position of their political parties (Stansfield, 2003; Orsam, 2013). 
Official institutions, such as parliament, which has weak decision-making 
powers, are largely ineffective. Instead of parliament or government bodies, the 
respective political bureaus of the KDP and the PUK make the most important 
decisions: both parties have paralyzed parliament on multiple occasions. The judiciary 
system in the region is also ineffective: the rule of law is weak. The general attorney 
apparatus cannot prosecute high-ranking officials inside the KDP and PUK for many 
crimes committed or corruption issues (Orsam, 2013).  
Freedom of expression is limited; this is in part due to the politicization of the 
majority of the mainstream media: often, they either directly or indirectly belong to 
specific political parties or famous politicians. Political parties use the mainstream 
media to communicate with citizens and typically prioritize the interests of the political 
party over the interests of the public in their media coverage (Chomani, 2014). The 
independent media have a very narrow space to thrive and cannot play their role as 
effectively as they could in a democratic government; they have limited access to 
information sources. In IK, independent media and journalists face many challenges and 
are harassed, and threatened with arrest and even death. Most importantly, the region 
has a negative reputation in guaranteeing freedom of speech and press. The United 
States State Department report on human rights in Iraq has documented tens of cases of 
killing, arrest and imprisonment of journalists, human rights activists and independent 
figures without legal warrant (U.S. Department of State, 2015). Additionally, IK has a 
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poor record of human rights violations, such as killing females in the name of ‘honour’ 
and the rights of prisoners (Orsam, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2013).  
1.2 Significance of the Internet and Social Media for Iraqi Kurdistan  
The arrival of the Internet in IK in 2000 was an important technological 
development. It was available in IK before any other parts of Iraq (Internews Europe, 
2012). Although it was a very new medium for the Kurdish society and very few 
citizens had access to it, the Internet connected the Kurdish society with globalization 
trends, the global economy, and culture. This was important because it brought new 
social, cultural, and even political values and norms into Kurdish society 
(Sheyholislami, 2011).    
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, IK entered a new phase of economic 
investments in various sectors. Due to having security, the region succeeded in 
expanding investment in communication infrastructure, including the Internet and 
mobile networks; this increased Iraq's reliance on IK for Internet connectivity to reach 
three-quarters of Iraqi networks (Smith, 2014). Even when the Iraqi central government, 
on many occasions, blocked social media and other Internet services due to recent 
violence, IK, through its Internet infrastructure and networks reconnected the whole of 
Iraq with the global Internet (Dyn Research, 2014). In 2013, there were 21 Internet 
service providers (ISP) in IK alone (Ekurd daily, 2013).   
With regard to social media platforms, IK has witnessed a rapid growth of social 
media memberships on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube; this has attracted both 
political and non-political public figures to engage with and employ them for political 
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and non-political purposes. Existing research suggests that use of the Internet and social 
media has significantly increased in recent years, especially among Kurdish youths and 
politicians (Internews Europe, 2012; Hogan and Trumpbour, 2013). Another study 
conducted by IREX in 2012 found that nearly 50% of people in the Kurdistan region 
use social media at least once per week, and 72% of Iraqi Facebook users are between 
18-34 years old. Facebook is the most visited website in Iraq followed by other types of 
social media such as Twitter and YouTube (Invest in Group, 2012). Additionally, a 
BBG study (2014) revealed that:  
Facebook is by far the most popular social networking 
site, with almost all social media users (94.3%) having 
accessed it. The next most popular are Google+ at 41.8% 
and Twitter at 25.8% (BBG, 2015).  
Furthermore, the World Bank estimated that approximately 11.3% of the 
population used the Internet in 2014, compared with 5% in 2011 (U.S. Department of 
State, 2015). These findings indicate that social media usage in IK is growing day after 
day, and they also explain that Facebook is the most popular website and this popularity 
is among youth rather than other social sectors.   
In IK, the majority of the political parties have websites and politicians have 
Facebook and Twitter accounts or pages. They use the Internet and social media to 
establish communication and convey their political message to voters and followers, 
both during and outside election periods. This seems to be a timely development 
because it offers citizens the opportunity to interact with the political parties and the 
candidates over political issues. Furthermore, party members and citizens outside of the 
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political party structure communicate with the party leaders through social media to 
discuss the political agenda with top political leaders. Additionally, there are countless 
pro-party accounts and pages that support political parties by republishing statements, 
interviews and media activities of party leaders, publishing contents that enhancing 
political position of political parties and empower party’s political image in public 
mind. 
At the citizen level, social media appear to be the most popular means of 
communication to resolve political issues. For example, in 2011, Kurdish citizens in 
Slemani used social media to mobilize other citizens to demonstrate against corruption 
and demand the KRG should carry out social and political reforms. Additionally, social 
media appear to be rapidly integrating with political dynamics in IK. For example, on 
10 October 2015 due to the recent economic and financial crises in IK, a huge number 
of citizens organized protest in front of the KDP office in Qaladze town, Slemani 
province. The protests turned into a violence clash between protesters and KDP cadres 
and resulted in protesters burning the KDP office in Qaladze and killing one protester 
and some KDP cadres. Consequently, on 12 October 2015, Masud Barzani, the KDP 
president and the KDP politburo decided to prevent speaker of parliament, Yousuf 
Mohammad Sadiq – Goran List, from returning to Erbil (Rudaw, 2015). Accounts on 
social media platforms, such as ‘Roj Gul Facebook page1 were very active in Qaladze 
events. This particular page published many provocative videos of killings and burned 
KDP offices. In late 2016 and early 2017, teachers in the Slemani provinces and other 
towns organized massive strikes, demanding the KRG to pay their salaries and improve 
their lives (Rudaw, 2017). In these strikes, social media platforms were actively used to 
																																																															
1 https://www.facebook.com/RojgullTV/?fref=ts 
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mobilise, organize, and inform people in IK about their activities. Social media has also 
enabled citizens to communicate their grievances with local governing bodies, forming 
public opinions to put pressure on KRG officials to improve economic and political 
situations, and human rights conditions in IK. Additionally, citizens and journalists post 
official documents about corruption and human rights abuse on social media accounts 
and on some occasions the government responds to public opinion formed through 
social media.  
By observing social media accounts in IK, it is possible to claim that social 
media has become a platform on which citizens can deliberate, discuss and exchange 
political ideas online. Even traditional media outlets have created online pages, allowing 
users to discuss their opinions and political views. For example, NRT Media Network2 
has several political show programs. Tawtwe (analysis) is one of NRT daily political 
show invites citizens to participate in the discussion by writing comments and questions 
for program guests through NRT’s Facebook page,3 which has more than 2 million 
Likes. Rudaw Media Network,4 another media corporation, similarly has a political 
show called Rudawi Amro (event of today). The show invites users to write comments 
and questions for the show’s guests on its Facebook page,5 which has more than 2 
million Likes. This importantly enables citizens to participate and frame political issues; 
Ruwayda Mustafah6 highlighted that:  
																																																															
2 http://www.nrttv.com/ 
3 https://www.facebook.com/naliatv/ 
4 http://www.rudaw.net/Sorani  
5 https://www.facebook.com/Rudaw.net/?fref=ts 
6 Kurdish Female Blogger 
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Mainstream outlets are not framing the discourse, but are 
being framed on the basis of what social networking users 
are discussing, debating or highlighting (Mustafah, 2015).  
Through publishing posts and comments on the political and social contents of 
other users, citizens can express their opinions and interact with other social media 
users, government officials, political leaders and parliament members. More recently, 
online platforms have become another sphere on which to discuss politics, which is 
framed differently online, compared to other forms of communication technologies such 
as mainstream media. On social media accounts and platforms, political issues are 
generally discussed in an informal style, with comments often using aggressive and rude 
language. What can be said and read in social media platforms certainly cannot be said 
and read anywhere else. The structure of online platforms encourages users to produce 
and share as much information as possible with others even if the information is capable 
of influencing beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour. Additionally, the Internet and social 
media platforms played a key role in the Kurdish election campaigns. Due to social 
media’s simple user interface, politicians and candidates used these online platforms 
extensively in the recent parliamentary elections to advance their campaigns and 
communicate with voters.  
In response to the growth of online space, the KRG party’s security apparatus 
reacted against the online sphere in IK. According to the United States State Department 
2015 report on human rights in Iraq, in IK  
There were overt government restrictions on access to the 
Internet, and there were credible reports, but no official 
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acknowledgement, that the government monitored e-mail 
and Internet communications without appropriate legal 
authority. Despite restrictions, political figures and 
activists used the Internet to criticize corrupt and 
ineffective politicians, mobilize protesters for 
demonstrations, and campaign for candidates through 
social media channels (U.S. Department of State, 2015: 
32). 
With the growing use of the Internet and social media platforms by individuals 
across the globe, scholars are seeking to evaluate the emerging relationship between 
social media usage and political participation and political communication, such as 
voting, protesting and democratic deliberation (Fox and Ramos, 2012; Anduiza et al, 
2012; Uldam and Vestergaard, 2015). Scholars of democracy believe that political 
participation and political communication concepts are the main pillar of a democratic 
system and significant factor of democratization. Political participation enables citizens 
to communicate their preferences and concerns with government officials and to put 
pressure on government officials and policy makers. Political participation and political 
communication can enable the enhancement of democracy in a particular society. Social 
movements, as a type of political participation, can topple authoritarian regimes and 
establish a more democratic political system. Political discussion between citizens, 
politicians, political party leaders, and their political representatives in parliament can 
be influential in shaping government behaviour and make government more accountable 
and responsive to the public’s opinion and demands. Citizens’ participation in election 
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campaigns can lead to the election of a candidate capable of implementing 
comprehensive reform in government and political system. The democratic system 
allows citizens to express their views, opinions, and attitudes towards public affairs and 
issues affecting them without fear of any governmental restrictions. It also allows 
citizens to receive responses from their representatives and policy makers. Therefore, 
scholars claim that it is impossible to have a democracy or democratization without 
active and voluntarily participation of citizens in political life and a substantial 
communication process between citizens and government officials. Political 
participation and political communication may come with different forms and types e.g. 
voting, participation in elections and campaign, demonstrating, striking, writing 
petitions, participate in civil society organization and independent political groups 
(Dahl, 1989; Verba et al, 1995; Uldam and Vestergaard, 2015).   
With the arrival of the Internet and social media platforms, the status of political 
participation and political communication witnessed a dramatic transformation across 
societies. The general view is that digital age has transformed political participation and 
political communication across political systems. Yet, there is continued debate among 
scholars concerning the implications of the Internet for political participation and 
democracy (Best and Wade, 2009). Generally, two lines of arguments are suggested: the 
first argues that the Internet and social media platforms are valuable tools for enhancing 
and increasing citizens’ participation and communication in political life. The Internet-
based applications are new resources for organizing, mobilising, and coordinating 
collective actions e.g. protest, demonstration, and strikes capable of toppling 
governments. The Internet and online resources are considered to be valuable tools to 
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directly connect citizens with politicians without relying on third party mediation, such 
as mainstream media. Online platforms also transformed elections and campaigns by 
opening new channels for citizens to engage with campaigns and candidates. The online 
platforms empowered candidates to better communicate their message and target voters 
(Bennett et al, 2008; Brundidge and Rice, 2009; Rahimi, 2011; Kwon et al, 2011; 
Shirky, 2011; Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011; Yahyanejad and Gheytanchi, 2012; Jensen 
and Anduiza, 2012; Colombo et al, 2012; Castells; 2012; Towner, 2012; Lopes, 2014; 
Breuera et al, 2014).  The second argument maintains that the Internet and social media 
applications are not bringing new changes that favour of democratic consolidation 
because nondemocratic regimes are also using these online resources to further 
empower their rules. They place the public sphere under surveillance and monitor 
activists and citizens, enhancing propaganda strategies by publishing pro-government 
contents online (Aday et al, 2010; Morozov, 2011; Morozov, 2012).   
Despite the growing importance of social media in IK, until now, there has been 
no research on the significance of the Internet and social media platforms for 
democratization in the Kurdish context. In general, research on social media and politics 
in the Middle East has focused on the use of social media in challenging dictatorships 
by organizing collective action, and enabling dissent and counter publics (Castells, 
2012; Howard and Hussain, 2013; Faris and Rahimi, 2015). However, challenging 
dictatorships cannot be equated with the process of democratization, though it could be 
the first step towards democratization. Therefore, this study sheds light on the 
implications of using social media platforms for democratization by focusing on the 
case of Iraqi Kurdistan. Because of its hybrid political system, the IK is an interesting 
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case for examining the potentiality of the Internet and social media for democratic 
consolidation in a nascent democracy.  
2 The Research Questions and Objectives 
The preceding discussions about the existence of social media in IK generate the 
following research questions: 
How does the rise of the Internet and social media platforms influence the 
democratization process in IK? 
1. How does the rise of social media influence political participation of citizens and 
what is the value of that participation for democratic consolidation in IK? What are the 
benefits and risks of social media for political participation and the democratization 
process in IK? 
2.  How do social media platforms facilitate citizens’ participation in social movements 
and collective actions? How do social media influence freedom of expression and 
opinion? What are the implications of these actions for consolidating democracy in IK? 
3.  How do the Internet and social media contribute to generating political discussion 
and interactivity between the Kurdish citizens and political parties and their leaders? 
What are the implication of online resources for democratic discussion and 
consolidating democracy in IK? 
4.  How far do social media democratize the campaigns and communication strategies 
of candidates and political parties during elections? How do social media platforms 
enhance citizens’ engagement with elections and campaigns? What are the implications 
of online campaigns for democratic consolidation in IK?   
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 This thesis aims to achieve the following specific objectives:  
1. To assess the impact of social media on citizens’ political participation. 
2. To assess the impact of social media on political communication. 
3. To assess the impact of social media on political discussion and democratic 
deliberation between citizens and party leaders and government officials in IK.  
3 The Thesis Argument 
Among democracy scholars, the rise of the Internet and social media encouraged 
new waves of debate about the potential these online resources have to facilitate 
political participation and, consequently, enhance democratic consolidation or improve 
the quality of democracy. Generally, as Chapter Two explains in detail, there are two 
lines of argument on this issue; the first claims that the Internet and social media are 
new resources for increasing political participation and facilitating political 
communication, thereby contributing to democratization and democratic consolidation. 
Social media facilitate participation in demonstration, protest by enhancing citizens’ 
capacities to coordinate, inform, and publicise their collective action. Social media 
enable citizens to better engage with elections and campaigns and also enable 
candidates to better communicate their message and enhance their campaign and 
political image. The online resources are valuable tools, which can connect citizens with 
politicians and increase levels of interactivity and generate productive discussion over 
political issues. The second line of argument emphasizes that the Internet and social 
media do not change the current status of politics and democracy much. Politicians can 
easily manipulate the public by using social media platforms in the way they would 
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traditionally use mainstream media: in a unidirectional approach. Social media can be 
new sources for government officials and representatives to reassert their power and 
influence over politics. The differences between scholars’ opinions can be attributed to 
differences in the contexts in which social media has been examined. Therefore, due to 
various factors, it is difficult to establish a generalizable and clear-cut explanation and 
interpretation about the power of the Internet and social media in fostering democratic 
politics. 
This thesis argues that although the Internet and social media facilitate political 
participation and political communication in the context of IK, signs of enhancing 
democratic politics empowered by online citizens’ participation in IK seem to be weak. 
The political participation and political communication facilitated by the Internet and 
social media platforms are not effective and may not lead to consolidate democracy in 
IK because of repression and harassment by the security agencies and because of the 
top-down approach employed by politicians and political candidates. The candidates 
and party leaders use the Internet and social media resources for achieving short-term 
objectives such as winning elections, promoting personal image, and discrediting rival 
politicians, rather than using them as an open space for citizens to engage with party 
policies and interact with the decision-making process in government institutions. 
Therefore, the increased political participation and political communication via the 
Internet and social media accounts seems to be having a limited impact on the 
likelihood of Kurdish policy makers enabling reforms and enhance the efficacy and 
quality of democratic governance in IK.  
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4 Thesis Structure and an Outline of the Chapters 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter two contains four sections; the first 
section is dedicated to the concepts of democracy, democratization, and social media. It 
also develops a multi-level understanding for democratization, which this thesis adopted 
as a base for the conceptual framework. The second section is dedicated to reviewing 
the literature on the Internet, social media, and democracy and identifying thesis’ 
contribution to knowledge. The section will review three bodies of literature. The first is 
literature on social media and democracy in democratic states. The second body is 
literature on social media and democratization in authoritarian states. Finally, the third 
body is literature about politics and democracy in IK, which has gaps in identifying the 
impact of social media on this particular field.  
The third section engages with developing a theoretical framework for the study. 
The theoretical framework begins by developing a concept of political participation and 
political communication for the purpose of this thesis and then highlights the 
implications of the Internet and social media platforms on these concepts. The thesis 
then proposes to operationalize the concept of democratization through the concepts of 
political participation and political communication. For the concept of political 
participation, the study uses Jan Toerell’s (2006) classification of political participation. 
Teorell classified the concept of political participation into three categories; the first 
category of political participation is participation as influencing attempt, the second is 
political participation as direct decision-making, and the third category is political 
participation as political discussion (Teorell, 2006). The thesis also uses the concept of 
political communication in relation to democratization. It then explains how social 
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media may improve or increase political participation and political communication, 
thus, contributing to democratization. These theoretical underpinnings will be used and 
operationalized on three case studies to examine the role of social media in enhancing 
democratic consolidation in IK. The final section addresses the methodological issues of 
this thesis. This section clarifies the research design, methods of data collection, ethical 
considerations, and data analysis. It also explains the operationalization of conceptual 
framework in relations to the empirical chapters.    
Chapter three consists of an overview of democracy and the democratization 
process in IK. The aim of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with how democracy 
emerged, what is the status of the democratization process, and identifies the major 
challenges to democratic consolidation in IK. The chapter explores the elements of 
democracy that are available in IK, such as pluralism, parliament, government, judiciary 
bodies, tolerance of different religious, political and cultural factions. However, it also 
explores the challenges IK faces in democratization process and it has critical problems 
in power-sharing, peaceful transition of power, transparency, rampant corruption and 
weak economy, role of media and freedom of expression, and rule of law. The chapter 
concludes with establishing that IK is at the crossroads on democracy, and its future of 
democratization is uncertain.    
Chapter four is concerned with the impact of social media on political 
participation as influencing attempt and explores the case of citizen participation in the 
Slemani protest movement in 2011, which called for democratic political reforms in IK. 
These protests were the largest organized in IK, and coincided with the waves of 
protests and revolutions in the Arab world, known as the Arab Spring. Drawing on 
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original interviews and relevant social media accounts, this chapter examines the use of 
social media by the Slemani protesters, its success in mobilising a popular movement 
for political reform, and the degree of which the protests were successful in influencing 
IK’s politics. The chapter first explores the environment in which the Slemani 
movement emerged and the major factors that contributed in sparking the protests. 
Then, by using theoretical assumptions developed in chapter two attempts to analyse the 
role of social media platforms in facilitating protest participation by providing a forum 
for communication, coordination, and spreading news about the protests. It also 
analyses the major risks and drawbacks of the online platforms for the Slemani 
movement. The chapter finds that although social media platforms were important 
resources in facilitating citizens’ participation in the Slemani movement and conducting 
several significant functions for running the movement for more than two months, the 
party security forces, the KDP and the PUK, also actively used the online resources to 
monitoring and arresting activists and movement leaders, demonizing the movement 
and its message, and publishing pro-KDP and PUK propaganda. Ultimately, the 
Slemani movement had limited influence on the KRG’s political behaviour and 
decision-making and, thus, limited influence on further consolidating democracy in IK.    
Chapter five explores the potential impacts of social media on generating political 
discussion between citizens and politicians, including political party members, party 
leaders, parliamentary representatives and government officials, as well as the role of 
social media in facilitating citizens’ participation in political discussion. This chapter 
considers the PUK and the KIU as case studies and examines the role of the party 
websites, social media accounts and pages of the party leaders and pro-party accounts in 
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generating political discussion and opportunities for citizens to participate in the 
formulation of government policies and decision making process. This chapter also 
provides a brief background about both political parties and their online profile. It then 
explores the significance of the Internet and social media for political discussion 
between citizens and party leaders, politicians, parliamentary representatives and 
government officials. To this end, it studies three different types of online sites: party 
websites, Facebook accounts and pages of political leaders, and those set up by pro-
party individuals. The chapter finds that rather than using online resources for 
generating political discussions with citizens, political parties and their leaders are using 
the Internet and social media applications in a unidirectional way to publish 
propaganda, promote party leaders and their message. There is limited evidence that the 
Internet and social media are generating rational, deep, and productive conversation 
between citizens and political parties on policy and governance issues, government 
decisions, and law proposals. The main purpose of the usage is to achieve personal 
gains rather than establishing an online democratic forum for exchanging ideas on 
politics in Kurdistan.   
Chapter six assesses the relationship between the Internet and social media usage 
and political communication by focusing on political campaigns and elections. The 
chapter mainly concentrates on the Kurdistan parliamentary elections of 2013. Drawing 
on original interviews and relevant social media accounts, the chapter investigates the 
impact of social media on electioneering and campaigning. It examines the significance 
of the 2013 parliamentary elections for Kurdish politics generally. The results of the 
election illustrate that the balance of power among Kurdish political parties has changed 
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and the KDP and the PUK are no longer the only kingmakers in Kurdish politics. The 
chapter analysis how the Internet and social media influenced candidates’ campaigning 
strategies and the degree to which candidates used online platforms to improve their 
political responsiveness to the concerns and issues of voters, thereby facilitating citizen 
participation in decision-making processes as well as political discussions. The chapter 
concludes that although the online platforms opened a new space for citizens’ 
participation and engagement with elections, campaigns, and candidates, but candidates 
are using social media platforms for self-promotion, enhance their political personality, 
and win a seat in parliament, rather than engaging in democratic conversation or 
increase citizens influence over the election and campaigning process. 
Chapter seven outlines the major findings of the study that the study has reached 
at the end of the research. Chapter eight discusses the conclusion of the study and it 
engages mainly with the implication of the findings for wider study of social media and 
democratisation.  
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Chapter 2 
The Internet, Social Media, Democracy, and Democratization: 
Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, and Methodology 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the major relevant literature and develops a theoretical 
framework to guide the thesis and build analysis for the empirical chapters. With the 
advent of social media platforms, scholars in different parts of the world have started to 
examine to the role of these platforms for politicians and citizens, and their capabilities 
in achieving democratic transition. This chapter first reviews the literature on the 
Internet, social media, and democratization in both democratic and authoritarian 
contexts. It then highlights the importance of studying the role of social media in 
democratic consolidation in the context of IK and the potential scholarly contribution of 
such research.  Then, it defines basic concepts, e.g. political participation and political 
communication, and develops the study’s theoretical underpinnings by combing 
concepts from democratic theories with insights from the Internet and social media 
literature. Additionally, the chapter engages with explaining methodological issues and 
how the theoretical framework will be operationalized through empirical chapters.       
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1.1 Democracy and Democratisation 
Like many other political concepts in political science, the concept of 
democracy and democratisation, identifying the conditions of democratisation, 
measuring democracy, and analysing prospects and different dimensions of democracy 
are highly contested themes. Scholars of the field not only struggled to propose a 
unanimous definition, but their efforts to formulate one were resisted and faced 
challenges from all sides. Defining the concept as a type of government where citizens 
possess power themselves or through elected representatives (Spinner, 2011; Grigsby, 
2012; Ishiyama, 2012) is subject to various explanations and interpretations. However, 
in a general sense, it is important to look at the concept of democracy from different 
angles rather than limiting it with one point of view. Therefore, it is possible to 
conceptualise democracy and democratisation from two main perspectives; 
conceptualisation from a procedural perspective, and conceptualisation by outcome or 
result perspective. 
With respect to the first perspective, procedural perspective, this approach is 
sometimes described as a realistic approach as it emphasises the process of democracy 
and democratisation as a political regime or method (Møller & Skaaning, 2013). The 
roots of this perspective trace back to Max Weber and Hans Kelson and its prominent 
defenders of this perspective are Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Dale, and O’Donnell 
(Møller & Skaaning, 2013). For these scholars, a democratic government has three 
fundamental properties: electoral rights (Schumpter, 1994), political/civil rights (Dale, 
1989), and rule of law (O’Donnell, 2001). For instance, Schumpeter (1994) defined 
democracy as an:  
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Institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions, in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
peoples vote (Schumpeter, 1994:269).   
Similarly, Robert Dahl (1977; 1989) suggested some criteria for democracy in 
which some of them can be included under the three aforementioned properties. He 
believed that democracy is a type of political system where citizens have the 
opportunity to: (1) formulate their preferences; (2) signify their preferences to their 
fellow citizens and the government; and (3) have their preferences weighed equally in 
the conduct of government; (4) effective participation, which means that all members 
of society must have an opportunity to present their views about policy proposals 
before they are implemented; (5) voting equality which denotes that no one should be 
excluded from voting and their vote must be counted honestly and accurately; (6) 
enlightened understanding, citizens must have a chance to learn about alternative 
government policies and their outcomes for their life in an open and transparent 
sphere; (7) control over political agenda, meaning that citizens have leverage over 
government initiatives e.g. referenda which grants them power to show public support 
for government policies; and (8) inclusion of adults, which means all social groups of 
society should be included in the governance process with no deprivation and 
discrimination of any of them (Dahl, 1977; 1989). 
Additionally, Linz and Stepan (1996) addressed four main components to 
recognise democracy in any regime: (1) rule of law, meaning no individuals including 
government officials and rulers stand above the law; (2) civil society groups and 
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institutions autonomous from the state structure represent and articulate public’s 
interest without restrictions of state power; (3) free and fair elections; (4) the extent to 
which government officials are held accountable (Linz & Stepan, 1996). 
Some other scholars concentrate on other fundamental criteria in a given 
political system to be considered as a democracy. Some of these criteria are procedural 
criteria for democracy and democratisation, while other are principles. According to 
Grigsby (2012),  
The rule of ‘demos’ is brought together through (1) 
elections in which the people are free to select and 
reject government officials, (2) ongoing access to the 
government by the people between elections, and (3) 
the enactment of laws and policies reflecting the 
interests of a self-governing people, it is clear that the 
people and the government are connected in terms of 
inputs (citizens demands), and outputs, (laws and 
policies) (Grigsby, 2012:163-4). 
Furthermore, some authors argue that there should be a broader understanding 
of democracy rather than simply identifying participation, such as voting. In 
democratic governance, citizens and their representatives should have democratic 
oversight of government bureaucracies, military institutions. Arguably, democracy is:  
A method of governing an association, a form of 
governance through which the people rule by means of 
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political procedures upon which they commonly agree 
(Margolis & Riaño, 2009:6).  
The power of citizens and their representatives should include both the ability 
to preserve traditional liberal principles and impose standards and rules for non-
government sectors to comply with to protect personal and sensitive data and to utilise 
human and natural resources to avoid exploiting uncontrolled resources (Margolis & 
Riaño, 2009).  
Some scholars, such as Carothers refer to standard achievements that 
international community aims to accomplish during transformation from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic one. These include developing a constitutional 
framework, holding competitive elections and establishing a competitive political 
party system in accordance with international standards, respecting and protecting 
human rights, effective and inclusive legislatures, enhancing and professionalising 
independent judicial authority and the courts, power devolution and decentralisation of 
decision making for local governments, expanding participation in civil society 
organisations and independent media (Carothers, 1999).  
Conceptualizing democracy and democratisation from procedural perspective 
has many advantages. This perspective simplifying the components of democratisation 
and allow for agreement on what to include or exclude as criteria for democratisation. 
This approach contains relatively few defining characteristics easy to be assessed in 
various cultural, social, and political contexts to address causes and consequences of 
these properties for democracy and democratisation. This perspective is more 
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pragmatic and realistic and relatively simple to assess democratic achievements 
empirically.  
Meanwhile, this perspective also has drawbacks and disadvantages. Although 
electoral rights, political/civil liberties, and rule of law are significant properties for 
assessing the level of democratisation in a given country, some countries, however, 
may achieve substantial progress with respect to elections than with respect to rule of 
law and civil liberties and vice-versa. However, the procedural approach does not deal 
with democratisation components individually, but aims to see all the elements as one 
package. The absence or weakness in any properties would change a democratic 
government to into different category of political system rather than democracy 
(Møller & Skaaning, 2013). Additionally, this perspective does not address issues 
beyond these conditions, such as the operation of democratic government and what 
can achieve for citizens, or as Huntington noted ‘the degree of governing’.  
Another group of scholars attempt to conceptualise democracy and 
democratisation and judge it through the capacity of democratic government in 
achieving developmental goals and meeting social needs. Some authors believe that a 
democratic system can be distinguished by the capability of political system in 
achieving economic growth and development, the reducing of corruption in the 
economic sector, the capacity of central government in maintaining order and manage 
the delivery of basic public goods and services (Lipset, 1959; Schneider & Schmitter, 
2004; Fukuyama, 2011).      
With respect to defining democratisation, like the concept of democracy, there 
is no fixed and timeless objective definition for democratisation; it is subject to a 
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variety of understandings and interpretations. Some scholars argue that considering the 
role of electoral process in achievement of democratisation process, stating that 
democratisation means exit from authoritarianism regime and ending with peaceful 
transfer of government between competing political parties or acceptance of electoral 
process as the only game for reallocating public office. However, the problem with 
this understanding of democratisation is that it is too permissive for some contexts and 
too exacting for others (Whitehead, 2002).  Some states reached a satisfactory level of 
institutional stability and in considering election as the only game for political process, 
such as in Spain and Italy, but still require substantial progress in other sectors 
(Whitehead, 2002). Additionally, this perspective only engages with democratisation 
as a process occurs within a formal institutional structure, such as electoral politics, 
but ignores the process from informal structure, such as social movements and civil 
society. Civil society must be free to operate as a condition of democracy.  
A suitable definition proposed by Whitehead, who sees democratisation as “a 
complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended process. It consists of progress towards 
a more rule-based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics. It 
necessarily involves a combination of a fact and value, and so contains internal 
tensions” (Whitehead, 2002:27). Additionally, due to the complexity of the concept, 
Haynes (2012) believes that the process of democratisation in a given country needed 
to occur in four recognisable, complementary, and overlapping stages. The first is 
political liberalisation, which requires political reform in authoritarian rules. The 
second stage calls for collapse of authoritarian regimes and removal of dictators from 
power. The third is democratic transition, and requires a tangible shift to democracy, 
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usually identified by the democratic election of a new government. The fourth stage, 
called democratic consolidation, requires the entrenchment of democratic institutions 
and perceptions among both elites and citizens that democracy is the more favourable 
political approach (Haynes, 2012). 
Democracy promotion and strategies are required for democratisation to 
flourish; this is subject to debate. Scholars propose various approaches on how best to 
achieve democratisation. One approach is called the sequentialist approach. The 
debate between those supporting the sequentialist approach and those opposing it is 
called the sequence/fallacy debate. Sequentialists emphasise the importance of 
necessary preconditions and requirements for establishment of stable democratic 
government or which requirements should be prioritised and put in place to build a 
democratic government. Scholars like Fareed Zakaria (1997), Amy Chua (1998) 
Mansfield and Snyder (2005; 2007), also known as sequentialists, argue that it is risky 
to promote democracy before having necessary preconditions are in place and that 
democratic designers should pay special attention to flourishing those preconditions 
before pushing for electoral election. In their view, it is crucial for democratic 
promoters to establish rule of law and build well-functioning state before moving to 
other mass political participation of the public in political life or organizing electoral 
competition (Zakaria, 1997; Chua, 1998; Mansfield & Snyder, 2005; 2007). More 
specifically, Mansfield and Snyder support economic development, which will 
naturally enhance the rule of law. Leaders in new democracies, in their view, desire to 
appease their citizens economically; therefore, legal system and rule of law reform is a 
significant element necessary for a flourished economy (Mansfield & Snyder, 2007).  
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Another essential precondition, sequentialists argue, that needs to be in place 
before starting democratisation process is having well-functioning state. Mansfield 
and Snyder (2007) state that state should first be capable of functioning well in terms 
of its security and safety for citizens, providing basic services, have monopoly on 
force, and of creating effective institutions before entering onto path of sustainable, 
pluralistic political development, holding general elections and open the space for 
political participation. Thus, in a post-authoritarian society where a state has 
completely collapsed under civil war and other negative events, it is very dangerous to 
push for democratisation without having a well-functioning state. Strengthening state 
capacity should be prioritised and democratisation must wait until there is a state with 
capable, impartial institutions and a solid capacity to develop, legislate, and implement 
effective policies (Mansfield & Snyder, 2007; 2005). While Carothers (2007) has no 
problem with having effective state in principle, he noted that leaders in new 
democracies who engage in the state building process frequently end up with building 
corrupt and incompetent institutions, creating patronage networks, and developing an 
infrastructure of weak institutions. Autocrats misuse the state apparatus as a source for 
gaining income for themselves through corruption and supressing political rivals. 
Autocratic leaders consider an independent, impartial, strong and effective state 
apparatus as a threat to their rules. Moreover, in new democracies, governments 
struggle with state building process; for example, political parties may use state 
institutions to build patronage networks, and coalition governments can setback 
institution building and sustained policy implementation (Carothers, 2007).  
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Comparably, Francis Fukuyama accepts the sequentialists’ view that the 
constrained and the capacity of the society in questions make a workable strategy. But 
he also accepts Carothers’s argument that there is a small number of examples where 
state building preceded democratisation in a given country (Fukuyama, 2007).  
Meanwhile, Carothers (2007) does not completely accept the sequentialists’ 
view. He argues that experiences demonstrate that establishing those preconditions in 
new democracies can be difficult to be correctly carried out. Carothers (2007) warns 
that autocratic leaders in new democracies are often less interested in rule of law and 
in economic developments of their citizens; rather, they make rule of law reforms to 
enrich themselves, protect the economic privileges of their peers, and supress and 
deprive other political rivals from economic resources. These leaders only care about 
holding onto power and use every means to keep their ruling alive. Even if they want 
to develop their country’s economy, they may do so in a way that serves their 
interests, which ultimately compromises any serious pursuit of the rule of law. 
Moreover, leaders in new democracies will typically reform certain laws, such as 
commercial law to achieve economic development and abandon reforming laws 
relating to political rights and freedom (Carothers, 2007). 
Besides that, autocrats sometimes mislead the public by pretending that their 
policies aim to reform the economy, by launching anti- corruption campaigns and anti-
crime-related policies. However, these reforms are limited and avoid essential 
components of genuine rule of law. These anti-corruption campaigns may consist of 
techno-legal changes or programs for raising the public’s awareness on the risks of 
corruption. These policies do not lead to democratisation because they are not 
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comprehensive in scope and/or implementation; rather, they manipulate the public and 
the rule of law agenda (Carothers, 2007). 
Similar to Carothers, Berman (2007) also is sceptical about sequentialists’ 
recommendations on establishing preconditions before launching democratisation and 
she noted that the history of European western countries demonstrate that even the 
existence of precondition did not guarantee peaceful transition to democracy. The 
histories of France, England, and Germany do not support the sequentialists’ view as 
these countries witnessed revolution, civil war, and ethnic cleansing in a time where 
state institutions were in place. Even countries that Mansfield and Snyder cite as 
examples of successful democratisation did so after waves of military coups, storms of 
violence, failed democratic experiences, civil wars and occupations (Berman, 2007).  
Alternatively, Carothers (2007) proposed a different path for democratisation 
to flourish, named as gradualism, which is different from sequence/fallacy one.  He 
named this approach as “democratic gradualism” and explained it as:  
It does not entail putting off for decades or indefinitely 
the core element of democratisation- the development of 
fair and open processes of political competition and 
choice. It involves reaching for the core element now, 
but doing so in interactive and cumulative ways rather 
than all at once. Gradualism can take different forms 
depending on the context (Carothers, 2007:25).  
Carothers also admits that democratic gradualism should not be considered as a 
magic bullet: this can easily be misused by unfaithful leaders for democratisation. This 
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approach will not provide democracy promoters with new forms of influence to 
enhance democracy and it is not universally applicable. However, it does not mean 
that democracy in unachievable. Gradualism is a different approach from 
sequentialism as Carothers highlighted: 
The gradualist approach seeks to find a way for countries 
where few circumstances favour democratisation to take 
incremental but definite steps toward open political 
competition while simultaneously pursuing state-building 
and rule-of-law reforms (Carothers (b), 2007:21). 
 
Regarding IK, this thesis considers democratisation to be a complex and long-
term process aimed at achieving political, economic, and social stability through 
conducting regular, impartial, and standardised elections and peaceful transitions of 
power, which ultimately lead to establishing a government capable of achieving the 
public’s economic and social interests and needs. In this sense, it adopts Whitehead’s 
definition of democratisation but also considers that the end point should include both 
procedural elements of democracy as well as ensuring particular outcomes in terms of 
delivering development and security for citizens. In line with Carothers’s gradualist 
approach, this thesis recognizes that multi-party elections constitute a positive step 
towards democratisation even if, in the case of IK, they have not yet dismantled the 
monopoly of the two main parties, which undermines the building of strong 
institutions and the rule of law. Therefore, the thesis seeks to understand how social 
media may constitute a means through which democratisation may be strengthened, 
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through enhancing citizen participation to hold politicians to account and to voice 
demands that may, in turn, contribute to strengthening institutions and the rule of law.  
1.2 Social Media 
The concept of social media is relatively new, and scholars use different 
terminologies to describe and explain it. Some definitions concentrate on Internet 
applications that allow users to create content and exchange it. Kaplan and Haenlein 
(2010) define social media as  
A group of Internet–based applications that build on the 
ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and 
that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated 
content (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2012: 60).  
Other scholars such as Howard and Hussain (2013) use the term digital media. 
They contend that digital media consists of: 
(A) The information infrastructure and tools used to 
produce and distribute content that has individual value 
but reflects shared values. (B) The content that takes the 
digital form of personal messages, news, and ideas that 
becomes cultural products (Howard and Hussain, 2013: 
13).  
The above authors refer to the creation and exchange of content by social media 
users. This is important; however, the functions of social media sites go beyond this. 
Some authors remark on the communication dimension of social media sites: according 
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to Coleman and Blumler (2009), social media are set of websites with media features 
capable of disseminating information and facilitating multidirectional communication. 
In this multi-dimensional environment, small groups of people are able to influence and 
shape the perceptions and beliefs of an entire nation (Coleman and Blumber, 2009). 
Similarly, Bimber et al (2005) claim that social media are broad communication 
channels that provide online information for their users in a contentious political arena 
and offer alternative perspectives towards social issues (Bimber et al., 2005). 
In summary, social media are definable as types of Internet applications that 
offer citizens the opportunity to send, receive, share, disseminate, exchange, and publish 
different types of data and information. These applications are capable of establishing 
and enhancing communication among humans and helping them to create communities 
and share feelings among users. These two features are necessary to distinguish social 
media from traditional media and other Internet applications. 
2 Literature Review  
2.1  Social Media and Democracy in Democratic States  
Democratic states have recently witnessed an increase in the use of social media 
sites in political activities such as campaigning, disseminating political information and 
policy planning. In western democracies, social media play a growing role in 
presidential and parliamentary elections (Chadwick, 2006; Davis et al, 2009; Wawrd 
and Gibson, 2009; Hendricks and Denton, Jr, 2010; Katz et al, 2013; Rajput, 2014).   
One of the problems in liberal democracies is the decline of citizens’ interest and 
faith in parliamentary democracy, joining political parties, voting, and participation in 
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general politics. Consequently, citizens search for a different form of political 
engagement such as joining social and protest movements rather than formal political 
organization. However, politicians in liberal democracies search for other means, such 
as social media, to rejuvenate the publics’ interest in politics. Thus, digital technologies 
can be seen as promising medium in reinvigorate democracy (Coleman, 2009; Loader et 
al, 2014).      
The examination of the role of social media in reinvigorating democracy in 
democratic states will be begin with focusing on political campaigns and elections. 
Social media have a great impact on political parties and the election process. In many 
liberal democracies, in presidential and parliamentary elections, social media are used 
for campaign operations, mobilization, and fundraising. These academic works argue 
for the role of social media in enhancing the quality of democracy. They mainly claimed 
that social media opens new channels for interested citizens to engage and participate in 
democratic politics. They also argue that digital technologies allow marginalized and 
new parties to emerge and compete with the established parties and ultimately produce a 
more pluralistic and competitive party system. New and marginalized parties benefit 
from the Internet, which enables them to overcome financial constraints because it is a 
cheap and efficient way to reach out to voters. (Grossman, 1995; Morris, 1999; 
Browning, 2002; Margolis et al., 2003; Bimber and Davis, 2003; Trippi, 2004; 
Chadwick, 2006; Davis et al, 2009; Reddick and Aikins, 2012; Pa˘trut and Pa˘trut, 
2014).       
Contrastingly, some other scholars argue that the Internet will not change the basic 
dynamics of election campaigns. Online platforms are less likely to increase competition 
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among parties because wealthier parties and candidates will use the Internet in a more 
effective way than small and new parties. Wealthier parties will have more staff, better 
websites and more effective media converge for their campaigns. Ultimately, the 
Internet may intensify political inequalities (Davis, 1999). The Internet, according to 
this view, is still a tool in the hands of political elites, which enables them to manipulate 
the public, ultimately excluding citizens from politics. The Internet and social media do 
not inherently influence the political behaviours of governments, or influence laws and 
policies to make them more democratic (Hindman, 2009; Margolis and  Riaño, 2009).  
Additionally, Margolis and Riaño (2009) argue that,  
Political uses of the Internet have affected aspects of 
democratic politics, such as electioneering and lobbying 
techniques, but they have hardly enhanced or furthered 
democracy. Even though the potential for more effective 
participation, greater voting equality, more enlightened 
understanding, and more substantive control over the 
political agenda certainly exists, patterns of political 
activity associated with the net generally reflect the 
predominant patterns of offline political activity (Margolis 
and Riaño, 2009: 151).  
Another way of considering the role of social media in democratic reinvigoration 
in democratic states is as a way for political activists to disseminate political 
information. Social media and the Internet have increased the amount of information 
available to citizens. This process can be conducted through the official websites of the 
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parties, social media sites, and through personal social media accounts of politicians 
(Davis, 2009). The availability of information may empower parties’ political 
communication with voters and citizens, because the availability of information is more 
likely to increase democratic participation. It also encourages citizens’ interaction with 
the information because they can contribute to increasing and deliberating the 
information through sharing, posting, and commenting on activities via social media 
sites (Morris, 1999; Browning, 2002; Chadwick, 2006).   
Besides political parties and politicians, recently, scholars in democratic states 
have become interested in citizens’ engagement with social media for political 
participation. These studies primarily concluded that the Internet and social media have 
empowered citizens to participate in politics, and given voices to voiceless individuals 
(Lusoli and Ward, 2006; Bimber et al, 2009; Jensen and Anduiza, 2012). However, 
these studies concentrate on the democratization trends on individual levels rather than 
on institutional levels; they fail to address how citizens’ empowerment influences 
government decisions and policies or how the Internet and social media contribute in 
democratizing the decision-making process of local and national governments.     
Authors who have studied citizens’ usage of the Internet and social media for 
political participation in liberal democracies agree on three basic themes. First, the 
Internet and social media reduce the costs of participation in terms of time and effort. 
Traditional forms of political participation e.g. contacting politicians, donating and 
signing petitions require lower costs in terms of time and effort. Individuals can easily 
disseminate their thoughts and information across a wide range of audiences, which 
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they were not able to do through verbal communication. This process is significant in 
revitalizing the democratic politics (Bimber, 2003; Adams, 2009; Shulman, 2009).   
Secondly, social media expand the scope of political participation through 
creating new channels of political communication, political mobilization, and 
organization among citizens, politicians, and government officials. Social media 
simplify the diffusion of information and political messages, commenting on political 
information, and recruitment for political issues. Thus, social media sites offer a set of 
opportunities for democratic citizenship and incentives for citizens to partake in 
unconventional forms of participation, and it generates an environment that enables a 
range of interactions and activities (Bimber, 2003; Kriesi, 2008; Bimber et al, 2009; 
Coleman and  Blumler, 2009; Jensen and Anduiza, 2012).  
Thirdly, social media generates new sources to facilitate participation and 
motivate citizens to participate by making information more readily available to them. 
Social media reduce the costs of acquiring political information, which may serve as a 
positive motivation for offline political participation such as voting or protest (Norris, 
2001; Tolbert and Mcneal, 2003; Jensen and Anduiza, 2012).  
Contrastingly, some authors question the value of political information via social 
media accounts in producing political participation. The intention of individuals to 
search for political information is a crucial factor, as individuals do not always explore 
political content. Instead they use them for social communication, work, and 
entertainment. Therefore, using non-political sites does not promote political 
engagement (Shah et al, 2001; Cantijoch, 2012). Similarly, Albrini (2008) concludes 
that information alone might be of little use without well-organized civic political 
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organizations and institutes, which might translate online political activity into actions 
in the real world (Albirini, 2008). Moreover, the availability of political information 
alone cannot guarantee citizens’ participation in politics, and accordingly, access to 
political information on social media will not encourage political participation. Seeking 
political information is limited to those citizens who are already politically interested 
and active (Norris, 2003; Cantijoch, 2012; Nie and Erbring, 2009).  
In democratic states, citizens also benefit from social media in communicating 
politically to participate in unconventional types of political participation such as 
protests and demonstrations. Some scholars analysed that political participation in 
contemporary democratic societies faces some basic challenges such as a lack of 
confidence in political institutions and elites, and these challenges have led citizens to 
search for other forms of participation through social media (Norris, 2002; Aelst and 
Walgrave, 2004; Dalton, 2004; Lusoli and Ward, 2006; Chadwick, 2006; Chadwick, 
2007; Segerberg and Bennett, 2011; Fenton and Barassi, 2011; Kwon et al, 2011; 
Vaccari, 2012; Harlow, 2012; Cantijoch, 2012; Castells; 2012).    
This group of authors emphasize on a set of basic themes about the role of social 
media in mobilizing particiption in protests. Firstly, social media enable users to 
disseminate and frame information on provocative political events, and facilitate the 
development of political sophistication. This process has several consequences for 
individuals’ behaviour at political protests; for example, social media shape the political 
perception and knowledge of citizens, and online discussion groups facilitate 
anonymous participants to argue about specific topics of common interest (Backer and 
Wehner, 2001; Diani, 2001; Bimber, 2001; Hughes, 2002; Chadwick, 2006; Bimber et 
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al.; 2009; Ghannam, 2011, Cantijoch, 2012; Welp and Wheatley, 2012; Papacharissi 
and Oliveira, 2012; Breuera et al, 2014).  
Secondly, social media foster transnational links between individuals and like-
minded groups: they are powerful conduits for forming new political movements. Social 
media sites are more likely to unite citizens who share common interests and grievances 
despite geographical and social barriers. On social media accounts, participants can 
form groups who have common interests, build up political organizations, and discuss a 
variety of significant and mutual topics (Vedel, 2003’ Lim, 2012).  
In spite of social media’s ability to lower communication barriers, some authors 
argue that connecting online is not enough to result in protests. Protesters often embrace 
social media to advance the protest’s reach (Fuchs, 2008; Barakovic, 2011).  
Since 2003, the Kurdish political parties, candidates and politicians generally 
engaged with the online resources to develop communication strategies during election 
campaign. The prime example of social media usage in election is the 2009 and the 
2013 parliamentary elections. In these elections candidates resorted to social media 
platforms, especially Facebook and YouTube, to establish communication and promote 
candidates’ political brands and campaigns.  
IK, as has been argued, is not a fully liberal democracy, and its economic and 
social circumstances are quite different from liberal democratic states. Thus, for 
balance, the next section explores the literature on social media in authoritarian states.    
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2.2  Social Media and Democracy in Authoritarian States 
There is not enough literature pertaining to the role of social media in 
democratizing party politics and elections in authoritarian states. This is due primarily 
to the absence of political freedom in these contexts (Calderaro, 2014). In these states, 
authoritarian governments narrow the scope of political freedom and apply strong 
censorship policies to prevent citizens from accessing unwanted information; security 
organizations use social media to suppress and curb citizens’ online and offline activism 
(Michaelsen, 2011; Mackinnon, 2012; Wagner and Gainous, 2013).  
Authoritarian states have certain characteristics; authoritarian governments are 
characterized as non-participatory regimes: they do not provide freedom for citizens to 
participate in political life. In authoritarian states, citizens are outside of the decision-
making process and the outcomes of the government’s decisions delink the government 
and the people. Furthermore, the military, a single political party, a ruling family, or 
individual elites shape the decision-making in authoritarian governments. The 
mechanisms for transforming power among political actors are unclear or unavailable to 
citizens, who cannot contribute to power transformation through elections. Additionally, 
the circulation of information among citizens and communication channels in 
authoritarian governments is strongly restricted through control and censorship of the 
mainstream media and other information sources (Casper, 1995; Valenzuela and 
Valenzuela, 1995; Posusney, 2002, 2004; Lust-Okar, 2005; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 
2009; Michaelsen, 2011; Grigsby, 2012).  
The rise of the Internet and social media has consequence for political freedom 
and circulation of information. In many authoritarian states, social media provide a new 
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way of conducting politics for citizens. They have created an environment that enhances 
‘bottom-up’ activism, whereby the public is able to shape political developments 
(McCallum, 2011; Howard and Hussain, 2013).  Many studies on authoritarian states 
have argued that social media enable citizens to communicate politically to organize 
protests for democratic transformation. In the Arab world, during the Arab Spring 
uprisings, social media became important tools for activists to mobilize, organize and 
inspire protesters to take to the street. The key arguments in this literature about social 
media and protests revolve around two major themes. First, that social media allow 
political actors to increase the amount of political information and reduce information 
access costs. In authoritarian states, social movements and individual activists tend to 
consider social media as an important asset in their arsenal of protest strategies, which 
enable them to follow different strategies to organize and direct their adherents. 
Secondly, increasing and spreading political information under authoritarian regimes 
may lead to changing public opinion and dismantling the chains of censorship, which 
ultimately may lead to changing the regime. In these circumstances, social media have 
important roles in fostering transnational links between individuals and like-minded 
groups (Howard, 2010; Howard et al., 2011; Khondker, 2011; Tufekci and Wilson, 
2012; Cantijoch, 2012; Castells, 2012; Howard and Hussain, 2013; Eaton, 2013; 
Breuera et al, 2014).  
These studies mainly argue that online resources are facilitating democratization. 
However, it is important to remember that democratization, as the coming section 
explains, is a long process: It cannot be achieved through a single set of demonstrations 
or even compelling an autocrat or dictator to resign and leave power. The experiences in 
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Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen illustrate that democratic designers should be 
extremely careful of how to establish a democratic system, because, in the post digital 
media revolution, returning authoritarianism in a different style or insecurity and 
instability is possible. This appears to be a longer-term problem of the difficulties of 
establishing and consolidating democracy that precedes the digital age (Backer and 
Wehner, 2001; Cabras, 2002;  Hill and Sen, 2002; Cardoso and Neto, 2004; Carthew, 
2010; Howard, 2010; Shirky, 2011; Ghannam, 2011; Rahimi, 2011; Howard et al., 
2011; Murphy, 2011; Khondker, 2011; Cantijoch, 2012; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; 
Castells, 2012; Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2012; Lim, 2012; Eaton, 2013; El-Nawawy 
and Khamis, 2013; Howard and Hussain, 2013; Breuera et al, 2014).  
Contrary to these studies, other authors concluded that the Internet and social 
media might not lead to democratic movement at all. In some circumstances, the 
Internet and social media enable authoritarian regimes to suppress democratic 
movements: they can build extensive networks to strengthen and tighten their hold of 
power. Censorship and surveillance are also problematic for digital democratic 
movements; it may lead citizens to be reluctant to join democratic movements. The 
authoritarian regimes use the Internet to develop strategies, tactics, and tools to maintain 
their power, stifle dissent, censor and monitor opponents, and publish propaganda. They 
can use the Internet to build a large community to support and promote government 
views and policies and enhance state power over society. It is argued that the idea that 
the Internet can spread democracy to the most suppressed citizens is unrealistic 
(Morozov, 2011; Rahimi, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; Qiang, 2012; Howard and Hussain, 
2013; Larémont, 2014).  
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Moreover, the Internet may further empower authoritarian regimes by 
strengthening their rule. MacKinnon (2012) proposed the concept of ‘networked 
authoritarianism’ for those regimes empowering their rules by the Internet. In the 
networked authoritarian state, the single ruling party remains in control while a wide 
range of conversations about the country’s problems occurs on websites and social-
networking services. In the networked authoritarian state, there is no guarantee of 
individual rights and freedoms. Those whom rulers see as threats are jailed, truly 
competitive, free, and fair elections are not held, and the courts and the legal system are 
tools of the ruling party (MacKinnon, 2012). Arguably, in newly developing 
democracies, governments may benefit from the Internet to curb and disrupt 
democratization process. According to MacKinnon, 
Strong governments in weak and new democracies are 
using second and third generation Internet controls in 
ways that contribute to erosion of democracy and slippage 
back toward authoritarianism. This situation is enabled by 
a weak rule of law, lack of an independent judiciary, weak 
guarantees of freedom of speech and other human rights 
protections heavy or untransparant regulation of 
communication industry, and weak political opposition 
that is rendered even weaker by cleaver manipulation of 
media, legal system, and commercial regulatory system 
(MacKinnon, 2012: 90). 
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These analyses are also relevant to the case of IK because IK has authoritarian 
characteristics. IK citizens communicate through social media to organize protests in 
order to achieve specific political objectives, such as the protest in Slemani in 2011, in 
which citizens demanded political reforms. There are also protests to improve human 
rights conditions and lift restrictions on freedom of speech. Citizens have used social 
media to mobilize others and partake in protests. Additionally, the Kurdish activists and 
some parliamentarians relied on social media to expose information on corruption, 
misuses of government resources for personal and political party purposes, documenting 
human rights abuses, criticizing the KRG officials and political party leaders. This 
thesis will assess the impact of social media on these political activities.  
3 Impact of the Internet and Social Media on Democratization 
In non-democratic societies, the quest for democracy, democratization, and the 
people’s aspiration for democracy and freedom is a contested topic for many scholars. 
With the arrival of the Internet in authoritarian states, hopes for democracy and freedom 
are revitalized. However, the question of how the Internet and social media influence 
democratization in a non-democratic context needs to be examined across contexts in 
order to build theoretical foundations and expand the current level of understanding 
about the impact of social media on democratic consolidation.     
The advent of the Internet encouraged scholars to draw different conclusions 
about the implications of the Internet and social media for democratic governance. 
Some envisioned the Internet as a great new era for democratic promotion following the 
invention of direct and representative democracies (Grossman, 1995), and a new cure 
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for democratic imperfections in liberal democracies (Chadwick, 2006), while others see 
it as having limited impact on democratic politics (Margolis and Riaño, 2009; Hindman, 
2009).  
In order to assess the relationship between social media and democratisation,this 
thesis operationalizes democratisation in terms of political participation and political 
communication. The study’s justification for this approach stemmed from literature on 
democratisation, which consider political participation and political communication as 
two important factors in enhancing democracy in Western countries (Pateman, 1970; 
Kitschelt and Rehm, 2011; Rawnsley, 2005). According to Pateman, early, ‘classical’ 
theorists on democracy, Rousseau, Mill, and Cole, emphasised on maximum 
participation of all the people in political life. Political participation is a necessary 
condition for political institutions to function, protection of the stability of political 
system, and work as possible force in solving many problems in Western democracies 
(Pateman, 1970). It is unimaginable to have a healthy democratic system without active 
participation of citizens in politics (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2011).  On political 
communication, according to Rawnsley (2005), one of the reasons behind the public’s 
declining interest in political life, and the weak turnout during parliamentary and 
presidential elections in Western democracies is the existence of crisis in political 
communication. He argues that practising politics depends on successful 
communication strategies that appear in the organization of collective action, and 
government responses to public opinion (Rawnsley, 2005). Political communication is 
also important to democratisation because it allows the expression of new ideas, 
facilitates political recruitment, and improves socialisation and mobilisation; political 
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communications have social and political consequences for social control and nation 
building (Rawnsley, 2005). Before engaging with how the Internet and social media 
influence political participation, political communication, and democratisation, it is 
useful to define the concepts of political participation and then political communication. 
3.1 Political Participation   
Political participation is difficult to define due to variations in forms of 
engagement with politics, the occurrence of the political participation in different arenas 
or political contexts, and variations in the intensity of participation in terms of time and 
resources. The term basically refers to wide range of political activities that aim to 
establish links from the mass public to the ruling elites (Hague and Harrop, 2004; 
Kitschelt and Rehm, 2011).  
Some scholars defined the concept from a western democratic perspective and 
excluded some other types of political activities e.g. political discussion. According to 
Huntington and Nelson, political participation is:  
Activity by private citizens designed to influence 
government decision-making (Huntington and Nelson, 
1976: 3).  
Additionally, Verba et al defined political participation as:  
An activity that has the intent or effect of influencing 
government action either directly by affecting the making 
or implementation of public policy or indirectly by 
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influencing the selection of people who make those 
policies (Verba et al, 1995: 38).  
These definitions are not fully valid for non-democratic settings, as citizens have 
limited influence in the decision-making process (Hague and Harrop, 2004; Kitschelt 
and Rehm, 2011). In contrast, Uldam and Vestergaard (2015) propose an appropriate 
definition for the concept: they do not see the concept from the perspective of 
influencing decision-making. They define political participation as: 
An understanding that captures the efforts of civil society 
actors to address issues of public concern beyond the 
rights and obligations of liberal citizenship such as voting 
(Uldam and Vestergaard, 2015: 2).     
Scholars debated two main typologies of political participation. The first is 
labelled as conventional or formal political participation, and refers to voting and 
political discussion. These types of political participation occur within institutional 
context. The second is unconventional or informal political participation, for example 
participation in boycotts, protests, demonstrations, and social movements. These types 
of participation are conducted outside official institutional settings and aim to resist the 
dominant politics (Pateman, 1970; Pintor and Morlino, 2003; Hague and Harrop, 2004; 
Kitschelt and Rehm, 2011; Jorba and Bimber, 2012; Uldam and Vestergaard, 2015).  
These definitions are relevant to this study, as the thesis examines one type of formal 
political activity e.g. the 2013 parliamentary election, and one type of informal political 
participation e.g. the Slemani protest in 2011.  
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For the purpose of this study, this thesis will combine concepts from democratic 
theory, namely political participation and political communication, with insights from 
social media literature. This thesis uses Teorell’s (2006) conceptualization and 
classification of political participation. His conceptualization for the concept covers 
three angles; the first is political participation as influencing attempts; the second is 
political participation as direct decision making; and the third is political participation as 
political discussion (Teorell, 2006). Teorell’s model will be further expanded under the 
shadow of social media literatures. This study focuses on two types of Teorell’s 
classification of political participation: as an influencing attempt, and political 
participation as political discussion. The study deliberately avoided concentrating on 
political participation as direct decision-making because there is no empirical example 
of political participation as direct decision-making in IK. Therefore there will be no 
empirical chapter in this study on this type of political participation.  
3.1.1 Political Participation as an Influencing Attempt  
 The first dimension highlighted by Teorell (2006) is called political 
participation as an influencing attempt. Other scholars, such as Sidney Verba and his 
colleagues, also discussed this type of political participation. They emphasized the 
citizens’ ability to affect government officials (Verba and Nie, 1978). This perspective 
also considers political participation as an instrumental act organized and conducted by 
the public to make the government and political system responsive to their will. Verba 
(1996) argues that: 
Participation is a mechanism for representation, a means 
by which governing officials are informed of the 
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preferences and the needs of the public and are induced to 
respond to those preferences and needs (Verba, 1996: 1).  
In his reflection on this idea, Powell asserts that the responsiveness of the 
political system and government political decisions to the citizens’ demands are 
strongly linked with accountability (Powell, 2003).  
From these understandings, the responsiveness of government individuals and 
institutions to the preferences and needs of citizens is a central normative issue in 
democratic theories. Teorell (2006) calls it as ‘the responsive model of democracy’ 
(Teorell, 2006). Consequently, this perspective bypasses the elitists’ model of 
democracy and participation by granting citizens the space to influence the policy 
outcomes rather than electing representatives, in which their outcomes may not match 
voter’s preferences and needs.  
Typologies of participation that aim to influence political elites are 
demonstrations, social movements, boycotts, writing petitions, organizing in unions,. 
These ranges of activities are prime examples of this type of political participation both 
in democratic and authoritarian contexts (Kitschelt and  Rehm, 2011).  
For the purpose of this thesis, one type of political participation will be selected, 
as an example of an influencing attempt: social movements (Kitschelt and  Rehm, 
2011). The arrival of the Internet and social media left tremendous implications for 
social movements. Hence, it is possible to distinguish between two lines of arguments; 
one sees social media platforms as useful resources for social movements, while the 
other considers them as risks. 
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 The first argument believes that social movements extensively benefited from 
social media, which mobilized citizens, established communication locally and globally, 
coordinated collective action, disseminate information, and leadership. Social media 
make achieving key functions of social movements, such as communication, 
organization and mobilization, faster and more efficient. They empower social 
movements to strategize coordination tactics by accelerating users’ involvement with 
the online networks of communities, forming a collective identity, and joining collective 
action. Additionally, social media facilitates the construction of online communities and 
increase interaction and collaboration among online members (Bimber and Flanagin, 
2005; Wall, 2007; Bennett et al, 2008; Cormode and Krishnamurthy, 2008; Brundidge 
and Rice, 2009; Rahimi, 2011; Kwon et al, 2011; Shirky, 2011; Eltantawy and Wiest, 
2011; Yahyanejad and Gheytanchi, 2012; Towner, 2012; Jensen and Anduiza, 2012; 
Colombo et al, 2012; Castells; 2012; Lopes, 2014; Breuera et al, 2014).  
Online communities allow for the distribution of success stories among social 
movements across the globe. Social media permits communities across borders to be 
aware that they share similar problems because they nurtured transportable strategies for 
mobilization (Howard and Hussain, 2013). In this sense, Castells (2009) concluded that  
Individual citizens around the world are using the new 
capacity of communication networking to advance their 
projects, to defend their interests, and to assert their values 
(Castells, 2009: 57).  
Similarly, Norris (2002) argues that,  
	 54	
The Internet has altered citizens’ involvement in politics 
by electronically promoting the diffusion of protest ideas 
and tactics quickly and efficiently across national borders 
(Norris, 2002: 208). 
 Additionally,  
Social media were singularly powerful in spreading 
protest messages driving coverage by mainstream 
broadcasters, connecting frustrated citizens with one 
another, and helping them to realize that they could take 
shared action regarding shared grievances (Howard and 
Hussain, 2012: 116). 
Furthermore, and on a global level, social media have transformed the ways in 
which civil society actors and activists organize protests and express dissent. Social 
movement leaders employ social networking sites and digital content systems to 
orchestrate collective action, activate and fuel local protest networks, establish networks 
and links with international social movements and share their political opinion and 
perspectives with global media systems and corporations on micro-level (Bimber et al, 
2005; Byrne, 2007; Howard, 2011; Gerbaudo, 2012; Howard and Hussain, 2013). 
Social media have had noticeable impact on leadership issues of social 
movements. Some authors argue that they operate without clear leaders. Instead, they 
have been organized by participation of groups, which use an informal style of decision-
making. The key tasks are performed by groups of activists that are horizontal in 
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structure without explicit hierarchies (Tufekci, 2014). The horizontal nature of 
networks, Castells argues 
Supports cooperation and solidarity while undermining the 
need for formal leadership. The Internet creates the 
conditions for a form of shared practice that allows a 
leaderless movement to survive, deliberate, coordinate and 
expand (Castells, 2012: 229).  
Social media allow citizens to form online groups unlimited by geographic 
boundaries or the need for face-to-face communication (Shirky, 2008). Many key 
functions traditionally linked with social movement leaders are accomplished by 
individual actors positioned in social media-facilitated networks e.g. strategic framing 
of protest activity, connecting fragmented and separate individuals and groups in 
collective action (Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Gerbaudo, 2012; Poell et al, 2016).  
Moreover, in times of protest and demonstration, social media allow citizens to 
distribute information and news and develop new forms of journalism, known as 
citizens’ journalism. Citizens’ journalism facilitates political participation supported by 
the Internet and social media and it is significant for social movements as well. Citizens 
can publish photographs and video on social media (Bimber and Flanagin, 2005; Quinn 
and Lamble, 2008; Kwon et al, 2011). In the digital age, citizens are part of journalism 
as they have the opportunity to influence the traditional power relations in the media 
(Woo-Young, 2005). The scope of citizens’ journalism is not limited to sharing images 
and photos taken by citizens, but via social media citizen journalism, users interact, 
publish news in their online accounts. Such news and information is open to feedback, 
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responses, sharing of opinions, experiences, and feelings of a larger group of users and 
provoke discussion and interaction. On the micro-level, citizens’ journalism allows 
citizen to be real-time observers of events (Quinn and Lamble, 2008; Kwon et al, 2011; 
Tufekci, 2014; Demirhan, 2014).  
Social media have also created implications for the need of social movements 
for the mainstream media in gaining publicity and attention to their case. Media 
coverage is crucial to generate public sympathy and communicate with the internal and 
external environment (Lopes, 2014; Donk et al, 2004). In a setting where the media are 
strongly censored and controlled by regime apparatus or the mainstream media are 
neglecting coverage of activities of social movements, the Internet and social media can 
play active role in providing alternative media coverage. In this sense, social media 
impact the spread of information and reporting news on social movements (Demirhan, 
2014). Therefore, social media are key to social movements to reach out to the outside 
environment and publish their pictures because social media and the Internet undermine 
the vertical structure of control and provide new outlets for the free expression of 
opinions and views (Zayani, 2014).  
Social media not only break the state’s control over the flow of information, but 
also allows the spread of information between different countries faster than traditional 
media outlets (Howard and Hussain, 2013). Social media provide “means by which 
many people can reach information that governments would rather deny them” 
(Tufekci, 2014: 2).  
One of the crucial features of social media is their ability to bypass official 
sources and mass media, granting a voice to ordinary citizens in transforming the 
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political landscape of their society. Social media can offer alternative perspectives 
toward social issues and act as prime information providers in a contentious political 
arena (Kwon et al, 2011; Clark, 2012; Lopes, 2014; Demirhan, 2014). Additionally, 
social media influence the information infrastructure of societies. Information 
infrastructure  
Become formative spaces for nurturing and organizing 
social action. Such spaces are especially important for the 
public sphere in non-democratic societies because they 
can be the only public spaces where autonomous or even 
anonymous discussion can take place (Howard and 
Hussain, 2013: 35).  
In the digital environment, social media grant ordinary citizens the opportunity 
to have access to other sources of information uncontrolled by the state-run media. The 
international news corporations and networks of friends and other online connected 
users provide these sources. These sources can sharply undermine the control of state 
over the flow and circulation of information across networks (Howard and Hussain, 
2013). Therefore, information technologies empower both individuals and social 
movements, enabling them to break barriers and constraints imposed by governments. 
Citizens’ contribution may influence the dominant political discourse, challenging, and 
weakening the control of authoritarian governments over the political discourse and 
narratives (Dahlberg, 2001; Sieb, 2008; Salamey and Pearson, 2012; Howard and 
Hussain, 2013). This thesis explores all of the above claims with regards to social media 
and social movements and assess the role of social media in facilitating the influencing 
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attempts of social movements in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, by focusing on the case of 
the Slemani protests of 2011. 
With respect to assessing the success of social media platforms in facilitating the 
attempts of social movements to influence decision-makers, it is also necessary to 
consider that authoritarian regimes can use the same tools to curb and suppress citizens’ 
political participation with censorship and surveillance, disinformation, and crackdowns 
on social movements. In this sense, the Internet can be a significant tool for social 
control. These regimes may resort to disconnecting their entire country from the Internet 
or blocking specific social networking websites e.g. Facebook and YouTube, to prevent 
citizens from receiving critical information, which could undermine the regimes’ 
legitimacy and stability. When a government practices censorship, the ability of citizens 
to communicate politically becomes weak and probably results in suppression of 
political activities (Aday et al, 2010; Morozov, 2011; Howard, 2011; Morozov, 2012; 
Howard and Hussain, 2013; Tufekci, 2014).  
Furthermore, social media can alert security forces to social movements and 
protesters’ strategies and plans. In Iran, security forces relied on social networking sites 
to prevent organizing mass demonstrations by ex-protesters of the Green movements, 
which were sparked by the 2009 Iranian presidential elections. Through social media, 
the security apparatus succeeded in targeting activists and their coordination plans and 
strategies. Even members of the Green movement did not expect that their movement 
could be suppressed by the technologies on which they extensively depended 
(Yahyanejad and Gheytanchi, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2012). Authoritarian regimes invested 
heavily in developing digital counterinsurgency strategies to crackdown on protests and 
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dissent. The digital counterinsurgency strategies are the combination of several digital 
methods and sophisticated tactics by some authoritarian regimes to construct virtual 
firewalls, filters, censorship, removing content, and even demonizing digital movements 
and the influence of social media networks, (Qiang, 2012; Howard and Hussain, 2013; 
Tufekci, 2014).  
Because of that, social media can be harmful for social movements in terms of 
coordination of actions. Due to the lack of centrality of command in social media 
networks, different information about coordination strategies flows from different social 
media accounts, and ultimately confuse participants. Tufekci (2014) observed this risk 
in the Egyptian revolution in 2011 and concluded that  
although social media were used as a key tool for 
requesting supplies, it often only added to the confusion, 
as people who had not known whether an order had been 
filled would repeat prior days’ requests. By itself, social 
media does not automatically facilitate easier organizing 
of logistics, and can lead to confusion (Tufekci, 2014: 11).  
The same risk has been observed in the 2009 Green Movement in Iran and the 
2013 Gezi Park Movement in Turkey (Yahyanejad and Gheytanchi, 2012; Demirhan, 
2014). Therefore, social media can fragment protesters into smaller groups which makes 
it easier for security forces to suppress them (Tufekci, 2014). 
The above discussion of the relationship between social media, social 
movements and political participation as influencing attempt suggest that social media 
platforms can be useful for to facilitate political participation in social movements 
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aimed at achieving democratization. Yet, social media might also be used as a weapon 
by nondemocratic regimes to suppress these movements and hamper democratic 
transformation.  
3.1.2 Political Participation as Political Discussion     
Another dimension of political participation classified by Teorell (2006) is 
articulating political participation as political discussion. Scholars have disagreed over 
what should be dubbed a political discussion, and how it should be conducted 
individually or collectively. In regard to this, some see political discussion as decision-
making by means of argument (Elster, 1998); other scholars consider political 
discussion as a process of public opinion formation, which comes before decision-
making (Chambers, 1996; Teorell, 2006). 
Political discusion is the essential need for democracy to work and do its 
functions (Gimmler, 2001; Coleman and Blumler, 2009). According to Barber, ‘there 
can be no strong democratic legitimacy without ongoing talk’ (Barber, 1984: 136). 
Additionally, Insua and French (2010) defined democratic political discussion as  
The entire series of interactions between authorities, 
stakeholders, and citizens from the initial exploration of 
issues of concern, up to the conclusion of deliberations 
and resolution of the matter, through to the making and 
implementation of the decision (Insua and French, 2010: 
3).  
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One of the leading scholars who argued extensively for the idea of public and 
political discussion is German theorist and scholar Jurgen Habermas. He highlighted the 
importance of the ‘public sphere’, which he defined as “a virtual or imaginary 
community, which does not necessarily exist in any identifiable space” (Habermas, 
1962:175). Similarly, Hauser (1999) defined public sphere as “a discursive space in 
which individuals and groups associate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where 
possible, to reach a common judgment about them” (Hauser, 1999:61). The concept 
refers to an area in social life where citizens can together discuss and identify common 
problems without restrictions; it allows them to debate and influence political action. 
This discussion takes place mostly through mass media, meetings, and social media.  
With the arrival of the Internet and social media platforms, the status of political 
discussion has transformed tremendously. The online platforms revolutionized human 
communication and provided humanity with resources to establish conversation, 
interpersonal networking, personalization and individualism (Löfgren and Smith, 2003; 
Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Abrams, 2005; Semetko, 2006; Kalnes, 2009; Calderaro, 
2014; Lachapelle and Maarek, 2015). 
 Scholars have proposed two prospects about how the Internet and social media 
influence political discussion. The first suggests that the Internet and social media are 
good tools for generating political discussion and promoting democratization, while the 
second argues that the online tools do not bring innovations for political discussion and 
democratic politics.    
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The first perspective believes that one of the merits of social media is the 
possibility of establishing two-way communication and generating interaction between 
senders and receivers of the online contents. Bruns and Highfield highlight that  
The growing adaptation of social media has the potential 
to increase interactions between citizens and politicians, 
raising the level of participation in public debate, by 
putting these different voices in the same space (Bruns and 
Highfield, 2013: 671).  
Groups of authors consider the Internet to be positive for generating discussion 
and improving democratic consolidation. In their view, it is likely that the Internet and 
social media will lead to more informal political discussion, as it provides access to 
information from diversified sources and to new channels of communication. The 
Internet and social media have transformed the status of the availability and access to 
information and data, which is necessary for generating political discussion and 
democratic deliberation. In this way, it is logical to see the online platforms as a positive 
force for democratization, particularly in those contexts where the media outlets are 
dominated by political ruling elites. Access to online information will make citizens 
more politically active and more informed about government and politics. Thus, the 
Internet is a significant tool to serve democratic ideals because it is neutral, 
decentralized, interactive, educational, and can reinvigorate the public sphere. Free-
flowing political information is essential for the democratic participation of citizens 
because information helps citizens to select the correct representation, monitor the 
current government officials, and therefore facilitate the enactment of desirable policies 
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(O’Loughlin, 2001; Mäkinen and  Kuira, 2008; Best and  Wade, 2009; Groshek, 2009; 
Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2012; Salgado, 2014).  
Similarly, Gimmler (2001) argued that,  
In the deliberative process, information plays a central role 
along with achieving equality of access to it. Equality of 
access to information and an unrestricted means of access 
are fundamental to a more ambitious practice of discourse. 
This is supported by Internet technology. The opportunity 
for interaction, which the Internet facilitates, satisfies 
another prerequisite of deliberative practice. As a means 
of promoting interaction, the Internet has a positive and 
direct contribution to make. Above all, the Internet 
encourages the exchange of services and information 
(Gimmler, 2001: 32). 
Through social media, citizens have the opportunity to employ the interactive 
features of social media accounts, pages, and websites. Political party websites and 
social networking platforms are grant the public freedom of contribution and of sharing 
the parties’ online message across individual networks when visiting their platforms 
(Ward et al, 2003; March, 2004; Jackson and Lilleker, 2009). 
Scholars argue that the Internet and social media provide a platform for open 
and free expression and a medium for informing citizens about politics. The public 
obtains opportunities to express political views and learn about those of others. Social 
media provide opportunities for citizens to openly discuss politics, criticize, scrutinize, 
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and even steer cynicism regarding the government and the established media (Dutton, 
2009; Michaelsen, 2011; Howard et al, 2011; Towner, 2012; Castells, 2012; Towner, 
2012; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Salgado, 2014). 
Social media offer a pluralistic environment for political discussion and social 
media sites support free communication (Howard and Hussain, 2013). Social media are 
considered a new discursive space, which could lead to more participation in the public 
debate for all citizens. Consequently, it is possible for social media to establish a 
deliberative atmosphere for the development of civil society and pluralism (Dahlberg, 
2001; Gimmler, 2001; Macintosh, 2004; Zheng and Wu, 2005; Dahlberg and Siapera, 
2007). 
Similarly, Coleman and Blumber (2009) state that interactive, digital 
information and communication technologies would seem to offer promising ways of 
creating forms of political discourse consistent with democratic norms. Online 
interactivity could facilitate communication connection characterized by greater 
transparency and public co-presence, political discussion and individual self-
representation (Coleman and Blumber, 2009).  
The Internet may also empower individuals to influence politics and participate 
in discussion about topics of common interest. According to Noveck (2000)  
Individuals could have a newfound influence on political 
and other decision-making processes on all level. 
Discussion of issues of central importance to geographic 
communities and dispersed interest communities can form 
a basis for consensus-building and political organizing. 
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The ready availability of information to inform the 
conversation disperses power from the educated elites to 
all participants (Noveck, 2000: 21).  
The Internet and social media are also bringing new and less well-represented 
voices into political process (Chadwick, 2006).   
Additionally, the Internet and social media have changed the ways in which 
politics can be conducted across societies. According to West (2011), politics no longer 
has to be an echo chamber where people of like-mindedness listen to one another; 
digital technology enriches political conversation and engagement. People are exposed 
to more views than in the past. This enriches national dialogues and allows people to 
evaluate policy ideas (West, 2011).  
Another group of scholars argue that the Internet and social media are more 
likely to reinforce the current status of politics. Instead of rejuvenation of democratic 
politics, the Internet may contribute to damaging democracy by lowering the levels of 
rational public sphere by forcing online political arguments to be simple, distorted, and 
intensely impolite in order to gain popularity among other countless online arguments 
(Margolis and Resnick, 2000; Sunstein, 2001; Noam, 2005).  
On the other hand, the Internet can be seen as something that  
Threatens to overwhelm us with so much information so 
as to give the appearance of democratizing and enriching 
our political lives while actually frowning us in 
irrelevancies (Noveck, 2000: 23).  
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She further argues that information on the Internet has little educational impact 
regarding political context (Noveck, 2000). 
Additionally, Kalnes (2009) questioned the Internet and social media platforms’ 
ability to establish political discussion between citizens and political parties and 
enhance democratic politics. Parties’ motivations in adopting social media are primarily 
driven by their attempt to win elections rather than proposing policy choices for citizens 
to give their opinion and rationally discuss these options (Kalnes, 2009).  
Moreover, Noveck (2000) observes: 
Despite the flourishing of electronic commerce and the 
doubling of the webs size every week, there is no 
concomitant growth in electronic democracy. There is 
much information, but no guarantee of knowledge; a lot of 
chat but little debate. Seeming transparency and openness 
lead to a loss of privacy, rather than the emergence of a 
virtual public sphere (Noveck, 2000: 20). 
 Additionally, not all citizens have the intention and skills to be active online 
participants due to not possessing sufficient political knowledge to engage in online 
discussion. Having access to unlimited amount of online information may not lead to 
active and effective participation of citizens in discussing and proposing policy choices, 
as most people still have no sufficient knowledge, skills, and even interest to engage 
with discussing complex questions of their government. Instead, party leaders and 
representatives are mostly doing that for citizens (Margolis and Riaño, 2009). 
Additionally, others reveal that obtaining news and information from social media will 
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not lead to increasing users’ knowledge about politics or shaping citizens’ political 
action. It is also difficult to present a mechanism to measure levels of increasing 
political knowledge through social media platforms (Pasek and Romer, 2009; 
Baumgartner and Morris, 2010; Groshek and Dimitrova, 2011).  
There are some problems of democracy that the Internet and social media seem 
to be unable to solve, or maybe the Internet will create other problems for democracy. 
According to O’Loughlin, there are some practical difficulties the Internet is ineffective 
in solving, such as the problem of access, the sheer volume of discussants which makes 
it difficult to reach a consensus, and moderators editing comments: this may increase 
the debate’s rationality, but it takes power away from participants. As along as the 
Internet is not under the control of citizens and democratic governments, then public 
sphere and deliberation process cannot operate democratically (O’Loughlin, 2001).  
Furthermore, Hindman (2008) believes that social media will not expand political 
discourse and it is still tools that political elites or elite groups can use them to enhance 
their political influence and manipulate citizens. Even the contents produced by citizens 
stemmed frequently from the same contents created by the political and business elite-
dominated media sources. The Internet has not made debate more inclusive and the 
online tools contribute towards reproducing the hierarchies of mainstream media and 
politics. Furthermore, participants in the online political discussion are elite participants 
from mainstream media rather than marginalized and excluded participants from 
traditional media. It is not difficult to discuss in online space, but it is not easy to be 
heard (Hindman, 2009). Besides that, in terms of information production, political 
parties’ adoption of the Internet  
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Generates opportunities for monitoring maverick 
individuals and groups within the party. It also presents 
the possibility of a new information elite emerging within 
the membership, whereby certain key players have greater 
information and better opportunities to be heard (Gibson 
and Ward, 2009: 89).  
Similarly, Moore (1999) observed that 
Interesting and powerful ideas are discussed online 
infinitely broader than what occurs in mass-media ‘public 
discourse’—but to a large extent such ideas seem buried in 
the net itself, and when the computer is turned off one 
wonders if it was not all just a dream, confined to the 
ether. So far, there seems to be minimal spill over into the 
real world (Moore, 1999: 41).  
More importantly, one of the common problems in the new democracies is the 
dominance of powerful political and economic actors of the media outlets over social 
media platforms, which generally leads to a lack of pluralism in the public sphere, as 
this dominance is less likely to permit diversity of opinion and may even manipulate 
public opinion. Therefore, it is more likely that this dominance will be transported to the 
online media and creates obstacles for a free media environment supportive of 
participation. Consequently, the invasion of online media spaces and controlling digital 
contents by the dominant elites contrast deeply with the notion of the Internet and social 
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media as a tool of liberalization and pluralism in developing democracies (Salgado, 
2014).    
In summary, there are two fundamental perspectives about the implication of the 
Internet and social media for political discussion. One believes that the Internet and 
social media are contributing to enhance political discussion and democratization. The 
other maintains that the Internet and social media have little impact on developing a 
democratic political discussion. This thesis will consider these perspectives in relation 
to the social media and Internet sites of political parties in IK. These perspectives can be 
used to assess contribution of websites of political parties, Facebook accounts and pages 
of party leaders and politicians, and pro-party pages and accounts in generating political 
discussion in chapter five.   
3.2 Political Communication  
Despite the academic study of political communication being a fairly new 
discipline, the actual practice of the phenomenon is as old as politics. Authors who have 
engaged with the concept initially realized that the concept is difficult to define with any 
precision, simply because both components of the phrase are themselves open to a 
variety of definitions. Traditional views about political communication would have been 
that it is a linear, top-down process from leaders to people (Lilleker, 2006).  
Other authors mainly connect the aim of political communication with the 
ambitions of political actors to achieve set of political objectives. In regard to this, 
Lilleker (2006) claims that the purpose of political communication is to achieve a 
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political objective. He argues that the modern understanding of the concept concentrates 
on three actors, each of whom produce political communication:  
First, the political sphere itself: the state and its attendant 
political actors. Their role is to communicate their actions 
to society in order to gain legitimacy among and 
compliance from the people. Second, there are the non-
state actors, where we would include a range of 
organizations with political motivations as well as 
corporate bodies and, of course, the voters. Each of these 
organizations and groups communicate messages into the 
political sphere, in the hope of having some level of 
influence. Third, there are the media outlets, the media 
communicates about politics, influencing the public as 
well as the political spheres (Lilleker, 2006: 1).  
This perspective clearly identifies the actors that communicate with society in 
order to achieve particular objectives. These definitions mainly concentrate on top-
down communication by politicians and party leaders, and do not consider citizens’ 
communication with politicians.  
 This study considers definitions proposed by McNair (2011) and Perloff (2014) 
because these two scholars define the concept more broadly in terms of actors who 
engage with the activity and the issue addressed. McNair (2011) emphasizes attempts 
by politicians to reach political aims. He provides an appropriate understanding of the 
concept, defining political communication as:  
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1) all forms of communication undertaken by politicians 
and other political actors for the purpose of achieving 
specific objectives. 2) Communication addressed to those 
actors by non-politicians such as voters and newspaper 
columnists. 3) Communication about these actors and their 
activities as contained in news reports, editorials, and 
other forms of media discussion of politics (McNair, 2011: 
4).  
Furthermore, Perloff (2014) consider political communication to be  
The process by which language and symbols employed by 
leaders, media, or citizens, exert intended or unintended 
effects on the political cognition, attitudes, or behaviours 
of individuals or on outcomes that bear on the public 
policy of a nation, state, or community (Perloff, 2014: 30).  
Technological developments have significant consequences for political 
communication especially during elections and campaigning. The rise of the Internet 
and social media left unprecedented implications for elections and campaigns. Different 
terminologies, such as online campaigns, digital politics, e-democracy, and Facebook or 
Twitter election have emerged in the public discourse (Bimber and Davis, 2003; Davis 
et al, 2009; Towner, 2012; Williams and Gulati, 2012; Edgerly et al, 2013). As the 
Internet and social media integrated with the elections and campaigns, scholars of 
democracy and democratization began to examine the implications of these technologies 
for further enhancing elections and campaigns. Hence, the results of their studies 
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illustrated two opposite expectations. The first argues that the Internet and social media 
have many positives for elections. While the second view believes that the online 
platforms do not have powerful influence in democratising elections and campaigning.  
The first perspective considers that the Internet and social media have many 
benefits for candidates and citizens. For candidates, the online resources increased 
candidates’ capacities in publishing information on party activities or politicians’ 
activities, communicating political messages, promoting their personality and political 
images, issuing statements, raising funds, and mobilizing voters to go to voting booths. 
Politicians find social media to be a quick, effective, and powerful conduit to energize 
their supporters through posting regular contents online. This is more likely to motivate 
people to engage politically and support candidates more actively (Tewksbury, 2003; 
Bimber and Davis, 2003; Davis, 2009; Davis et al, 2009; Dhuddi, 2010; Edgerly et al, 
2013; Bruns and Highfield, 2013; Gainous and Wagner, 2014; Barberá, 2014; Suiter, 
2015; Highfield, 2016; Towner, 2012).  
Social media are also effective in empowering individual candidates to organize 
and strategize independent campaigns. This is because they allow  
Candidates to develop decentralized campaign strategies, 
because this type of technology is a reasonably cheap and 
functional platform for campaigning that strengthens 
individual candidates and their campaigns at local and 
national levels (Carlson and Strandberg, 2012: 126).  
Online campaigns, especially on social media, provide new capacities for 
candidates to create personalized and individualized campaigns, more or less separated 
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from the party’s campaigning. Generally, social media brings concentration on the 
individual candidates and politicians rather than the political parties. Therefore, it 
provides fertile ground for increased personal campaign (Vergeer, 2012; Enli and 
Skogerbø, 2013; Suiter, 2015).     
Moreover, social media allow candidates to present themselves as 
multidimensional figures, share their personal and private life with the public, thus, 
competing for attention with other candidates. They can also use it to organize personal 
meetings with journalists and voters. Traditional campaigning is needed for personal 
contact and communication with voters, and social media seem to be a vital aid to this 
(Lilleker and Jackson, 2010).       
Additionally, social media usage in election campaigning resulted in new 
practices called by some scholars ‘micro targeting’, i.e. targeting specific groups. 
According to Edgerly et al,  
Campaigns can now target certain voters with specific 
information. By doing this, campaigns have a better 
chance of appealing to the specific issues that are most 
important to different voters (Edgerly et al, 2013: 85).  
With the rise of social media, the role of mainstream media in elections and 
campaigns has changed considerably. The Internet and social media enable candidates 
and politicians to bypass the mainstream media and communicate directly with voters 
and control their political message (Vergeer, 2012; Bode and Dalrymple, 2015). Some 
politicians and candidates regularly distribute contents to online followers who may 
rebroadcast it on different networks, increasing the potential reach of each post 
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substantially. Additionally, the distribution is systematic and denotes a new type of 
media network. It is a network of largely like-minded users that is easily accessible and 
operates separately from the gatekeeping function of the traditional media (Gainous and 
Wagner, 2014). 
Social media enhance the capacity of politicians to influence agenda setting of 
mainstream media, attract the media coverage for their campaign, and enhance 
visibility. This is also important in countries such as IK, where the mainstream media 
are dominated by two major parties. It is particularly important for unknown candidates 
or minor political parties because the online platforms offer them the ability to transmit 
campaign messages, compensate underfunded candidates and increase the capacity of 
candidates and minor parties to compete and vie with other powerful candidates. In 
some contexts, candidates integrated their mainstream media campaign activities with 
social media to attract more viewers and audiences. Even mainstream media streamed 
their primetime coverage to multiple platforms during the election period (Gueorguieva, 
2008; Borah, 2014; Singer, 2014; Highfield, 2016). The importance of social media 
linked with the idea that  
The networks exist outside the traditional media machine, 
allowing candidates to shape and dictate their content 
(Gainous and Wagner, 2014: 1). 
 The networks are appropriate at election time when mainstream media 
concentrate on large parties and party leaders (Bruns, 2008; Shirky, 2008; Hermans and 
Vergeer, 2012; D’heer and Verdegem, 2014).  
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Furthermore, social media effectively connects candidates with very remote 
users in online communities. This is particularly interesting because they allow 
candidates to converge their campaigns with different networks, irrespective of distance, 
geography, and traditional political cleavage. These properties are significant for online 
campaign because they may facilitate many of the campaigning goals, from and 
network of supporters and volunteers, and save resources and capacities for candidates 
when they want to organize campaigns on the ground (Bayraktutan, 2014; Gainous and 
Wagner, 2014).     
For citizens, social media platforms have many benefits for engagement with the 
election campaigns. Online resources assist the online users to learn about candidates 
and familiarize themselves with candidates’ pages, and allow supporters to be part of 
the candidates’ campaign (Williams and Gulati, 2012; Edgerly et al, 2013). Social 
media tools provide users with the opportunity to increase communication, 
participation, rely on users’ generated content, and harness collective knowledge 
(Cormode and Krishnamurthy, 2008).        
It is unquestionable that social media extensively lowers the costs of publishing 
and distributing for citizen and user-generated contents. During campaigns, citizens can 
publish a variety of content on the election and candidates including videos, comments 
and blogs. Social media are effective tools in enhancing open and free expression, and 
foster exchange feedback. Additionally, social media create forums for citizens to 
publicly and openly criticise public officials, politicians, and candidates and practice the 
role of gatekeeping. These tools offer readily available public forums, which are 
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considered a central element in democratic consolidation (Barlow, 2007; Shirky, 2008; 
Gainous and Wagner, 2014). 
Furthermore, social media also enable citizens to organize and collaborate to 
effectively distribute messages to supporters and encourage the media to back 
campaigns (Ragas and Kiousis, 2011). Social media allow  
Users to not only choose what network to be part of but 
also to be an active participant in the network. The user is 
a new creator, not simply a receptacle. This ground-
shifting advance creates an entirely new way to view 
politics and the values attributed to advertising and 
campaigning (Gainous and Wagner, 2014: 5). 
The rise of social media and its integration with campaign strategies altered 
expectations about the capability of social media in establishing interactivity and 
genuine political discussion among voters and candidates. Some scholars even expected 
that social media practices might reduce gaps between politicians and citizens, 
encouraging a type of representation based on interactive communication. Practices 
across contexts suggest that social media enable voters to communicate directly with 
candidates and campaign staff (Vergeer, 2012; Edgerly et al, 2013; Gainous and 
Wagner, 2014). 
Some scholars see social media interactivity as a way to enhance direct 
representation, because direct representation requires two-way communication between 
politicians and citizens. The communication should cover every day political 
conversations between representatives and the public. Some scholars argue for 
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‘sustained engagement’, which means that the goal of campaign should not only be 
mobilizing voters, securing votes, and win election. The candidates and campaigners 
should sustain a level of engagement with voters and supporters for a longer period. 
Sustained engagement also encourages granting opportunities for people to be part of 
the campaign by letting them set the tone, and sustain a connection over time (Carlson 
and Strandberg, 2012; Edgerly et al, 2013; Graham et al, 2013).  
With respect to the second perspective, which argues that social media are not 
going to produce any new changes towards democratising election campaign. Some 
scholars argue that social media further empower large parties and candidates over 
minor parties and candidates. Large parties and candidates have better financial 
resources and as a result they can benefit in linking mainstream media campaign with 
the online domain. Furthermore, large parties and candidates have recruited staff with 
technological talents who may design social media strategies more effective than small 
parties and candidates. Therefore, social media increase political inequalities among 
political parties and candidates (Davis, 1999; Morris, 1999; Chadwick, 2006; Jacobs 
and Spierings, 2016). 
Despite this, many candidates continue to use social media for information and 
news sharing in a top-down fashion as a strategy for delivering information. Towner 
(2012) highlighted several reasons for this: 
First, it is costly in time and money to maintain social 
media sources. Second, two-way communication forces 
candidates to clarify ambiguous policy positions, which 
may weaken a candidates’ broad appeal. Third, candidates 
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fear losing control over their message and image, as social 
media open the door to unfiltered, user-generated content. 
Fourth, candidates simply may not know how to use social 
media for two-way communication (Towner, 2012: 193).  
From this perspective, candidates may not fully use the potential of social media 
interactivity properties to establish democratic dialogue and interactivity over social 
media platforms (Galley, 2000; Bimber and Davis, 2003; Glassman et al, 2010; Grant et 
al, 2010; Graham et al, 2013; Bayraktutan et al, 2014). 
Moreover, all citizens do not have equal access to the Internet or interest in 
politics. There are countless users who solely use social media for non-political 
purposes. Social media campaigns will not reach those citizens cut off by the digital 
divide (Browning, 2002; Vergeer, 2012). 
Additionally, social media news may be subject to information bias and 
manipulation. Users may exclude information that does not meet their expectations and 
preferences. They can select information that supports their political perspectives and 
beliefs and practice self-selection process to avoid exposure to unwanted and 
inconsistent information. In this case, citizens may not follow diverse range of political 
topics and this may lead to a lack of the common experience necessary to a well-
functioning democracy (Bimber and Davis, 2003; Iyengar et al, 2008).  
4 Methodology 
The purpose of this section is to explain the plan, activities and procedures that 
this thesis followed in order to find the answer to the research questions. This section 
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also attempt to illustrate the operationalization of theoretical framework for assessing 
the implication using social media platforms for democratization process in IK in the 
empirical chapters of this thesis.    
4.1 The Epistemological and Methodological Paradigm 
This thesis took an interpretive approach, using an epistemological method to 
describe, understand, and observe how social media influences the democratisation 
process in IK. Interpretivism is a term that usually denotes an alternative to the 
positivist approach that dominated social sciences for a long time. This approach aims 
to understand events and uncover the meanings relevant to human behaviours and the 
external world. It also explores the motivations behind human behaviours. It does not 
aim to discover laws about causal relationships between variables; rather, it aims to 
understand human nature, and societal and cultural diversity (Della Porta & Keating, 
2008). This approach opposes the positivist approach: it aims to understand social 
outcomes but without impact from universal laws or rules. Explanations are instead 
drawn from the interpretation of human motives for behaviours and actions. 
Interpretivism tends to explain action by demonstrating it as something justified from an 
agent’s perspective (Ferejohn, 2004; Della Porta & Keating, 2008). The interpretivist 
approach is founded on the idea that a strategy is required that respects the differences 
between people and the objects of the natural science and therefore requires ‘social 
scientists to grasp the subjective meaning of social action’ (Bryman, 2016:26).   
The interpretivist approach requires researchers to interpret elements of the 
study, thus integrating human interest into the results. Myers (2009) believes that 
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interpretive researchers assume that access to reality, given or socially constructed, is 
only through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, 
and instruments (Myres, 2009). More precisely, interpretivists believe that it is 
important that they analyse how humans interpret activities; this can be achieved 
through methods other than those employed by the positivist approach. Individuals are 
intricate and complex: different people experience and understand the same ‘objective 
reality’ in very different ways and have their own, often very different, reasons for 
acting in the world (Fitzpatrick, 2012; Denscombe, 2014). Interpretivists argue that, in 
order to understand human action, we need to see the world through the eyes of the 
actors doing the acting. An interpretivist approach to social research would be much 
more qualitative, using methods such as unstructured interviews or participant 
observation (Weber, 2004; Myres, 2009; Fitzpatrick, 2012). 
Additionally, there is strong link between qualitative research and using this 
approach. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2003)  
Qualitative research is a situated activity that 
locates the observer in the world. It consists of a 
set of interpretive practices that make the world 
visible. These practices transform the world. They 
turn the world into a series of representations, 
including field notes, interviews, conversations, 
photographs, recordings and memos to the self. At 
this level, qualitative research involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. 
	 81	
This means that qualitative researchers study 
things in their natural settings, attempting to make 
sense of, or to interpret, and phenomena in terms 
of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003:3). 
This study did not consider positivist research as an epistemological paradigm. 
This is because positivism primarily singles out causal explanation to establish a cause-
effect relationship between variables of study. This approach tends to explore universal 
laws of human behaviour and make generalisations from specific observations in a large 
number of cases. Positivists are more popular in scientific studies, which generates and 
tests hypotheses (Héritier, 2008).  
However, in social sciences, it is extremely difficult to use instruments and 
measurement to conduct experiments and use a large dataset and statistical analysis to 
discover and isolate causes and effects of variables (Della Porta & Keating, 2008).  
Interpretivism is linked to the study of democratisation as the thesis defines 
democratisation as a multifactor process; therefore it is difficult to isolate the effects of 
social media from other factors that may influence democratisation.  This study aims to 
understand how the use of social media influences the Kurdish democratisation process. 
It aims to understand the effect from the participants’ assessment of their motivations 
for using social media.         
This epistemological and methodological approach was influenced during the 
process of formulating the nature of the research questions of the study and methods 
applied in collecting data (semi-structured interviews). The nature of the research 
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questions meant that the questions were formulated in order to understand and reflect on 
the impact of using social media on the democratisation process from the participants’ 
perspectives. The questions do not aim to establish causal links between social media 
and democratisation, or gauge the precise influence of social networking sites on 
democratisation. The study’s justification in avoiding this is principally linked with the 
methodological challenges of measuring the influence of social media. The questions 
focus on how individuals describe the impact of social media on democratisation from 
their own experience. 
Interpretivism is compatible with the design of the research. The study uses case 
studies and selected three major events in IK as units of analysis. The study aimed to 
understand individual perspectives on using social media in these three cases. The 
interpretivism approach is more appropriate than positivism in understanding events and 
motivations of human behaviour in these events.     
To collect data, this study used semi-structured interviews. Despite its limitations, 
the interview is generally appropriate for understanding individuals’ experiences 
regarding specific social and political phenomena (Friesen, 2010). Therefore, the 
study’s epistemological and methodological approach is compatible with the methods of 
data collection adopted to answer the study’s questions. The implications of this 
approach will provide an in-depth descriptive analysis about the impact of using social 
media platforms for democratisation process in relation to the cases selected. The 
approach will allow an in-depth understanding of using social media platforms for each 
event selected in the research design to be obtained. 
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4.2 The Research Design 
To investigate and explore the research questions, this thesis used a case study 
approach. A case study approach emphasizes detailed contextual analysis of a limited 
number of events or conditions and their relationships (Kumar, 2011). By using a case 
study approach, this thesis presents an in-depth descriptive analysis of social media’s 
impact on IK’s democratization. 
In doing so, three case studies were examined. The first case looked at the 
implication of using social media for mobilization of citizens to participate in protests 
and its impact for democratic consolidation. To explore this issue, the study 
concentrated on the Slemani movement in 2011, known as the 17th of February protests. 
This protest was significant in IK’s history because it was the biggest protest against the 
KRG since the 1991 uprisings. This protest coincided with the Arab Spring revolutions 
in Tunisia in 2010 and in Egypt in 2011 and lasted for two months. This protest is 
considered to be the first popular mobilization in IK that demanded real democracy, 
social, political, and economic reforms. The protesters used social media to 
communicate with and mobilize other citizens to join them. The government used force 
to suppress it and ultimately many people were killed and wounded. 
In analysing this case, this thesis tends to operationalize theoretical insights 
addressed under the title ‘participation as influencing attempt’ to assess the implications 
of social media usage for the success of the Slemani movement. This case focused on 
how social media were used for citizen’s participation in the movement, how social 
media influenced the structure of information during the protest, and how the popular 
movement framed itself in social media platforms and how it challenged political and 
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media discourse controlled by political parties media. It questions the role social media 
played in organizing the protest without reliance on traditional political organization 
especially political parties, and how protesters benefitted from social media for self-
organization. The negative impacts on social media on the protesters and their activities 
and how social media negatively influenced the protest are also examined. Finally, it 
questions the implications of this digitally fuelled movement on democratic 
consolidation in IK.   
The second case assesses social media in relation to political participation as 
political discussion by exploring the interactivity between, on the one hand, the Kurdish 
political parties, including party leaders, parliamentary representatives and government 
officials, and, on the other hand, Kurdish citizens. More precisely, this case 
concentrated on two political parties in IK: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and 
the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU). The study’s justification in selection of these two 
cases is that they are most different. The PUK is not an institutionalized party, but rather 
is organized around the personality of the party leader. Moreover, it has great influence 
over government institutions, as it is closely intertwined with government institutions 
for historical reasons. As for the KIU, it is, to a large degree, an institutionalized party. 
Power is not concentrated in one person and it is hard for a single leader of the party to 
dominate on the party entirely. Among all political parties, the KIU is the first Kurdish 
and Islamic party that changed its top leaders, including the general secretary through 
democratic and peaceful means in the party congress. Moreover, the KIU is not 
intertwined with government institutions. Most parliamentarians and government 
officials are also high members or leaders of political parties. Hence, the case assesses 
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the role of social media in generating democratic political discussion and interactivity 
between political parties and citizens.  
This case operationalizes theoretical underpinnings presented under the title 
‘political participation as political discussion’ to assess the impact of the Internet and 
social media for political discussion. This case engaged with an explanation of how 
social media influenced political discussion between citizens and political parties and 
how the party websites and social media accounts and pages of the party leaders and 
pro-party pages and accounts contribute to generating political discussion. It also asks 
how party leaders use social media and how they have influenced their political 
position. It further investigates how political parties and their leaders engage with social 
media for interactivity and dissemination of information and how these issues influence 
IK’s democratization process.        
The third case assesses the use of social media in political campaigning and 
elections in the Kurdistan parliamentary elections in 2013. The case of the Kurdistan 
parliamentary elections in 2013 operationalizes theoretical insights presented under title 
‘political communication’ to assess the potential of the Internet and social media for 
democratization. This case focused on how social media influenced electioneering and 
campaigning strategies by conveying political messages, and mobilizing voters to go to 
voting booths. It questions how social media influences candidates’ relations with 
political parties and citizens and how social media influenced the traditional style of 
campaigning and electioneering. It also investigates the impacts of social media on 
candidate-mainstream media relations and coverage of campaigning was, and how 
social media influenced dissemination of information and interactivity between 
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candidates and citizens. Lastly, it evaluates the negatives of social media on the election 
campaign and how social media influenced the candidates and their campaigning 
strategies.  
The study chose the Slemani movement in 2011 and the 2013 parliamentary 
election in IK as case studies. When this study commenced, both cases had already 
taken place, which prevented direct observation of social media operations in both 
contexts. However, the researcher interviewed figures that lived and were directly 
involved with the course of both events including political activists who were leaders of 
the Slemani movement, and parliamentarians who gained parliamentary seats and 
organized online campaigns. Thus, the researcher was able to gain their experiences of 
the events and role of social media. 
4.3 Methods of Data Collection  
This thesis used qualitative methods to collect data and information. The data 
was collected mainly through interviews and online contents. Other minor resources, 
including civil society organization reports (local and international), intergovernmental 
organization reports and publications such as those by the UN, websites, government 
documents, magazines and newspapers published in IK, and documents from the 
political parties were also considered. Usually the interview technique is used for 
qualitative studies to record human experiences and stories relating to a specific subject 
through verbal interchange, often face-to-face. Through interviews, the interviewer 
attempted to elicit information on experience, beliefs or opinions from the interviewees. 
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For this research, 28 interviews were arranged; the interviews were conducted in the 
Kurdish language and then the text was translated into English.  
For the first case study, the Slemani movement in 2011, ten interviews were 
conducted with the main and prominent leaders of the protest movement and journalists 
who covered the protest in Slemani governorate. During the interview, questions were 
asked about the interviewees experiences and observations of the influence of social 
media on the protest activities, publicizing information, publishing stories, sending out 
political message of protesters, organizing protest activities, coordinating collective 
action, mobilizing undecided citizens to join the protest, resisting government 
censorship and surveillance, and negative influences of social media on the protest. 
Additionally, data was collected from Facebook and YouTube contents relevant to the 
protest.       
For the second case study, nine interviews were conducted with party leaders in 
both parties, specifically those active on social media. The interview questions asked 
how party leaders engaged with social media to establish political discussion and 
interactivity; how and why they used social media to disseminate information and 
communicate politically with citizens, and what the implications were for 
democratization. Further questions asked how social media enhanced the party’s 
relations with citizens and how party leaders and citizens interacted online social media 
and how this reflected on the democratization process. Lastly, it they were asked to 
reflect on the negative impacts of social media on political discussion and interactivity 
between political parties and democratization, and consequently the democratization 
process in IK. Besides the interviews, data was also collected from the official websites 
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of both political parties, official Facebook pages and accounts of leaders of both parties, 
and pro-party social media accounts and pages. Additionally, the study observed the 
online contents such as posts, comments, and shares by social media users. The study 
triangulated the interview material with the online content.  
For the third case study, nine interviews were conducted with members of the 
Kurdistan parliament. These figures were equally distributed among all five political 
parties who won in this election. During the interview, they were asked how they used 
social media for political campaigning and what kinds of impact they experienced from 
using social media for electioneering and campaigning. They were also asked how 
social media helped the parties and candidates to achieve their political objectives and 
how social media expanded the scope of their communication with citizens. Lastly, they 
were asked how social media changed the relations between the party leaders and 
citizens during the election campaign. 
With respect to collecting online data, this study collected samples from the 
social media platforms Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Facebook was mainly used as 
it is the most popular platform among Kurdish citizens. The data was primarily 
collected from Facebook pages and accounts of parliamentarians, who are active online, 
accounts and pages of party leaders of the PUK and the KIU, websites of the PUK and 
the KIU, and fake and pro-party accounts and pages. 
This study did not use Social Networking Analysis (SNA) technique for data 
collection, as this technique is incompatible with the research questions and design. 
Furthermore, SNA is more appropriate for quantitative studies. Moreover, SNA can be 
	 89	
used to gather information on interaction around specific topic inside social media 
networks. 
4.4 Considerations of Ethical Issues 7 
The panel review from the department of Politics and International Studies – 
University of Warwick approved the project and ethical considerations submitted to the 
panel. In collecting data for this study, the researcher carefully took ethical issues into 
consideration. During the process of data collection many standard ethical issues were 
taken into account: protection from harm, maintenance of privacy, freedom from 
coercion, informed consent, and institutional review boards. With respect to the 
protection of safety of participants, before conducting the interviews, the researcher 
asked participants to choose a place they felt safe and comfortable. During the interview 
process, the researcher completely avoided any activity that could cause possible 
psychological harm or stress for participants. The researcher completely avoided 
exerting any social pressure on participants to force or manipulate them to state 
something that appeases the researcher. Also, the researcher avoided reacting to the 
interviewees’ answers.   
To maintain privacy and correctly store data, before starting the interviews, the 
researcher obtained the participants’ consent to record the interview’s audio. They were 
also notified that any information given would not be shared with a third party and the 
interviews would be treated confidentially and only used for the research.  
																																																															
7 The First Year Review panel approved this project and ethical consideration on 18th February 2015.  
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With respect to freedom from coercion, the participants were informed that their 
participation in the project is voluntary. If they decided to withdraw, there would be no 
penalties, and they were not obliged to provide an explanation for their reasons for 
withdrawing. The researcher notified participants that they had the right to request a 
copy of the audio recording of the interview and ask to have the audio recordings be 
permanently deleted at any time. They were also informed that participants are not 
obliged to answer all questions: they had the right to refuse to answer. They were under 
no obligation to reveal information.  
Before each interview, the researcher fully briefed participants on the interview 
procedure, and informed them of their rights. The participants were informed of the 
nature, duration, and purpose of the study, their role in the study and how the 
information would be used. They were also given a consent form in accordance with 
regulations and guidelines of the University of Warwick. The interviewees signed two 
versions of the consent form. In the form, there were several options presented to 
participants, regarding mentioning their name and treating the giving information; it 
also provided the contact details of a third person from the University of Warwick if 
participants had any questions or concerns after the interviews.  
The researcher conducted all the interviews in Kurdish language, and then the 
interviews were transcribed and translated into English language. The interviewees were 
chosen in agreement with the researcher’s PhD supervisors. For the case of the Slemani 
movement, the interviewees were prominent leaders of the movement, journalists, and 
activists who covered and actively participated in the movement. For the case of 
political parties, the interviewees were leaders from both parties, especially those who 
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have social media accounts and pages (Facebook, or Twitter, or both). For the 2013 
parliamentary elections, the interviewees were those parliamentarians who used social 
media accounts during the election campaign, which are still active.  
In addition to interviews, data was collected from the participants’ social media 
accounts. To further examine the reliability of interview data, the researcher 
triangulated the interview statements with social media analysis. 
4.5 The Data Analysis 
After conducting the interviews, the recorded interviews were transcribed. Then 
the text cleaned up by removing content irrelevant to the project. After this process, the 
transcripts were separated into meaning units grouped under different themes. 
Additionally, the most commonly used approach, known as ‘Ad Hoc Meaning 
generation’, followed to analyse the interview data. According to Kvale (1996), this 
approach  
Consists of different approach and techniques for meaning 
generation, and no standard method is used for analysing 
the whole of the interview materials. There is instead a 
free interplay of techniques during the analysis (Kvale, 
1996: 203). 
With respect to analysing the collected data, this thesis aimed to analyse and 
interpret the data using two approaches. The first approach identified the main themes 
that emerged from the field notes and transcriptions of the interviews. The second 
approach involved developing a narrative to write interpretively about a situation, 
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episode, events or instances. The data was analysed in the light of the theoretical 
underpinnings developed in the Chapter Two (Kvale, 1996; Powell and Renner, 2003; 
Kumar, 2011). 
When analysing Facebook accounts and pages of parliamentarians and party 
leaders, the accounts and pages were first verified to confirm that the accounts and 
pages are real and belong to real individuals, because there are countless fake accounts 
in the name of politicians and party leaders. Then, the study examined the content 
posted on these accounts and pages and categorised and examined the content.  There 
was particular emphasis on its purpose. These accounts were been observed constantly 
throughout the research period (2014 until 2017). For the third case study, the 
parliamentary elections in 2013, data was collected from the online archives of 
parliamentarians in 2013. 
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Chapter 3 
Democracy and Democratization in Iraqi Kurdistan: 
An Overview 
1 Introduction 
Since the 1991 uprisings against the Baathist regime, politics in IK has changed 
dramatically. The uprisings occurred after continual suppression by successive Iraqi 
governments since the creation of new Iraq in 1920; they allowed IK to gain semi-
autonomy from the Iraqi central government and run the region politically and 
economically since that time.  
 This chapter attempts to familiarize the reader with IK’s politics and its 
democratization process since the 1991 uprisings. It concentrates on the internal politics 
of IK, more specifically with the process and challenges of democracy transformation. It 
does not engage with every single political development in-depth, as it is not the 
purpose of this chapter to do so. However, the key political developments will be 
highlighted to show how the democratization process started and the status of this 
process.  
1.1 The Creation of IK 
 The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War (1914-1918) led to 
the creation of different nation-states under European rule and the division of the 
Kurdish people among the newly-created states of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, against 
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their will (Stansfield, 2003; Yildiz, 2004; Katzman, 2010). Following the Lausanne 
treaty in 1923, Britain and the League of Nations attached Mosul province (Mosul 
Vilayet) and the rest of current-day Iraqi-Kurdistan to the provinces of Baghdad and 
Basra to create the modern state of Iraq (Romano, 2006; Yesiltas, 2014).    
Since the creation of Iraq in 1920, successive Iraqi governments (from the 
Monarchy until Ba’athist regime under Saddam Hussein) did not want to consolidate 
Iraqi Kurds into successful and democratic nation-building policies, and ultimately 
failed in integrating their aspirations within the new state politics. According to 
Yesiltas:  
The inclination of the authorities in Baghdad to see any compromise 
with the Kurds as the beginning of a perilous process, which will 
culminate in eventual Kurdish secession, resulted in the constant 
perception of the Kurdish question as a national security threat by 
successive Iraqi governments (Yesiltas, 2014: 42). 
 The majority of these governments depended on exclusion policies and did not 
recognise the political rights of Kurds (Romano & Gurses, 2014; Yesiltas, 2014). As a 
result, the Kurdish people faced systematic and various forms of suppression and 
persecution. These policies pushed the Kurds in Iraq under the leadership of Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani’s leadership to revolt against the Iraqi 
governments and resist these policies (Yildiz, 2004).  
After the Baath party’s military coup and defeat of the communist regime of 
General Abdulkarim Qasim in 1963, and Saddam Hussein’s seize of power in 1979, the 
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Kurdish people faced very strong repression by the Baathist regime. The political 
ideology of the Baathist party was based on ‘Arabisation’ through an amalgamation of 
non-Arab nations, including the Kurds, into a single Arab nation (Matthews, 1993). To 
put this political ideology into effect, the Baathist regime employed both military and 
non-military methods. From 1970 to 1974, the Baathist regime conducted a wide 
campaign to change the demographic character in the Kurdish area especially in Kirkuk 
and Mosul provinces. Many Kurdish villages in Kirkuk were destroyed and replaced 
with new Arab settlements from the centre and south of Iraq. Kurdish government 
officials were transferred to areas outside the Kirkuk governorate and replaced with 
Arab civil servants and workers and Arabic names were given to the Kurdish market, 
quarters, streets, and schools (Yesiltas, 2014).  
 In response, the Kurdish militants known as ‘Peshmarga’ fought with the Iraqi 
army: during this conflict, thousands of people were killed (Yildiz, 2004). In 1980, Iraq 
entered a bloody war with Iran that lasted until 1988; Kurds living on the Iraq-Iran 
border suffered badly during the Iraqi army’s military campaign. Between 1986 and 
1987, the Baathist regime planned and executed a sinister operation, which committed 
genocide against the Kurdish people. It was named ‘Anfal’, the name of a chapter from 
the Holy Quran. More than 182,000 civilians were killed and more than 5000 villages 
were destroyed (Romano, 2006; Yesiltas, 2014). Additionally, the Baathist regime used 
chemical weapons against the Kurdish people: in 1988, Halabja, a town the most 
prominent example of Chemical Attack, which used mustard gas and other chemicals. 
More than 5000 civilians, most of them women and children, were killed, and more than 
10,000 were wounded and displaced (Romano, 2006; Yildiz, 2004).  
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In 1988, the Kurdish political parties formed the Kurdistan Front; this Front and 
the Kurdish people were waiting for an opportunity to revolt against the Baathist 
regime. This opportunity appeared as a new political situation developed in the relations 
between Iraq and Kuwait (Yildiz, 2004; Onley, 2009; Bismarck, 2013). When the war 
between Iraq and Iran ended in 1988, Iraq had huge amounts of debt and it needed to 
recover economically from the war. The only way to achieve this was through oil 
revenues. However, Kuwait’s policy regarding oil exports resulted in lowering oil prices 
in the international market. Iraq demanded Kuwait consider Iraq’s financial and 
economic burdens regarding oil exports, but the diplomatic endeavours were 
unsuccessful. Thus, in 1990, Iraq launched a military campaign against Kuwait; Iraq 
occupied Kuwait and ultimately entered another devastating war with the United States 
and its allies (Matthews, 1993; Long, 2004).  This war, known as the ‘Second Gulf 
War’, resulted in the expulsion of Iraq’s army from Kuwait in 1991 and the destruction 
of most of Iraq’s military, economic and infrastructure capabilities and the imposition of 
a comprehensive embargo on Iraq by the United Nations Security Council which lasted 
until 2003 (Browne, 2003; Yildiz, 2004). The consequences of this war encouraged 
Kurds in the north and Shias in the south to revolt against the Baathist regime.   
1.2 The 1991 Kurdish Uprising 
Following the declaration of a ceasefire between Iraq and the International 
Coalition in 1991, President Bush Sr. called on the Iraqi people and military to revolt 
against the Baathist regime. Consequently, Kurds in the north and Shia in the south 
revolted against the regime and in Kurdistan. Within weeks, Kurds and the Kurdistan 
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Front (composed of the KDP and the PUK Peshmarga) controlled the Kurdish 
autonomous region and the nearby oil-rich city of Kirkuk (BBC, 1991). When the Kurds 
controlled most of the Kurdish areas and provinces, they hoped for the United States’ 
support, which would allow them to reach their historical dreams. Instead, the United 
States and its allies remained silent, and ignored the regimes’ retaliation against Kurds 
and Shias. Retreating from Kuwait, the Iraqi army launched retaliatory aerial and 
ground attacks on Kurdish and Shiite communities, killing thousands of Kurds and 
displacing many others. The Iraqi army brutally punished the Kurdish population for 
rising up against the central government by chasing them out of their homes in the 
middle of winter to the snow-capped mountains of Kurdistan. In this retailiation 
campaign, between 30,000 and 60,000 people were killed by the Iraqi regime. In the 
north, 1.5 million Kurds fled across the mountains into Iran and Turkey (BBC, 1991; 
Ahmed, 2012).  
In response to this humanitarian catastrophe, the United Nations Security 
Council approved Resolution 688 in April 1991 which called on the Baathist regime to 
withdraw all its military and administrative units, established a no-fly zone in northern 
Iraq, and provided a safe haven for Kurds in Iraq (The United Nations, 1991). This 
resolution was important for the Kurdish case, because it  
Internationalized the Kurdish question by mentioning the 
Kurds for the first time since 1923 and empowered the 
United Nations for the first time to intervene in the 
internal affairs of a member state such as Iraq (Ahmed, 
2012: 7-8).  
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The resolution aimed to ensure the territorial integrity and independence of 
Iraqis under a democratic constitutional, parliamentary and pluralistic structure, the end 
of the repression of the Iraqi people (The United Nations, 1991). However, neither the 
resolution nor the international community allowed Kurds to include the Kirkuk 
Province within IK. Kirkuk is a city with various ethnic population and different 
religious doctrines including Kurds, Arabs, Turkmens, Sunni, Shia, and Christians. The 
city has a huge amount of natural resources, including oil. These two factors became 
source of conflict between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad’s successive governments; 
it brought regional intervention to the city’s affairs (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009). 
The United Nations identified the 36th parallel as a separate line between the Kurdistan 
region and Iraq, which only included the Erbil, Slemani, and Duhok provinces (Ahmed, 
2012). 
2 The Challenges of the Democratization Process in IK (1991-2003) 
The withdrawal of the Baathist regime administrative and military units from the 
Kurdistan region created an administrative vacuum in the region. To fill this vacuum, 
the Kurdish political parties (principally, the KDP, under the leadership of Masoud 
Barzani and PUK, under the leadership of Jalal Talabani) held free elections in the three 
provinces they controlled in 1992 and established the Kurdistan Regional Parliament 
(KRP) in the shadow of the Western forces (McDowall, 2004; Ahmed, 2012). The first 
Kurdistan parliament election was carried out on May 19, 1992, and nearly one million 
citizens voted. There were no further parliamentary elections in IK until 2005. The 1992 
election was supervised by representatives of a number of foreign organizations such as 
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Human Rights Watch, Members of the European Parliament and foreign journalists. 
Each party had to gain a minimum of (7%) of the votes to have representation in the 
Kurdistan parliament (Kurdistan Parliament, 2014). In this election, the KDP obtained 
50.8% of the votes, while the PUK obtained 49.2%. The two parties were equally 
balanced in the new and first Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) (BBC News, 
2011). Despite the KDP’s slight majority, the PUK formed the cabinet with the KDP via 
dividing parliamentary seats, cabinet posts and other positions between themselves 
equally; this is known as 50:50 policy (Stansfield, 2003; Leezenberg, 2005; Harris, 
2015). The formation of KRG was important for the region to prosper and step toward 
democracy and stabilization; however, the process was not free from defects: it 
‘provided ample opportunity for corruption’ (Leezenberg, 2005: 638).  
The Kurdistan Regional Government – KRG - was born in a very exceptional 
political environment. Two rival political parties KDP and PUK formed the KRG. The 
KDP was established in 1946 was led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani until the failed 
Kurdish revolution in 1975. The KDP mainly depended on support of Kurdish tribes 
and the political structure of the party appears to be more tribal. In 1975 and due to 
political and ideological differences inside KDP, Jalal Talabani, a former leader of the 
KDP who mainly represented left-wing groups, formed a new political party called the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Since its establishment, the two political parties 
struggled against each other (Stansfield, 2003). Both parties had grassroots’ support in 
different parts of the Kurdistan region. According to Gunter (1998) KDP’s grassroots 
support is more located in conservative, feudal, and tribal areas associated with the 
Kurmanji-speaking, Bahdinani area of North-Western IK. On the other hand, the 
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grassroots supporting the PUK is more leftist, socialist, intellectual, and progressive; it 
is associated with the Sorani-speaking area of South-Eastern IK (Gunter, 1998). 
The new Kurdish government suffered from several challenges, which 
ultimately led to the outbreak of the civil war (1994-1998) and the divide of the 
Kurdistan region between KDP and PUK. The parties did not settle their historical 
differences when they created the Kurdish government (Gunter, 1998). The practice of 
democracy in Iraq generally and Iraqi Kurdistan particularly was a new experience for 
political parties and the Kurdish populace, the ability of Kurds to establish a democratic 
government was greeted with intense scepticism (Watts, 2014).  
The social, economic and political situations in IK were problematic to the 
process of democratization. Gunter (1996) highlights three key problems to 
democratization:  
Primordial loyalties, proliferation of guns and armed 
militias, and the disastrous economic situation; each of 
these problems is enough to prevent the institution of a 
Kurdish democracy (Gunter, 1996: 240).  
 Other challenges also accompanied the lack of democratic traditions, such as 
the weakness of government institutions, the absence of the rule of law, and most 
notably the inability of the government to disarm PUK and KDP militants and 
reorganize them in a national and unified modern army (Stansfield, 2003; Natali, 2010). 
Despite this, the economic confrontation was the primary reason for outbreak of the 
civil war between KDP and PUK. The parties did not agree on distributing revenues that 
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come from different sources such as tariffs and NGO financial donations (Yildiz, 2004; 
Natali, 2010; Defronzo, 2010). Stansfield (2003) concluded that  
The two leaders effectively wielded political power, but 
did not affiliate officially with the administration, in either 
the legislature or the executive, resulting in a weakening 
of the governmental structure (Stansfield, 2003: 152).  
The operation of government structures in decision-making processes strongly 
depended on the political bureaus of both political parties; the stability and coherence of 
government structures strongly relied on the political balance between both parties 
(Stansfield, 2003).   
External factors also greatly contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in IK, 
such as the regional struggle and power politics between Iran and Turkey. However, 
both regional states had a common aim, to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state 
in the northern Iraq: Turkey supported the KDP and Iran supported the PUK (Gunter, 
1998; Leezenberg, 2005; Defronzo, 2010). From 1995 to 1997, the fighting between the 
two political parties brought the regional powers into the civil war. In August 1996, the 
KDP conducted a joint military operation with the Baathist regime army to expel the 
PUK from Erbil and Slemani cities: the PUK lost most of its territory. The KDPs 
justification for this alliance was that it perceived PUK-Iranian joint forces as a threat to 
Iraqi territorial integrity. In response to this operation, the PUK, supported by the 
Iranian military, was able to recover most of the territory it had lost including Slemani 
(Gunter, 1998; Yildiz, 2004; Defronzo, 2010). In May and October 1997, the Turkish 
forces escalated their support for the KDP by bombing PUK and PKK positions and 
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actually approached the cities of Erbil and Kirkuk. In the largest intervention to date, a 
reported 50,000 Turkish troops entered IK (Gunter, 1998). In 1996, IK was divided 
between both political parties and both parties established their own governments. With 
respect to this, Stansfield (2003) writes that: 
The KDP consolidated its hold on Erbil and established 
the third cabinet of the KRG under the premiership of Dr 
Roj Nuri Shawaise with Nechervan Barzani as his deputy. 
Similarly, the PUK secured its own stronghold of Slemani 
and established its own third cabinet, again under the 
premiership of Kosrat Rasoul (Stansfield, 2003: 154).   
Alongside these developments in IK, the United Nations Security Council 
ratified 986 Resolutions, which would have permitted Iraq to sell certain amount of oil 
in return for the purchase of food and medicine. This resolution and other resolutions 
that were ratified, such as Resolution 1153 in 1998, dramatically increased the amount 
of oil sales allowed to 5.256 billion dollars every six months (Hisso, 2008). IK directly 
received 13% of the funds from the sale of oil with no return to the Iraqi central 
government. This fund contributed enormously both economically and socially, because 
the fund was used in many different industries, such as medical services, restoring 
electricity, agriculture, water services, food and medicine supplies, education, and 
resettlement of those displaced by the civil war. These resolutions somewhat eased the 
economic difficulties in Iraq, but did not bring prosperity and welfare to the Iraqi 
people. The resolutions were positive developments for IK particularly, because IK was 
under two embargos at that time. One was the international embargo imposed on Iraq, 
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which also covered the Kurdistan region. The second was the embargo of the Baathist 
regime on the region after the 1991 uprisings. To an extent, these resolutions mitigated 
the conflict between the KDP and the PUK. The implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 986 eased poverty, diminished Talabani's resentment over Barzani's 
unwillingness to share the income from the lucrative customs assessments on Turkish 
truckers who pass through the KDP area, but not through PUK areas (Makovsky, 1998; 
Qadir, 2007; Hisso, 2008).  
In addition to this resolution, a series of diplomatic endeavours by the United 
States and other Western states ended the open conflict between the KDP and the PUK. 
Both parties signed an agreement in Washington DC in September 1998, known as ‘the 
Washington agreement’. In this agreement, both party leaders pledged to work towards 
the re-establishment of the elected regional parliament and government (Leezenberg, 
2005). The agreement aimed to create a peaceful, unified IK, and acknowledged many 
economic and security benefits for both political parties such as revenue-sharing, 
power-sharing including elections, and security arrangements, and a larger role for the 
international community in helping to stabilize the new regime (Makovsky, 1998; 
Osman, 2001). After signing the agreement, both parties formed the Higher 
Coordinating Committee (HCC) to implement the agreement. However, the lack of 
confidence and trust between KDP and PUK was the main obstacle to the agreement. 
Both parties’ high-ranking leaders arranged several meetings and visits to Erbil and 
Slemani to resolve their disputes but none of these efforts brought profitable results 
(Osman, 2001). On the contrary, after this agreement, IK remained divided between the 
KDP and the PUK. According to Harris,  
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The plan was to create a peaceful, unified IK, but in reality 
it remained divided into two de facto governments. The 
KDP controlled the North-Western Kurmanji-speaking 
provinces of Dohuk and Erbil, and PUK dominated the 
South-Eastern Sorani-speaking province of Slemani 
(Harris, 2015: 2).  
The Washington agreement was a positive step towards security and stability for 
the people of Kurdistan region, as it eliminated internal fights and even, according to 
some witnesses, established a healthy competition between the sides to demonstrate the 
greater administrative efficiency (Makovsky, 1998).  
However, this stability and security was at the expense of democracy and 
establishing an accountable government. Each party worked on consolidating their 
economic and political powers and excluded other political parties, which lived under 
their controlled territories. There were two administrations, two cabinets, two 
paramilitary units (Peshmerga), and two flags (Stansfield, 2003; Khalil, 2009). The 
region has since ‘been caught up in a complex process of overcoming administrative 
division’ (Tomàs and Villellas, 2009: 13). The two parties did not work on modernizing 
social and cultural compositions of Kurdish society; instead, they continued to capitalize 
on these structures. Khalil highlights that ‘the two spheres of influence are centred on 
patronage networks and tribal politics’ (Khalil, 2009: 21).  
Within their spheres of influence, both parties monopolized the economic and 
financial resources and utilized them to empower and strengthen their position and 
popularity. Both parties used their own economic policies to their party and members 
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rather than the public. These economic policies intensified under the oil-for-food 
program signed by Iraq and the UN in 1996. According to Leezenberg (2005) after the 
Kurdish civil war, despite the continuing UN embargo, the oil-for-food deal contributed 
to the flourishment of IK’s economy (Leezenberg, 2005). However, these economic 
policies were not formulated in accordance with economic models in liberal 
democracies. The economic policies developed and operated directly by leaders of the 
parties within their own spaces and were monopolistic. The economic model developed 
under the KDP and the PUK did not help ordinary citizens financially. Under the 
leadership of KDP and PUK, the regional government was converted into a family 
business, empowering and enriching members of their own families, friends, and party 
members and alienating nonpartisan Kurds. The two parties alternated the premiership 
of the KRG between members of their own families and relatives. In addition to 
claiming that the KDP and the PUK supported a free-market system, the both parties 
each even controlled mobile telephone companies in their separate regions and provided 
limited access to local residents to communicate with relatives and friends on the other 
side. The constituencies of both parties became frustrated with them and became 
increasingly vocal, demanding free speech and press rights, greater administrative 
transparency, and an end to corruption (Ahmed, 2012). 
Despite dividing IK between KDP and PUK into two spheres of influence, the 
region was not completely separated between the two parties. People in both areas could 
move between provinces: university students from Slemani were able to study in Erbil 
and Dohuk and vice versa. The commercial activities between PUK area and KDP area 
continued. This was helpful in bringing Kurds of different regions closer together, 
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harmonizing their relationships, improving public communication, and preventing 
regionalism (Ahmed, 2012). 
This situation continued until 2003 when the United States and its allies invaded 
Iraq under the justification of stopping Iraq from developing weapons of mass 
destruction and because of Iraq’s support for terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida. 
The change in the Iraqi regime generated a new era in Iraq and tremendously affected 
the internal politics of the Kurdistan region.  
3 Democracy and Democratization in IK: 2003 and beyond 
3.1 IK’s Democratic Features 
Since the Kurdish uprisings in 1991, IK had the opportunity to work towards 
establishing a democratic political system. Despite the challenges of democratization 
process in IK, which will be addressed in detail in this chapter, the region has achieved 
some democratic progress. In IK, there is a chance for pluralism as law granted freedom 
of political parties and political groups with having rights to enter election and compete 
with other political parties for seats in parliament and conduct their political activities. 
In addition to political pluralism, the power is not formally concentrated in the one 
single institution or figure. Although there is no constitution in IK to identify the power 
of legislative, executive and judiciary bodies, but these three bodies exist and they have 
their respective spheres of influence. For example, parliament issues law and 
monitoring government affairs, government is executing laws from parliament and 
managing public affairs, judiciary looking at legal cases and adjudicating disputes. 
However, each of these bodies is suffering from critical challenges (Hars, 2016). 
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In IK, political parties also have their own media outlets. These media outlets 
are mainly broadcasting the political view of political parties. Party media outlets 
broadcasting information of political and economic status of IK and hosting political 
debates. These media outlets also engage with conducting election campaign and 
advertise for their own candidates (Chomani 2014). IK succeeded in achieving progress 
in a number of sectors including property rights, religious tolerance, women’s rights, 
equal access to education and a vigorous political opposition (Hars, 2016). While there 
was partial progress in these sectors, in some respects, IK appears to be an authoritarian 
political system. This issue will be addressed in detail in the following sections.    
3.2 Failures of Democratic Transformation in IK 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon 
in New York were a turning point in the United States (US) foreign policy toward 
terrorism in the world. After overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, 
Iraq was the next target in the US’ foreign policy agenda. The Bush Jnr. administration 
classified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’ and accused them of 
sponsoring terrorism and attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction. This 
resulted in the US launching a military campaign against the Baathist regime, which 
ultimately resulted in the overthrowing of the regime, and the US and its allies 
occupying Iraq in 2003 (Cameron, 2005).  
Changing the regime in Iraq was a very significant political event for the Iraqi 
people generally, particularly the Kurdish people. The regime had ruled for more than 
three decades and it had brought war and destruction to Iraq and the Kurdistan region. 
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The nature of the Baathist regime and its way of ruling left no hope for Kurds in Iraq to 
reconcile with this regime, and ultimately the Kurdish people in Iraq considered this 
invasion as an opportunity to free themselves from the Baathist regime, and actually 
Kurdish Peshmerga participated to some extent in removing Saddam Hussein from 
power. The removal of Saddam Hussein and the US’ efforts to establish a pro-western 
democratic political system in Iraq created an opportunity for democratic transformation 
in IK. 
In the post-Saddam era, people in IK hoped that the new era could provide a 
democratic transformation in the region. However, if one closely examines the latest 
political developments and democratic transformation in IK, one can conclude that the 
region is still struggling and has serious challenges that require a comprehensive 
program and efforts to implement reform and establish standardized good governance.  
3.2.1 Power Sharing 
The political reality after the removal of the Baathist regime from power in 2003 
and the US’ efforts to rebuild the Iraqi state democratically, compelled the KDP and the 
PUK to cooperate to deal with the new political developments in the post-Saddam era 
(Danly, 2009). This coordination crystalized in putting their enmity aside and presenting 
a unified front to the American-led coalition and the rest of Iraq in order to legalize their 
autonomous status and consolidate their position at the national level (Khalil, 2009; 
Danly, 2009; Katzman, 2010). By 2007, both parties reached an agreement and formally 
declared the unification of both Erbil and Slemani administrations.  
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This agreement was called a ‘strategic agreement’ or ‘de facto constitution’ 
because it was not only a simple agreement between two political parties. Through this 
agreement, both parties together ruled IK and excluded other political groups from real 
power sharing for many years. They were, however, united and addressed ‘the issues 
facing KRG with one voice’ (Fatah, 2012). 
 In an interview with Saadi Ahmad Pira, a political bureau member of the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), he stated that the agreement is important for 
achieving stability and harmony in IK; because of it, people in Kurdistan live in peace, 
the economy is progressing, and the political system is working (Ahmed, 2012). 
However, the opposition criticized the agreement and considered as a conspiracy to 
divide the wealth of KRG (Fatah, 2012). Abdulla accused the two leaders of sharing 
‘the oil income and wealth of Kurdistan between themselves and their families and 
cronies’ (Abdulla, 2012).  
Although this unification was a significant step towards IK’s democratization, 
the process suffered challenges, which ultimately prevented the KRG from presenting a 
successful pattern of good governance. While the introduction of the unification 
agreement stated that it would guarantee a growing democratic experience in the 
Kurdistan region’, the precise mechanisms designed to achieve unification will not 
achieve that objective in the near future. For example, the unification agreement 
specifically grants KRG government posts to either the KDP or PUK; accordingly, the 
unification was achieved in accordance with (50:50) politics as it was in the 1990s. The 
unification agreement excluded ministries, which constituted the source of power and 
influence, such as the ministries of finance, interior, and Peshmerga affairs (Tomàs and 
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Villellas, 2009; Khalil, 2009). The unification of these ministries was postponed, 
following further negotiations, but these ministries remained separated, controlled, and 
managed in accordance with the interests of both parties. As of the time of this writing, 
KRG have not succeeded in unifying the Peshmerga forces in one modern army: the 
forces are loyal to the KDP and PUK but not to the KRG. This is partly due to the lack 
of legal framework, such as a constitution, which could provide a plan for the 
unification of Peshmerga. Scholars, like Khalil (2009), believe that speaking about a 
unified Kurdish government is a sort of mirage. He writes that,  
In reality, while many people refer to a unified KRG, there 
are really two KRGs, each controlled by one of the two 
main political factions (Khalil, 2009: 21). 
Additionally, the agreement on unification included merged ministries, but the 
agreement did not remove the distrust and bad blood between the two parties. The 
unpopularity of the agreement was growing between some PUK medium and high 
cadres too since they felt that the agreement reduced their party to a mere puppet in the 
hands of the KDP (Fatah, 2012). The same sentiments were expressed by KDP leaders 
and cadres, which ultimately led top leaders of both parties to hold several meetings to 
renew the agreement between them in accordance with new political developments in 
IK, and the interests of both parties (The Kurdish Globe, 2014).  
3.2.2 Peaceful Transition of Power 
Through examining the process of democratic transformation in IK after 2003, it 
is possible to draw a mixed picture about the political reality in this region. One way is 
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to begin with the principle of peaceful transfer of power among political parties as an 
indicator for democratic transformation. Although there are many political parties in the 
region and law regulates the formation of parties since the first parliamentary elections 
in 1992, IK did not witness any other parliamentary elections until 2005. This implies 
that power did not transfer from one political party or group to another. According to 
Kadir (2007), this has caused ‘most of the crises and sufferings that faced the region 
recently’ (Kadir, 2007: 44). This idea confirms that the distrust and fear of being 
removed by each other and losing power, is not easy to overcome in the foreseeable 
future.     
 Despite holding three parliamentary elections in IK in the years 2005, 2009, 
2013, the process of peaceful transfer of power did not take place in accordance with 
liberal democratic societies. Both the KDP and the PUK participated in the 2005 and 
2009 elections as one list and when they gained the majority of votes they shared 
government positions equally in accordance with the 50:50 politics. As Qadir (2007) 
concluded in the 2005 parliamentary election, the two dominant parties ran on the same 
list so as not to compete, and divided power equally according to their leaderships' pre-
election agreement (Qadir, 2007). In the 2009 election, the KDP and the PUK created 
one list named the Kurdistani List headed by Barham Ahmed Salih to run the elections, 
despite the fact that Goran, which had separated from the PUK, took 25 seats from PUK 
seats in parliament. Forming one list by the KDP and the PUK in the 2009 elections was 
a clear indication that the two dominant parties were attempting to maintain their 
duopoly within the KRG (Danly, 2009). Even in the 2013 elections, which were crucial 
for all political parties especially the KDP and the PUK, because all political parties 
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participated with their own list, no real transfer of power took place as both the KDP 
and the PUK and other political parties formed a coalition government. 
Additionally, during these elections, political opportunities and resources were 
not equally available to all political parties in IK. The KDP and the PUK, the parties in 
power, use the public budget and the resources of government agencies for their election 
campaigns, while other parties, the Change List (Goran), the Kurdistan Islamic Union 
(Yakgrtu), and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (Komal) are independently funded. This 
variation in resources and the political opportunities allowed the KDP and the PUK to 
dominate Kurdish politics. Even in some occasions, those two parties exerted pressure 
on other parties through cutting off financial aid, burning the headquarters of other 
political parties and assaulting them as a punishment for their peaceful opposition to 
PUK and KDP domination in political life (Orsam 2013). 
 Interestingly, the absence of power transfer is not only limited between political 
parties, but also it is hard to see power transfer within political parties. Chomani (2013) 
considers that Kurdish political parties struggle to change their leaders and transfer 
power among leaders. He argues that: 
Almost all Kurdish political parties in the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq are really in need of a change in their 
leadership. The main leaders are still the ones we have 
seen dominating the political arena for the last four 
decades of Kurdish politics; yet they remain unchangeable 
for many reasons. The main leaders have not allowed 
other political figures to become powerful for fear of 
	 113	
being replaced and so new political charismas have been 
marginalized. Meantime, power has been handed down to 
family members and others have remained on the 
periphery (Chomani, 2013).  
From this perspective, we can conclude that, if changing leadership did not take 
place inside Kurdish political parties, then it cannot be expected to see the same process 
among different political parties through democratic mechanisms. 
3.2.3 Institutionalization and the Power of Democratic Institutions 
With respect to the intervention of political parties in government affairs and the 
relationship between political parties and government apparatus, it is possible to claim 
that the KRG has not achieved a substantial progress yet in mitigating party domination 
over government institutions. In her observation for KRG, Watts (2011) asserted that  
State-society relations under the KRG can be described as 
clientelistic and hierarchical. KRG governance is 
distributive, party-state governance with the two major 
parties controlling access to the resources of almost every 
sphere of political and economic life’ (Watts, 2011). 
 Similarly, Frazer believes that the KRG still struggles to unify the PUK and 
KDP administrations and removing party influence in running government institutions.  
He highlighted that  
All the KRG governmental institutions fall under the 
direct control of either of the two ruling parties. The PUK 
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- controlled Slemani province has established numerous 
educational institutions, similar to those in the KDP-
controlled provinces of Erbil and Duhok, leading to 
misallocation of resources (Frazer, 2011).  
The intervention of political parties in government affairs did not stop only at 
the ministry level; political parties interfere even in education institutions, places of 
worship, and markets. This type of intervention in public life resembles the style of the 
Baathist political party when it controlled all aspects of Iraqi society. Both the KDP and 
the PUK repeated the same style as their form of governance (Qadir, 2007). Kadir 
writes about the intervention of Kurdish political parties in public life, highlighting that:  
After dividing IK between the KDP and the PUK, and 
under the governance of both parties, totalitarianism 
gradually appeared, both parties stretched their wing not 
only over all government institutions, but the entire public 
life in Kurdistan. It was hard for ordinary citizens to gain 
any rights such as postgraduate study or doing business if 
they are not members in one of these parties. Political 
parties controlled all aspects of public life such as 
government institutions, civil society groups, finance, 
wealth, and economy, even those places, which have 
nothing to do with politics such as university and higher 
education (Kadir, 2007: 356).  
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Additionally, Mahmoud (2011) and Tomàs and Villellas (2009) argue that in IK, 
government action and political-party action are intertwined at all levels. Famous party 
members are also government officials, and government decisions in the region are 
primarily political-party decisions; furthermore, the economy, both public and private 
sector, in these regions is dominated and managed by party apparatuses. Even the 
security, intelligence and military services show clear loyalties to the political parties. 
The two parties are omnipresent in almost every public sphere (political, economic, 
judicial, media, social) and the strength of the connections between the main parties and 
the government limits its independence and ability to separate or criticize them (Tomàs 
and Villellas, 2009; Mahmoud, 2011). 
It appears from these analyses that after two decades of self-governing, the KRG 
is still incapable of rescuing itself from the domination of the KDP and the PUK. 
Government institutions are still not separated from the influence of political parties; the 
KDP and PUK still implement a policy of merging government with their party policies. 
These problems remain challenging for the KRG in its efforts at achieving a successful 
model of governance for years to come.  
3.2.4 Corruption and Failed Administration  
With respect to corruption and transparency, it is evident that IK does not have a 
positive record; the region suffers from corruption and the semi-absence of transparency 
and accountability. As a phenomenon, corruption was not widespread in government 
institutions before 2003 (Rizgar, 2007). However, the phenomenon has developed since 
the division of IK between the KDP and the PUK in several different forms such as 
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stealing the regions income, diverting the region’s income for the internal life of both 
political parties, stealing the budget by government officials, economic monopoly 
legally and practically, bribery, supporting corrupt persons and protecting them from 
being prosecuted (Kadir, 2007).  
Kurdish government officials and party leaders in both the KDP and the PUK 
extensively and on many occasions bragged about the political and economic progress 
they had achieved since 1991; there are examples of progress in Kurdistan (Clark, 
2008), but their people accused them of corruption, nepotism, power grabbing, and of 
paying no attention to their constituencies’ basic needs and aspirations. There is a 
widespread and prevalent perception among citizens that an excessive corporatism on 
the part of the KDP and PUK exists. It is also claimed that there is a serious lack of 
transparency and accountability with respect to public spending, with cases of 
corruption documented and condemned in the media not being investigated by legal 
authorities (Tomàs and Villellas, 2009; Ahmed, 2012). Recently, a leaked document 
exposed that thousands of people receive retirement benefits illegally under the Ministry 
of the Peshmerga, and hundreds of people receive fraudulent retirement benefits from 
the public income, while serving within political party organisations. The positions 
include the post of Minister, General Director and other key governmental positions 
(Kurdish Policy Foundation, 2014). 
Following the invasion of Iraq, billions of dollars poured into the region, mainly 
through international development programs, large-scale international money 
laundering and natural resources exporting, and the regions share of the Iraqi budget 
(Natali, 2010; Karem and Chomani (a), 2015). In 2007, the KRG budget reached six 
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billion dollars as its share of Iraq's oil revenues. However, there is a growing gap 
between ordinary Kurds and the political elite; a Kurdistani businessman stated, 
“corruption is like a virus. It is killing Kurdistan” (Clark, 2008). In this respect, Ari 
Harsin, a member of the Kurdistan parliament states,  
Sometimes Kurdistan seems like a mafia state. There is no 
transparency. The PUK and the KDP are dividing the 
budget of the Kurdish Regional Government between 
them, 52% for the KDP and 48% for the PUK. It is a very 
strange model of democracy (Clark, 2008).  
Furthermore, observers in IK believe that the two political parties developed an 
oligarchy regime with clientelist and kleptocratic practices. They believe that this 
regime has opened the way for monumental failures politically, economically and in 
terms of government performance as well as the burgeoning grievances of the populace. 
After two decades, KRG policies and plans for a flourishing economy in the region 
largely failed. In this respect, Karem and Chomani (a, 2015) observe that both parties, 
for example, purposefully discouraged growing internal products of agricultural wealth 
in villages and the countryside and they linked farmers with their political parties 
through paying them some amounts of money for political purposes. They wanted to 
buy votes and strengthen their private militias. Sadly these local despots have managed 
to inflict huge damage on society in two decades, which the enemies could not achieve 
in nearly a century (Karem and Chomani (a), 2015). 
The financial crisis that faced the KRG as a result of the Iraqi central 
government in 2014 cutting the region’s budget proves that KRG in fact has a fragile 
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economy, because it struggled to pay monthly salaries for its civil servants without its 
share of the Iraqi budget. IK is in a far weaker economic state than the KRG had 
anticipated. The KRG budget is dominated by a 750 million dollar per month wage bill 
for civil servants. Under KRG, the region is producing hardly any goods and its 
economy relies heavily on revenues from oil and gas, which means the region’s 
economy is not diversified (Mufid, 2014).  
The oil and gas sector has high levels of corruption. In 2014, the Kurdistan 
Tribune website prepared a special report about how officials from both the KDP and 
the PUK controlling the process of contracting, registering companies and competition 
regulation. The report documented that  
There are certain officials who are chairing 12-16 
committees in the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) 
and have complete power over them. The allocation of 
members and their chairmen is also political. The blocks 
that are based in the KDP-controlled zones are chaired by 
members of the KDP, while the blocks based in PUK-
controlled zones are chaired by MNR officials belonging 
to the PUK (The Kurdistan Tribune, 2014).  
The report further underscores the nature of the link between political parties 
and officials, which forms a fertile ground for corruption, highlighting that ‘the MNR 
official owes his loyalty to powerful and influential politicians who could therefore have 
a decisive say in the awarding of a service contract. According to industry insiders, 
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there are few service companies in both areas that are not linked to one or more 
politicians (The Kurdistan Tribune, 2014).  
It is reasonable to extrapolate that other ministries also suffer from the 
corruption caused by party intervention in their affairs. This however does not mean that 
the KRG and Kurdish parliament do not take these challenges seriously. Efforts to 
overcome these challenges are ongoing. One thing worth mentioning here is approval 
for the Oil and Gas Law by parliament, which aims to achieve a basic, transparent 
management for natural resources in IK.   
3.2.5 The Rule of Law and Accountability   
The lack of rule of law and accountability is the biggest challenge that faces 
democracy in IK and has allowed many other problems to emerge such as corruption 
and party’s interventions in government business. The political history of IK since 1991 
shows that the KRG itself started by violating law when KDP and PUK formed the 
cabinet in accordance with political compromise with 50-50 politics (Kadir, 2007). If 
violating law in the 1990s was normal due to the political situation which IK went 
through, no one can now justify weakness in the rule of law after two decades of 
autonomous and self-rule in the region.  
According to International reports on IK and local observers, the region did not 
achieve much in consolidating the rule of law. According to the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) Human Rights Office, many detainees in KRG 
prisons do not have access to a lawyer or have been arrested without being informed of 
the charges against them. In many cases, KRG security forces do not allow detainees to 
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contact their families (UNAMI, 2013). In IK, the security forces (Asayish) have their 
own courts and judges, which are completely separated from civilian courts and not 
supervised by the Ministry of Justice. These security courts follow political party orders 
precisely and mostly investigate prisoners illegally (Qadir, 2007).  
When someone speaks about the rule of Law in IK, the primary insight given is 
that law in IK is like a spider’s web that cannot arrest big insects. There are too many 
cases where the law is completely absent. For example, in cases of killing journalists, 
the law has a minimal role in finding assassins and holding them accountable. In 2009, a 
Kurdish journalist, Soran Mama Hama was killed in Kirkuk and the law did not find his 
killer(s) (Mohammad, 2014). Again in 2010, a young Kurdish journalist named 
Zardasht Osman was kidnapped in Erbil and then found dead in Mosel city, but nobody 
was punished for this crime (Alaaldin, 2010). In 2013, another journalist named Kawa 
Garmyiani was killed because he announced on his Facebook account that he has 
evidence on some corruption cases of PUK officials. He was killed in front of his house 
and the law could not prosecute his killer (The Kurdistan Tribune, 2013). In addition to 
these crimes, there are many corruption cases reported by the media but the law cannot 
do anything about them (Karem & Chomani (a), 2015). 
The main reason for this problem comes from political interventions in the legal 
system and judiciary affairs. After dividing IK between the KDP and the PUK, both 
parties systematically worked to impose their domination over government institutions, 
including judicial power. Political parties from 1991 until recently would directly 
intervene in the appointment of judges and general attorney staff. Organs of political 
parties such as the political bureau or council of leadership had recommended most of 
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these judges and general attorneys. In such circumstances, these judges and general 
attorneys will not investigate cases party leaders are involved in. Leaders of both parties 
intervene in court affairs by pressing independent judges not to open investigations in 
specific cases or release specific criminals or corruptors close to one of the political 
parties (Kadir, 2007). In 2005, KDP supporters and members attacked Kurdistan Islamic 
Union offices (KIU) in Duhok city because the KIU only decided to participate in Iraqi 
parliamentary election with an independent list. In these attacks, four members of the 
KIU, including two leaders of KIU were killed. In 2011, the same scenario was repeated 
but without human causalities. In both cases the judicial system were completely absent 
in arresting and punishing the criminals, because a high member of the KDP was 
indirectly accused of both attacks (The Kurdistan tribune, 2011).  
Orsam’s report on democratic transformation in IK documents many violations 
in the legal system and indicates that rule of law in IK is still deficient. Such legal 
violations include physical and psychological torture against suspects, extracting 
confession by coercion, changing information in documents and files of certain issues 
that are not closed, the weakness of the courts in the face of some issues related to two 
parties in power or tribal pressure, threats and pressures on judges not implementing 
decisions taken by judges in certain cases, and giving verdicts in favour of the parties in 
power (Orsam, 2013).  Bamarny (2012) argues that  
If we had judicial officials who would punish offenders 
and their wrongdoings, and who would side with the 
victim and uphold justice, we would not have had so many 
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political problems and our people would not have been left 
without an active government (Bamarny, 2012).  
3.2.6 Media and Freedom of Speech 
Although KRG officials claim that freedom of speech is guaranteed by law in IK 
(Law number 35 of 2007),8 during the political unrest, the security apparatus 
treated freedom of speech negatively. Human Rights Watch reports on IK claim that 
freedom of speech is under attack in the region (Human Rights Watch, 2013). In her 
evaluation for freedom of speech there, Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at 
Human Rights Watch states,  
Instead of ensuring the justice system investigates high-
level corruption, the Kurdistan Regional Government is 
ignoring its own laws to protect free speech and assembly, 
and using ‘laws’ that are not in force to silence dissent 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
International and local non-government organizations (NGOs) have recorded 
many cases where Kurdistan security forces (Asayish) practice different violations 
against journalists, political activists, and political opposition figures such as detention, 
arrests without warrants or charges of trail, prosecution, and even murder. 
Catastrophically, law and the judicial system do not investigate or prosecute the 
majority of these violations or perpetrators (Human Rights Watch, 2013; Metro Center, 
2013). In an interview with Jadaliyya website, Asos Hardi, general director of the 
																																																															
8 http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/files/articles/221008121630.pdf 
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Awene (Mirror) Company for Publishing who also was attacked in August 2011 by a 
group of men, comments on the freedom of speech in this way:  
Our main problem is that there is no guarantee for the 
freedom we have achieved in the KRG. Meanwhile, there 
are two administrations–KDP and PUK–on the ground, 
and that has made the KRG chaotic. Many of the higher 
officials within the KRG and the two ruling parties have 
their own thugs. Unfortunately, these thugs attack 
journalists in the centre of the cities. Most times, 
investigations go nowhere (Chomani, 2014).  
Additionally, law number 35 of 2007, regarding freedom of speech also has 
some defects and there is an urgent need for further amendments. The law basically 
covers the written media only, and does not involve other types of media such as 
electronic media or social media activities in the region.    
However, this does not mean that KRG is not taking any steps to improve the 
situation. There is some progress in reducing these violations. Law number 35 clearly 
prohibits any limitation or legal prosecutions against journalists. The Kurdistan 
parliament also passed a law called (the right of obtaining information in IK – Law 
number 11 of 20139). However, the main problem is the politicization of security forces 
in Kurdistan, and their leaders use them against those who speak against both parties 
and their leaders.   
Regarding the media, from 1991, IK has witnessed a continual increase in the 
number of media outlets. According to a report prepared by Reporters Without Borders 
																																																															
9 http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/files/articles/120713023536.pdf  
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the number of media outlets in 2010 reached over 850 including newspapers and 
magazines (Reporters without Borders, 3013). This tremendous number of media outlets 
is a positive phenomenon because they provide opportunities for those who want to 
write or express their ideas, however media outlets in IK suffer from serious challenges.  
 The biggest challenge is independence. The media sector is not independent of 
political parties, which own the majority of media corporations, and these media outlets 
are politicized (Abdulrahman, 2007). It lacks ‘a clear structure, identity or mission 
while also being too parochial, politicised and subject to manipulation by political 
parties and businessmen’ (Karem and Chomani (b), 2015). With the outbreak of the 
civil war between KDP and PUK in 1994, media outlets were divided between Erbil and 
Slemani areas. During the civil war, the media become one of the weapons used by both 
parties as propaganda machines to attack each other with insulting language and 
promoting hatred and violence. Currently, political parties invest huge budgets in 
establishing pro-party media outlets with high quality technology (Karem and Chomani 
(b), 2015).     
Despite that negative picture of the media in the Kurdistan region, the efforts of 
establishing independent media outlets away from the domination of political parties 
continue. Since 2001, some independent newspapers and satellite channels emerged, 
such as the Hawlati and Awena newspapers, and NRT satellite TV. The Change 
Movement (Goran) emerged in the 2009 elections with the assistance of IK's 
independent media. However, the size of the emerging independent media in 
comparison with political parties’ media is very small. This is mainly due to a lack of 
financial resources, while political parties dedicate a huge budget to their pro-party 
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media (Abdulrahman, 2007; Chomani, 2007). Interestingly, the aim of establishing pro-
party media by political parties, especially KDP and PUK was to confront independent 
media outlets and launch campaigns against the contents of independent media. In this 
regard Chomani (2014) writes that ‘after the emergence in 2000 of Daily Hawlati, the 
first free Kurdish media outlet, the KDP and PUK began establishing a number of 
media outlets to undermine the independent media. These outlets are widely referred to 
as the shadow media, as they claim to be independent but are subservient to their 
respective political parties (Chomani (a), 2014). 
Through monitoring KDP and PUK treatment with independent media and 
journalists, it is possible to state that the independent media in IK face serious 
challenges. As previously mentioned, journalists face physical and psychological 
censorship such as the threat of arrest, detention, prosecution, and even murder. The 
majority of the victims of this treatment are independent journalists from independent 
media (Abdulrahman, 2007; Metro Center, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2013; UNAMI, 
2013; Chomani, 2014). In the 2011 protests in the Slemani governorate and riots in 
Duhok, supporters of both parties burned NRT satellite TV and KNN satellite TV in 
Erbil and Speeda satellite office in Duhok for covering the events in both cities (The 
Kurdistan Tribune, 2011; Hlidkova, 2011). After the burning of the NRT Satellite, a 
Kurdish journalist from NRT wrote a letter to Barack Obama, president of the United 
States on March 2, 2011 saying:  
We feel abandoned by all. We are being intimidated and 
continue to receive death threats warning us not to resume 
broadcast. If this event goes without strong international 
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measures, we believe that the future of democracy and free 
media in Kurdistan region will be in jeopardy (Hlidkova, 
2011). 
Recently, on Saturday April 11 2015, 3000 copies of number 299 of Living 
Magazine, and independent magazine, disappeared in the Erbil governorate. The Chief 
Editor of the Magazine Ahmad Mira said in a press conference that  
Views of several politicians and observers on extending 
Masoud Barzani’s presidential term was published in the 
stolen issue our magazine, which seemed Erbil authority 
did not like it (Millet, 2015).  
These acts reporting on the media landscape in IK explain how democratic IK is 
when media, as one pillar of democracy, struggles with political parties.   
4 The Emerging Change Movement (Bzutnaway Goran) and the 
Opposition Front 
One of the remarkable developments in the political history of Iraqi Kurdistan is 
the emergence of the Change Movement (Bzutnaway Goran). In 2009, Nawshirwan 
Mustafa, a veteran politician who was a co-founder of the PUK and a close aide of Jalal 
Talabani, felt that the aging Iraqi president was leading the PUK to its demise by 
pursuing a policy subservient to Massoud Barzani's KDP and realized that reform 
within the PUK was not achievable. Being a veteran fighter, and intellectual with leftist 
tendencies whose image remains untainted by corruption, Mustafa managed to take 
many of the PUK's fighters and leaders with him when he split from the party and 
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formed the Goran Movement (Ali, 2013). The Goran movement created hope for those 
who wanted reform and change in the KRG and political landscape in IK. The 
movement achieved popularity especially among KRG youth, by offering a new option 
in Kurdistan: uprooting rampant corruption is one of Goran’s main objectives (Ali, 
2013; Chomani (b), 2014). 
The emergence of this movement had direct implications for IK’s politics. In the 
2009 Kurdistan parliamentary election, the Goran Movement won 25 seats, the 
movement in coordination with Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yakgrtw) and Kurdistan 
Islamic Group (Komali Islami) formed an opposition front with 45 seats. From 2009 
until 2013, IK witnessed opposition inside the Kurdish parliament for the first time 
since 1991. The opposition worked extensively to confront corruption in the public 
budget and dilapidation of public wealth of the region, but it was limited (BBC, 2013; 
Mohammad, 2013). In fact, this period was an important test for the power of 
opposition; it was not easy for the KDP and the PUK to pass their projects without 
resistance from the opposition. Additionally, with the Arab Spring protests, the Goran 
movement called for the dismantling of KRG and early parliamentary elections. In this 
respect, Chomani (2013) observes that:  
The movement shook the Kurdish political scene during 
its first four years in parliament, using its strong media 
presence to break silence on the public budget, corruption 
and lack of transparency over oil revenue, and human 
rights abuses. Goran’s demand to use Kurdistan’s oil 
revenue to fund social programs for the poor appealed to a 
	 128	
populace that had seen PUK and KDP party cronies get 
rich virtually overnight (Chomani (c), 2013).  
In the 2013 Kurdistan parliamentary elections, the movement won 24 seats and 
came second largest block in the Kurdistan parliament after the KDP, with the PUK the 
second party since the 1990s ranked as third even after change movement (BBC, 2013). 
The election results indicate that none of the parties can form a government alone 
because none of the political parties received a majority of votes, so they formed a 
broad-based government (Chomani (b), 2013). Since the 2013 parliamentary elections, 
politics in IK has taken a different direction. This new direction appeared in efforts to 
form KRG cabinet, in which the opposition front appeared as a very important player.   
This election had created many political results that changed the Kurdish politics 
in the coming years. One of the results of 2013 election was that the two-party system, 
the most important characteristic of the Iraqi Kurdish politics since 1991, no longer 
exists. The political dynamics stemming from the conflict and/or collaboration between 
the KDP and the PUK have been replaced by a multi-equilibrium game and a more 
complex structure. Apparently, the PUK lost the largest number of seats, only retaining 
18 seats. The main reasons for the PUKs defeat in this election rested on three factors: 
organizational problems, the absence of Jalal Talabani from the political landscape due 
to illness, and a weak campaign (BBC, 2013; Erkmen, 2013). The second political 
outcome worth mentioning is that the strategic agreement seems to have expired 
between KDP and PUK. This agreement signed in 2007 allowed both parties to share 
power and wealth equally between them without other political groups participating. 
After the 2013 election, it was not easy for the KDP and the PUK to continue on the 
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same course, as KDP leaders believe that the decline in the PUK votes will not allow 
them to work with the agreement any more. Due to the rise of other political forces, 
such as Goran and Islamic political parties, both parties adopted new policies in dealing 
with the latest political developments in the region (Awlla, 2013). The KDP adopted a 
broad-based government; however, implementing this policy practically was a difficult 
mission. For that reason, the formation of KRG cabinet took about nine months. This 
meant that it was not easy for both the KDP and the PUK to continue on the same 
policy, dividing everything equally. 
In this cabinet, all opposition parties, Goran, Yakgertw, and Komal, participated 
and took some important ministries. The opposition basically called on the KDP and the 
PUK to conduct a comprehensive reform as a prerequisite to form the new cabinet. In 
the new cabinet, the opposition received some important ministries. The Goran 
movement, for example, received the Ministry of Peshmerga affairs (equivalent to the 
Ministry of Defence) and the ministry of economic and finance. In this cabinet, the KDP 
and the PUK apparently shared power with opposition parties, but the reality was 
different. Omer Enayat, a member of Kurdish parliament from Goran list expressed his 
deep disappointment because his party could not do anything about reform, and the 
main obstacle is both the KDP and the PUK officials. In an interview with Awena 
newspaper Enayat stated,  
I did not agree with Goran’s participation in this cabinet, 
because Goran had a very comprehensive and effective 
plan for reform. Not only the KDP and the PUK do not 
allow the implementation of this plan, they also try to 
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distort it. Working with the KDP and the PUK resembles 
hitting cold iron, you can see how difficult is for Goran’s 
ministers to work in this government. For that reason, it is 
in Goran’s interest to withdraw from this cabinet as soon 
as possible (Awena, 2014). 
 This statement reveals the size of the challenge that the former opposition 
parties face in doing any reforms in this cabinet, because any reform potentially means 
weakening the influence of both the KDP and the PUK, which is definitely intolerable 
to them. 
Additionally, recent political developments in IK after the 2013 parliamentary 
elections revealed democracy is still fragile and not consolidated. For example, in the 
case of regional presidency, Masoud Barzani refused to step down when his period 
concluded in 2013. On 30 June 2013, the KDP pressed on the PUK to extend Barzani’s 
presidential period through parliament until 2015 without conceivable justifications. 
When his time concluded again in 2015, again Barzani did not step down from his 
position due to war with so-called the Islamic State (ISIS). Moreover, on 12 October 
2015, the KDP and Barzani paralyzed parliament by not allowing the speaker of 
parliament to return to Erbil, and also expel the Goran’s ministers from the KRG 
cabinet by force, because the Kurdistan parliament conducted two session to amend the 
regional presidential law and reduce power of regional president and make Kurdish 
political system parliamentary system (Alkadiri, 2015). Some scholars considered these 
political developments as a big regress of democracy in IK, and even the possibility of 
ignition of another civil war (Hassan, 2015; Natali, 2017).       
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5 Conclusion     
In the light of what has been presented, it is possible to state that the road of 
democratic transformation in IK and its political future is uncertain. The region needs to 
make great effort to further develop its democracy in order to be a model for Iraq and 
the whole region. Although the elements of democracy exist in Iraqi Kurdistan, such as 
pluralism, separations of powers, legislatives, executive and judiciary bodies, multi- 
party system, and elections, IK is still at the beginning on the road of democracy. The 
powers of democratic institutions suffer from intervention of the key political parties: 
the KDP and the PUK. Corruption is highly diffused and IK does not possess a standard 
economy. The rule of law and judicial system is very weak and cannot provide social 
justice. Iraqi Kurdistan is indeed heading toward authoritarianism rather than 
democracy as most of curtail powers dominated by two main families, Barzani and 
Talabani families. The region has negative reputation in guarantying freedom of 
expression because there are continual cases of killing journalists, activists and 
influential figures. Therefore, the following chapters assess the role of social media in 
contributing to democratic development in IK.  
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Chapter 4 
Social Media, Social Movements and Democratization: The 
Case of the Slemani Movement in 2011 
 
1 Introduction 
On 17 February 2011 in Slemani city, IK witnessed massive protests against the 
KRG. These protests can be considered as the first social movement to emerge since the 
1991 Kurdish uprisings. The Slemani movement demanded the dismantlement of the 
political party rule, the establishment of real democracy, and good governance. It has 
been claimed that protesters used social media actively to participate, organize, 
mobilize, and publicize the movement’s message and political objectives. This chapter 
asks, how the rise of social media influences political participation of citizens and what 
the value of that participation for democratic consolidation is in IK. It also asks what the 
benefits and risks of social media for political participation and the democratization 
process are in IK?  
This chapter operationalizes theoretical insights developed in Chapter Two 
under the title ‘political participation as influencing attempt’. Theoretical considerations 
suggest two lines of arguments: the first sees social media as a useful resource that 
significantly impacts political participation and involvement in protest and social 
movements to achieve democratization. This is because online platforms facilitate 
mobilization, communication, coordination of collective action, dissemination of 
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information, leadership, formation of online groups and communities, gaining publicity 
and public attention internally and internationally, and bypass traditional censored 
media. The second line of argument argues that the Internet and social media have a 
negative impact on political participation and democratization because authoritarian 
governments use these online resources to practise censorship and surveillance, 
disinformation and crackdown on social movements, gathering information about 
strategies of social movements and activists, developing counterinsurgency strategies, 
converting online tools to further empower their rules, and publish propaganda and pro-
government contents across the networks. 
This chapter concentrates on the Slemani movement in 2011 and attempts to use 
these theoretical insights to answer the above questions and assess the potential of social 
media for political participation and democratic consolidation in IK. It consists of four 
sections. Section 2 explores the environment behind the emergence of the movement 
and ignition of protest. The third section empirically analyses the impact of social media 
on political participation in the movement and to assess the implications for 
democratization. The fourth section presents a brief conclusion. This chapter argues 
that, although social media platforms were important tools for facilitating political 
participation in the Slemani movement, the movement was unsuccessful to influence the 
KRG to introduce democratic reforms in IK because the KDP and the PUK security 
agents used forces and online tools to supress the movement.  
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2 Understanding the Slemani Movement in 2011: Context and 
Development  
2.1 The Implications of the Arab Spring  
In 2011, some Arab states witnessed dramatic, rapid and unexpected changes. 
The popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt led to the removal of authoritarian regimes 
in both states (Castells, 2012; Joseph, 2012; Howard and Hussain, 2013). The political 
developments in the Arab world had a huge influence on other countries in the region 
(Watts, 2016). Due to similarities in internal circumstances, the sparks of protests also 
reached Iraq and Kurdistan region. The Slemani protest10 can be regarded as the first 
Kurdish social movement in the modern history of IK (Healy and Schmidt, 2011; 
Human Rights Watch (b), 2011; KNN, 2014). Under the influence of the Arab Spring, 
political activism in IK also began to develop. In particular, the Hosni Mubarak’s 
resignation hugely influenced people in Kurdistan; according to Mohamed Rauf “in 
some public places activists hung banners and was written: congratulation on toppling 
another dictator, hope the others follow” (Rauf, 2014: 56). 
After removing autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt, the Goran Movement11 issued a 
declaration in 29 January 2011. It referred to the importance and consequences of the 
Arab political events for IK, and said:  
We are in Kurdistan while welcoming this wave of 
change; in the meantime, we are concerned that the current 
																																																															
10 Known as ‘Khopishandanakani 17ay Shubbat - the 17th of February 2011 protests’ 
11 The Goran Movement was an opposition party in 2011 
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Kurdish authority did not make any effort toward 
establishment of truly democratic system and social 
justice. Instead, the KRG created a completely politicized 
and tyrannical system (Rauf, 2014: 341).  
In the declaration, Goran called for the dissolution of the Kurdistan parliament 
and the KRG, and demanded early and impartial parliamentary elections within three 
months (Ahmad, 2011). In response, the KDP and PUK described the declaration as an 
attempt at a coup against the KRG and provoking disorder in Kurdistan (Ahmad, 2011; 
Salih, 2011; Rauf, 2014). A PUK leader, Qubad Talabani, wrote that ‘No one doubts the 
need to improve governance and the delivery of services in Kurdistan. We are not yet 
Switzerland, but we are certainly not Egypt or Tunisia’ (Talabani, 2011).  
Besides this declaration, a civil society group12 decided to organize a peaceful 
gathering in Slemani city centre to congratulate and show solidarity with the Tunisian 
and Egyptian nations (Salih, 2011; Ahmad, 2011; CNN, 2011; Hardi, 2015; Mustafa, 
2015). The group stated:  
We present our warmest congratulations and absolute 
support for the both nations, because the people of IK are 
suffering from the same political, social, and economic 
crises that both nations suffered from (Rauf, 2014: 56-57).  
Despite the variations in degrees, there are similarities between internal 
economic, social, and political circumstances of IK and the Arab states (Saravan, 2015). 
The accumulation of twenty years of corruption, mismanagement, human rights and 
																																																															
12 Known as (Tori Bargri la Maf w Azadyiakani Khalk – Network of Defending the Rights and 
Freedom of people – NDRFP) 
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freedom violations, and lack of basic services encouraged Slemani citizens to protest 
(Salih, 2012). According to Yahya N. Ali, ‘Kurdish citizens considered Kurdish 
officials like those in Egypt and Tunisia, because they are all corrupt and dictatorial’ 
(Ali, 2015). Similarly, Haval Abubakr (2015), one of the gatherings organizers 
explained that the ‘KDP and PUK monopolized and politicized all aspects of Kurdish 
society. They converted society into a unique, closed and single colour’ (Abubaker, 
2015).  
As Sherko Mustafa, one of the movement leaders remarked,  
The Arab spring events increased people’s courage in 
Kurdistan to protest. It removed the illusion that dictators 
are unchallengeable and unbeatable; instead it told people 
that confronting authoritarianism and achieving change 
through mass protests are possible (Mustafa, 2015).  
After finalizing the gathering of the civil society group, some of the participants 
marched through Mawlawi Street in Slemani to Salim Street to make their way home. 
Several government and party buildings are located on Mawlawi Street. When the 
protesters reached the KDP office, they chanted slogans against Kurdish rulers, and 
confrontation soon broke out between protesters and the KDP officials. (Rauf, 2014; 
Abubakir, 2015; Ali, 2015; Hardi, 2015). It is unknown why the confrontation happened 
because the police did not investigate the incident.13 The crowd reportedly started 
throwing stones at the KDP office and smashing windows (Kurdish Views, 2011). 
																																																															
13 To see the video of shooting 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eGKpFTzDz2U 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFnQqiLDA70, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_63ZW5FCU2g). 
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Consequently, the KDP guards and cadres opened fire on the crowd, killing one person 
and injuring many others (Moradkhin, 2011; Salih, 2011; Ahmad, 2011). This incident 
ignited further protests; waves of demonstration erupted in Bar Darki Sara which were 
dubbed with different names such as Jasmine Revolution or Martyrs Revolution. 
According to Haval Abubaker, ‘the guards opening fire at our fellow citizens 
encouraged us to break silence. It is unforgivable’ (Abubaker, 2015).   
Interestingly, the protests turned into a social movement. The initial the bloody 
clash between the KDP guards and protesters turned into peaceful, non-violent civil 
resistance to the KRG (CNN, 2011). The movement presented several concrete 
demands to the KRG, which were similar to the Tunisian and Egyptian demands during 
their revolution. They included establishing a democratic parliamentary system, ending 
the politicized government by the KDP and the PUK, fighting corruption, nationalizing 
the Peshmerga forces, police and security apparatus, and drafting and ratifying a 
national constitution in the interest of the people (Moradkhin, 2011). The protesters 
presented a set of national demands for the whole of IK. The demands were a practical 
translation of the problems and democratic transformation of the region (Qadir, 2015; 
Ali, 2015). Yahya Ali (2015) a protest activist noted that ‘the protests were only 
organized in Slemani, while the demands, grievances expressed were the demands and 
grievances of the whole people of IK’ (Ali, 2015). The demands gathered participants 
with different political backgrounds and political ideologies who shared the same goals 
and objectives (Mustafa, 2015; Abubaker, 2015).  
At the beginning of the protests, the opposition front (Goran, the KIU, and the 
KIG) declared that they had nothing to do with the protests, for fear of being targeted by 
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the KDP and the PUK. Nawshirwan Mustafa, the general coordinator of the Goran 
Movement, issued a statement in which he condemned attacks on the political parties’ 
buildings and described those who threw stones at KDP office as disordered and 
anarchic mobs (Salih, 2011; Qadir, 2015). However, the opposition parties recognized 
the protestors’ demands as legitimate. For example, Salahaddin Mohammad Bahauddin, 
the secretary-general of the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), stated that if ‘the KRG does 
not do reforms and resolve the problems, the people will not have mercy and will not 
forgive the KRG’ (Ahmed, 2012). The opposition front further supported these demands 
when they presented a ‘reform package’ to the KRG as a road map to conduct 
comprehensive reforms in the region (Kamal, 2014).  
Despite official condemnation by the opposition, KDP supporters attacked 
Goran offices in Dohuk and Erbil, and surrounded the KIU politburo office in Erbil. 
Therefore, the opposition parties realized that it was better for them to indirectly support 
the protests. These supports were visible through active participation of some party 
leaders in the protests (Al-Tamimi, 2011; Karda, 2011). Consequently, the continuation 
of protests in Slemani encouraged other areas and towns to protest too. In a short time, 
protests were being carried out in Halabja, Chamchamal, Kalar, Kfri, Ranya, Sharazur, 
and Garmyan. Protesters in these areas expressed their support and solidarity for the 
Slemani protests and made the same demands. The Kurdish diaspora in European 
countries also organized supportive gatherings to show solidarity for the Slemani 
movement (Sbeiy (a), 2011; Sbeiy (b), 2011).14   
Due to the differences between the KDP and the PUK strategies of dealing with 
political contestation, and the social and political environment between the two areas, 
																																																															
14 (See the video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8DcDwTeujtY)  
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the protests did not reach Erbil and Duhok. PUK security forces controlled Slemani and 
its suburbs and generally there was a space for expression under the PUK in comparison 
with Erbil and Duhok, while the KDP hardly allow dissent to be expressed (Ahmad, 
2011; CNN, 2011; Jamal, 2011; Rauf, 2014; Ali, 2015). However, the KDP suppression 
strategies did not prevent attempts to organize protests in Erbil and Duhok. For 
example, in the afternoon of April 18 in Erbil, dozens of armed men in civilian clothes 
attacked students from the University of Salahaddin with knives and sticks, as they tried 
to hold a demonstration, and arrested 23 protesters (Human Rights Watch, 2011; KNN, 
2014). The KDP also deployed its party security agents in civilian clothes among people 
in the markets, bazaars, and public places. These agents heavily monitored any unusual 
movements, as the KDP ‘Informally declared a state of emergency. Several people were 
beaten or threatened because they wanted to protest’ (Ali, 2015). Spreading the protests 
in other towns made both the KDP and PUK deploy their party security militants to 
control the situation (Rauf, 2014). 
Along with the protests, local and international non-government organizations 
responded to the events. In this respect, Dale Prince, a spokesman for the U.S. 
Consulate in Erbil expressed the US’ support for the rights of people to demonstrate to 
demand democracy and a better life. Additionally, local and international NGOs 
condemned opening fire on protesters as a violation of freedom of speech (Wilgenburg, 
2011).  
The formal institutions in IK, such as parliament and government bodies also 
responded to the events. On 3 March 2011, Masoud Barzani, the president of the 
Kurdistan Region and the former President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani both sent letters to the 
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protesters, recognizing that peaceful protest is a right (Nuchenet, 2011; Rauf, 2014). 
Also, on 9 March 2011, the Kurdistan parliament also held an exceptional session to 
discuss the developments in Slemani governorate. In the session, parliament members 
discussed withdrawing legitimacy from the KRG cabinet headed by Berham Ahmed 
Salih from the PUK. Parliament voted on the issue but did not withdraw legitimacy 
from the KRG (Ahmad, 2011; Samad, 2011; Rauf, 2014). Additionally, the Kurdistan 
parliament sent a committee to Slemani to identify the facts, which then presented its 
findings to the parliament. In the light of the committee’s recommendations, the 
parliament issued two important decisions, which included 17 points.15 The decisions 
formally recognized and integrated the protesters demands and referred clearly to 
punishing the KDP guards who opened fire on protesters in front of the KDP office in 
Slemani, and compensating those who been killed or injured by the guards (Mustafa, 
2015). However, the government ignored these decisions.  
The KRG Prime Minister, Berham Ahmed Salih also appeared responsive to the 
situation. He stated in his speech on 9 March 2011 in the Kurdistan parliament that  
Demonstration is a legitimate right of our fellow citizens 
to request their rights. However, we all have responsibility 
to protect safety in order to maintain the Kurdistan region 
unit and strong. We must attempt to solve our problems in 
																																																															
15 (Decision number 1, 2011) http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/files/articles/150311114506.pdf 
The text of the decision No. 2 was not published in (Waqaeei Kurdistan – Realties of Kurdistan) 
newspaper by the parliament presidency in order not to be formally recognized as parliament 
decision. 
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our parliament as the only legitimate reference point of the 
region and its people (Samad, 2011).16 
 He also contacted the protesters directly, and visited the families of victims17 
(Mustafa, 2015). Unfortunately, Salih’s cabinet failed to normalize the situation. His 
cabinet could not conduct a neutral investigation, was incapable of ending KDP and 
PUK hegemony over government affairs, and unsuccessful in bringing real democratic 
changes. According to Chomani, because Salih was only the Prime Minister of Slemani, 
he was not able to arrest the criminals, neither was he able to stop the violence that the 
two ruling parties have used since he gained power. The criminals of 17th of February 
2011 are walking the streets despite court-issued arrest warrants (Chomani, 2012).  
Because the KRG ignored the protesters’ demands, they remained for 62 days in 
the Maidani Azadi (Freedom Square). During this time, various social, political and 
cultural groups and factions protested in various ways. They presented two proposals 
for the KRG to conduct a comprehensive democratic reform in IK. The first proposal, 
presented on 10 April 2011, was entitled ‘peaceful transfer of power in the Kurdistan 
Region’. The second was entitled ‘social and political contract in the Kurdistan region’ 
(Rauf, 2014). However, the KRG officials ignored these proposals.   
After 62 days of protest, the KDP and the PUK ended the protest forcefully. On 
6 March 2011, dozens of masked, armed men arrived in unmarked military vehicles at 
Freedom Square and attacked the protesters by beating them with sticks, and burned 
their tents (Human Rights Watch (b), 2011; Mustafa, 2015). Protesters fought back, and 
50 protesters were injured. This situation continued until 19 April 2011, when the KDP 
																																																															
16 (To see whole speech of Berham Salih in Kurdistan parliament on YouTube 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XLD98WOrQG4). 
17 (See the visit on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQc1uTPRjd0). 
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and the PUK security forces cleared Bar Darki Sara from the protesters. As a result of 
using force, 10 were killed and hundreds were also injured (Rauf, 2014).  
The decision to use force was purely that of the KDP and the PUK: there is no 
evidence to prove that the Prime Minister, Barham Salih, gave the order to use force. 
The KDP and the PUK security intelligences played a major role in silencing the dissent 
(Chomani, 2011). Suppressing the movement created a negative picture for the nascent 
Kurdish democracy and protection of human rights (Human Rights Watch (b), 2011). 
Ultimately the first Kurdish movement for democratic transformation and the IK’s 
version of the Arab Spring remained unsuccessful. However, the Slemani movement 
has become a celebrated moment in IK’s history (Abubakir, 2015). Activists have 
established a website and Facebook page in the name of the movement. The website and 
the page record human rights violations in Kurdish and English language.18 Activists 
remember the movement as a symbol of struggling for democracy and freedom in IK.    
3 The Impact of Social Media on the Slemani Movement    
The Slemani protests were considered a movement in which social media played 
a significant role in facilitating its emergence. It is possible to analyse the influence of 
social media on the movement in different ways, including mobilization, coordination, 
communicating movement messages, and risks of social media for the movement.  
																																																															
18 Website: http://www.17shubat.com/index.php/ku 
Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/17shubatMedia  
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3.1 Social Media, Communication, Mobilization, and Coordination 
strategies in the Slemani Movement  
Research indicates that social media are powerful in facilitating communication 
capabilities, engagement with political activities such as signing petitions, boycotting, 
protesting, and demonstrating. They also offer users the opportunity to utilize collective 
knowledge, and means to communicate, participate in and drive the political process 
themselves (Cormode and Krishnamurthy, 2008; Adams, 2009; Brundidge and Rice, 
2009; Rahimi, 2011; Jensen and Anduiza, 2012; Colombo et al, 2012; Castells; 2012; 
Towner, 2012; Breuera et al, 2014). 
Prior to the Arab Spring uprisings, the online political activism in IK was 
arguably under construction. Apart from those who already politically active, criticizing 
the KRG for corruption, injustice, and politicizing government institutions were rare 
activities on social media. The users, mostly youths, engaged with social media for non-
political issues, (Ali, 2015; Hardi, 2015; Abubaker, 2015; Ali, 2015; Mustafa, 2015).  
With the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings, in which the social media 
played a critical role, social media in IK witnessed new developments and they started 
to influence the Kurdish political landscape. One of the effects is about being connected 
with other contexts. Social media helped to connect Kurdish citizens with the Arab 
world events. Asos Hardi, a journalist based in Slemani and editor of Awena newspaper, 
observed that  
Social media showed youths in IK giving huge attention to 
the Arab Spring revolutions. If there was any new 
development in the Arab states, the online Kurdish users 
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republished and shared the online contents across social 
networking sites. Social media became a sphere where 
people spoke about the Arab Spring events (Hardi, 2015). 
Hardi’s observation motivated by his direct observation and monitoring of social 
media platforms. The importance of social media was not limited to connecting the 
Kurdish citizens with the Arab Spring events. The Kurdish users imitated the Arab 
activists in using social media for political activism and mobilization for 
demonstrations. Muhammad Rauf, journalist and political activist highlighted that 
Kurdish users have created several popular Facebook pages,19 these pages expressed 
aversion and called for protest against the narrowing scope for freedom of expression, 
rampant corruption, inequality and injustice in IK (Rauf, 2014). Moreover, San Saravan, 
a Kurdish journalist who covered the proetst activities for foreign media and reposted 
on social media platforms for 62 days and arrested twice by Kurdish security forces,  
stated that ‘this new way of communication evolved from earlier happenings. The use of 
social media in the Arab world is bigger than anywhere else’ (Vucht van, 2012). In 
closed societies, social media provides an opportunity for citizens to express their 
feelings about injustice, oppression and collective grievances and to form social and 
political pressures on authorities (Mustafa, 2015). In the context of IK, the Kurdish 
citizens called though social media as the first place for demonstration.  
When the protests ignited, social media became a vital element in the protest 
activities and for mobilization and coordination. Social media allow citizens to form 
groups without formal institutions and organization. Online groups are not limited by 
																																																															
19 Such as Jasmine Revolution Group, Kurds Outrage, and Mass Protest.  
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/304095302974293/)(https://www.facebook.com/17yshubatGora
n/?fref=ts ; https://www.facebook.com/Shaqam0/?fref=ts).    
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geographic boundaries or the need for face-to-face communication, and social media 
use can generate trust between users. Additionally, social media generates online 
communities where protesters and users may link and share their aspirations with 
thousands of online members outside of the protest (Mustafa, 2015).  
In the Slemani protests, social media became a vibrant platform able to 
mobilize various protesters, coordinate and arrange their activities outside formal 
political organizations such as political parties. They also allowed users to 
communicate ‘time, arrangements, and locations of protests’ (Hardi, 2015). They also 
‘facilitated our affairs such as being aware of protesters, informing about the activities, 
and communicating with other protesters without depending on a political party or any 
other form of organization’ (Ali, 2015). Rebin Hardi highlighted his experience, where 
every night, he and his friends would post their day’s activities on Facebook. the 
online platforms were also used to announce the activities of the next day, 
disseminated, received, and shared information about which personality will attend the 
protests and what is he going to say’ (Hardi, 2015). Informing about activities, and the 
dissemination of information and news through Facebook importantly provided a 
complete and transparent picture about the next round of activities (Saravan, 2015). 
Crucially, social media not only allowed the protesters to communicate, to plan and 
strategize,  the online platforms also surpassed geographical borders by involving the 
Kurdish Diasporas in Western countries: they demonstrated solidarity with the 
Slemani movement (Abubaker, 2015; Mustafa, 2015).  
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These statements indicate that social media enabled activists and protesters to 
easily organize collective action. Previously it was very difficult for a group of 
individuals to connect and mobilize each other to participate in a protest. Additionally, 
organizing collective action without support from a political organization was made 
easier by social media. Alongside communication, social media enabled protesters to 
find like-minded individuals and create online groups. These online groups share similar 
political perspectives, opinions, and sense of grievances and outrages inside and outside 
Slemani. They facilitated communication among them to plan and strategize their next 
activities. They were capable of sending and disseminating various messages under 
pseudonyms (Abubaker, 2015; Rebwar Ali, 2015; Mustafa, 2015; Saravan, 2015). Many 
protesters using social media for communication used pseudonyms, which was 
important as it allowed them to bypass online monitoring conducted by security forces.   
Furthermore, social media offered protesters power and energy to continue 
participating in the Slemani movement. Rebin Hardi, a prominent journalist based in 
Slemani and one of the protest leaders, commented that ‘without social media, the 
protesters’ enthusiasm might shrink very quickly as they would be isolated from each 
other, and unaware about other’ protesters’ actions’ (Hardi, 2015). Also, Asos Hardi 
believes that social media were necessary to ‘amplify the echo of our message and 
unable to continue on our activities’ around the world (Hardi, 2015).  
Additionally, social media have had a considerable impact on overcoming fear 
of authoritarian regimes. In the Arab world, along with communication power enabled 
by online social media, people gained significant levels of political experience, which 
led to breaking down the regime’s obstructive barriers (Salamey and Pearson, 2012). 
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Some protesters may have feared participating in collective action; however, in the 
Slemani movement, social media helped people in overcome fears of participation. 
According to Rebin Hardi, a write and one of the protest leaders in Slemani movement 
(2015)  
Social media were important in unifying major groups in 
society and made them feel powerful, not excluded, and 
not alone. Protesters felt that the movement was massive 
and assisted them to overcome their fear. Because in the 
protests, participants may have a fear that the protestors 
may be small, and the majority of fellow citizens will not 
support the protest cause. But social media offered 
reassurance to citizens that participants are countless, 
huge, and have support from other places. Facebook is 
filled out with contents supportive for the movement. This 
sentiment was important in motivating protesters to 
remain on street for 62 days (Hardi, 2015). 
 Similarly, San Saravan argued that social media boosted self-confidence, which 
was important for previously suppressed individuals. Social media helped those 
suppressed voices to feel that they still exist and still can be heard. It was like returning 
the will for people who had lost it before (Saravan, 2015). Sherko Jawdat Mustafa, one 
of the leaders of Slemani protest and leader of KIU, remarked that ‘when supports and 
solidarities were expressed via Facebook to the movement, it was possible to feel that 
there is an army backing the movement’ (Mustafa, 2015).  
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From these perspectives, it is possible to state that psychological empowerment 
is important for individuals to overcome their fear and participate in the protests. Social 
media can be useful tools in bringing that empowerment directly for these individuals. 
Additionally, social media resources enable citizens to be part of online protest 
activities by sharing, posting, and commenting on online contents related to the protest 
activities.  
In social movements, leadership can be considered as an important element in 
their formation, continuation, and operation. In the social media era, protest leadership 
has witnessed significant transformation. In the contemporary digitally fuelled 
movements, the prominent characteristic is that they do not have a single leader, instead 
have a horizontal network of social media activists not subjected to formal leadership 
hierarchies who supervise and lead the movements (Tufekci, 2014). Neither political 
parties nor even independent prominent figures led the Slemani movement. In fact, in 
the context of IK, it was and still is difficult for the protesters to coordinate their 
activities under the leadership of formal political organization. Political parties in IK, 
including the former opposition parties20 do not support demonstrations and protests as 
means of political engagement and do not offer an appropriate space for individuals to 
organize protests. Therefore, individuals may search for another platform, such as social 
media to organize protests where necessary. As Yahya N. Ali highlighted, social media 
‘allowed users to bypass organizational limitations of political parties and led protests 
by themselves’ (Ali, 2015).  
Despite the fact that the movement had a council to supervise and run the 
movement, the council’s decisions were not obligatory; some famous activists with 
																																																															
20 (Goran, Kurdistan Islamic Union – KIU- and Kurdistan Islamic Group -KIG) 
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different political backgrounds ran the council who had no history in organizing 
political activism. Facebook pages and accounts offered instructions, guidelines and 
directions for the movement. According to Haval Abubaker, one of the protest leaders 
‘protesters wished for messages supportive to the movements aspirations, messages that 
truly reflected what the protesters wanted and expressed to their demands’ (Abubaker, 
2015).  
Even more, political activism in social media and protests in the street 
compelled IK’s opposition parties to change their political discourse in favour of the 
movement (Ali, 2015). The same issue was also noticed in other contexts such as the 
2011 Egyptian uprising and the 2013 Gazi Park movement in Turkey. In these 
instances, protesters also used social media platforms for connecting like-minded 
individuals. However, the Internet leadership of protests may not always be effective in 
bringing democratic change.  
3.2 Social Media, Citizen Journalism and the Spread of Information in 
the Slemani Movement 
The role of social media in developing citizens’ journalism, spreading 
information, and establishing political discussion among users in times of protests is 
recognized among scholars. Via social media, citizens can obtain more capacities to 
affect the flow of information. As opposed to mainstream media, online users became 
the creator, sender, and receiver of news and information.  
When the Slemani movement started, social media and mobile phones were the 
first tools that the Kurdish protesters depended on to record videos, upload to YouTube 
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and spread them through Facebook. San Saravan commented that social media allowed 
ordinary people to realize that 
Something new happened in this movement, with one 
hand, people were throwing rocks, with the other hand 
they were filming it with their mobile phones. For the first 
time ordinary people realized how they could be part of 
the news21 (Vucht van, 2012).  
Videos of the shootings filmed on citizens’ mobile phones were widely 
circulated on the Internet and social media; this undermined the attempts of the KDP 
and the PUK to control media to misguide their audience about what was really 
occurred (Jamal, 2011). With this respect, Sherko Mustafa remarked that ‘social media 
astonished everyone, because it was impossible for audiences to catch all information 
and news spread by the online platforms, as the events developed very rapidly’ 
(Mustafa, 2015). Similarly, Rebwar Ali noted that the mainstream media used Facebook 
videos as sources because they were unable to catch and cover the entire movement 
(Ali, 2015)  
The importance of citizen journalism is not limited to documenting and 
spreading news to a broader audience. Social media can frame the expression of beliefs 
rather than simply expressing certain kinds of political action. Social media not only 
provide grounds for anti-regime views but also enhance the expression and development 
of a range of attitudes and pluralism in a wider sense (Shah et al, 2001; Tai, 2006; 
																																																															
21 (https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Demonstration+in+Slemani).  
a quick sweep of YouTube with the key words (demonstration in Slemani) will illustrate tens of 
video recordings on the event, and most of these recordings recorded by citizens’ mobile phones and 
then republished and shared in Facebook accounts and YouTube. Each of these videos has 
thousands of viewers 
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Shirky, 2008). According to Barham Ahmed Salih, ‘anyone armed with social media 
can establish a self-media outlet. They are fundamentally empowering those who are 
underprivileged’ (Salih, 2015). In the Slemani movement, social media helped to 
amplify voices of different marginalized individuals and groups. According to Asos 
Hardi, it particularly provided an opportunity ‘for youths, who felt that they had been 
neglected, to speak up and express their ideas to other users’ (Hardi, 2015). Similarly, 
Haval Abubaker noted that social media  
converted people from receiver of messages to creators 
and senders of message and allowed the appearance of an 
absolute liberal discourse capable of gathering and 
mobilizing people’ (Abubaker, 2015).  
Social media enlarged the scope of freedom of expression tremendously. What 
users can say in social media is vastly different to traditional media in IK (Hardi, 2015; 
Ali, 2015). These perspectives are important for the democratization process in IK as 
people face constraints on freedom of expression.  
On reporting news and information, during the protests, social media played a 
significant role in disseminating latest news and information to audiences. Even the 
activities and announcements of the council for the protests that supervised the 
movement, inside and outside Slemani were published through social media and 
reached other citizens in Erbil and Duhok (Fatah, 2015). Simultaneously, youths 
converted Facebook into a political platform. It was a conduit where news about protest 
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spread directly from the protest arena to other places, as activists did in the Arab Spring 
events (Muhamad, 2015). Additionally, Rebwar Ali22 remarked that:  
Teachers used Facebook to disseminate the latest news 
about the protests. Our group for the first time announced 
on Facebook that on 20 February 2011, teachers would 
participate in the protests. The announcement succeeded in 
bringing countless number of teachers into the streets. 
Facebook also used to increase political awareness of 
protesters and citizens through publishing news about the 
reaction of the government against the movement (Ali, 
2015).  
Social media facilitate the flow of information about the movement and bring 
citizens to participate in dissemination of information on the movement are significant 
as they provided massive opportunities for citizens to participate in the movement. In 
the past, it was difficult for citizens to participate in the protest activities. By the virtue 
of social media, citizens do not need to rely on other resources to be part of popular 
movements and these online resources maximized participation in the protest activism.    
Media coverage for social movements is generally significant and crucial in 
order to generate public sympathy and reach out to the internal and external 
environment. With the arrival of social media, the coverage of social movement 
activities witnessed substantial transformation (Donk et al, 2004; Lopes, 2014). In the 
Slemani movement, social media had a critical impact on the protests and gaining 
popularity. Generally, IK lacks a nationalized media as the majority of the media outlets 
																																																															
22 led Facebook group called (Campaign for Defending Teachers Rights). 
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are politicized. Consequently, political party media represent the interests and political 
ideology of the owner. Additionally, the media have legal and social responsibilities; 
contents are subject to filtering and modification to be legally acceptable and 
appropriate for public consummation (Abubaker, 2015); social media transport 
information directly without a mediator.  In social media, there is no filtration and 
modification of contents and they can be designed in a more provocative style, to trigger 
hatred and outrage, and to influence the audience’s feelings (Saravan, 2015; Ali, 2015). 
Social media allowed the protesters in Slemani to bypass the constraints of politicized 
media. According to Yahya N. Ali (2015)  
During the protests, the necessity for social media 
increased rapidly, because the coverage of local traditional 
media was not powerful enough. Consequently, youths 
resorted heavily to social media, especially when they 
realized the power of this technology in the Tunisian and 
Egyptian revolutions (Ali, 2015).   
Some activists criticized the role of the mainstream media for being politicised 
and blocking information. For instance, San Saravan highlighted that because 
‘traditional media belong to the political parties and they do not show everything’ 
(Vucht van, 2012). Additionally, the structure of traditional media is quite different to 
social media platforms. Traditional media are unable to operate like social media 
platforms in terms of publishing news and contents. Social media are always quicker 
than traditional media to provide the audience with news (Ali, 2015; Mustafa, 2015). 
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult for conventional media in IK to publicly call for 
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protest and demonstration. Protesters were unable to rely on political party media, even 
opposition parties, to publicize their protest. According to Rebin Hardi, 
 The opposition media outlets did not join the protesters 
with all their powers. We did not see any formal call for 
protesting or informing citizens about schedules or 
activities of protests in their media (Hardi, 2015).  
The KDP and the PUK designed strategies to censor information and prevent 
citizens from receiving latest news about the movement. In the first step, they attacked 
independent and the opposition media alike. For example, on 20 February 2011, PUK 
agents in Slemani burned the NRT Media Network’s office, which was allegedly the 
only independent media outlet. NRT played an important role in providing live 
coverage of the shooting incidents in front of the KDP office (Mustafa, 2015; Hardi, 
2015). According to Shaswar Qadir,23 after the channel’s office was burned, he 
‘received threats from the PUK officials who said; yesterday we burned NRT, today we 
will burn you. The PUK wanted to hide the truth. They will do everything to keep their 
system safe’ (Hlidkova, 2011). The KDP agents attacked Goran’s media and threatened 
Speda and Payam TVs by surrounding their offices in Erbil (Hlidkova, 2011; Human 
Rights Watch (b), 2011; Abubaker, 2015). The KDP and the PUK attacks on media 
come from the popularity of these channels as vital sources for news (Hardi, 2015).  
However, these strategies were unsuccessful because the opposition media in 
Slemani continued broadcasting news. The opposition and international media24 
disseminated news about the movement and amplified its picture. They rebroadcasted 
																																																															
23 Shaswar Qadeir is the NRT owner and cofounder 
24 Opposition Media (Speda, KNN, and Payam Satellite), International Media (CNN, BBC, and 
Aljazeera) 
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YouTube and Facebook videos in their news bulletin. In this sense, social media 
provided satellite TVs with real-time video recordings. Images and videos published by 
citizens in social media such as shootings, burning the tents and platforms of protesters 
by security members went viral across online networks. Consequently, satellite TVs 
maximized the viewers of the events. (Ali, 2015; Ali, 2015; Abubaker, 2015; Mustafa, 
2015; Saravan, 2015). More precisely, San Saravan (2015) highlighted that by ‘using 
social media, protests succeeded in bringing the international media on board. These 
channels magnified the echo of the movement to the rest of the world and helped in 
breaking barriers of isolation’ (Saravan, 2015).  
Mainstream media generally has some limitations and it is not appropriate for 
protesters to rely on them for the movements operation, as citizens have limited chances 
to disseminate information about time, location, communication, and coordination and 
protest activities generally. With this respect Rebin Hardi highlighted that  
The latest news about schedules, times, places, programs 
was not received from mainstream media, it was received 
from social media especially Facebook. Mainstream media 
are not under the control of populace and are owned by the 
political parties (Hardi, 2015). 
  Social media were important for the protesters because, they allowed users to 
distribute information and news, and receive feedback and comments very quickly; this 
information was also hosted online to allow easy reviewing. While the mainstream 
media is a unidirectional communication medium, social media have multi directional 
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communication capacity, which allows users to establish communication (Muhamad, 
2015).  
In IK, it is risky for mainstream media to directly express anti-government 
sentiments during political crises. For example, NRT Satellite TV, apparently the only 
independent Satellite TV in IK based in Slemani provided live coverage for the 
movement and promptly had its office burned by PUK assailants on the second day of 
the protests (Rauf, 2014; Mustafa, 2015; Saravan, 2015). The KDP and the PUK 
Peshmerga also surrounded the opposition media for possible attacks. 
In the social media era, social movements rely on the online resources to 
compensate for mainstream media’s lack of coverage. This reliance is important in 
diversifying the news and information and fostering plurality. Social media enabled 
protesters to organize and to mobilize their anti-government protests, communicate their 
message, and coordinate collective action, thereby supporting citizens’ participation in 
influencing politics.  
3.3 The Risks of Social Media to the Slemani Movement    
Despite the positive impacts of social media on the Slemani movement, there are 
also a number of risks and drawbacks that social media have for social movements and, 
consequently, democratization politics. Online platforms have many risks for social 
movements and protests as they are subject to surveillance and censorship. 
Authoritarian governments use these platforms for countering democratization process, 
to enhance their control over power, disseminate pro-government contents and spread 
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propaganda, and design counter-protest strategies (Rahimi, 2011; Morozov, 2011; 
MacKinnon, 2012; Howard and Hussain, 2013).  
Like many authoritarian regimes, the Kurdish authorities relied on social media 
to monitor activists and censor digital contents. In the Slemani movement, the PUK and 
the KDP party security members targeted and arrested activists and journalists who 
covered the protests through their personal Facebook accounts. They also arrested those 
who spoke at protests (Hardi, 2015). Human Rights Watch documented many of cases 
of harassing, threatening, arresting journalists, hacking, monitoring their personal 
Facebook and email accounts (Human Rights Watch (b), 2011). One journalist 
remarked that  
Many of my Facebook friends told me that the security 
forces called and threatened them, saying they had better 
take themselves off their Facebook friend list, and many of 
them have done’ (Human Rights Watch (b), 2011).  
Additionally, social media had drawbacks for logistical and coordination aspects 
of the movement. When users announced on Facebook about their plan and location for 
their next step, it was easy for security forces to monitor and crackdown on the plan. 
This is because the Internet and social media platforms are open to all. In Razwan 
Abubaker Muhamad’s (2015) experience, social media platforms allowed security 
forces to get to the meeting place before the activists ‘as they were aware about our 
plans whether through their direct monitoring of Facebook or through their spies and 
agents who probably received the news through social media’ (Muhamad, 2015).  
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Thus, it is clear that social media also allow security agents to collect 
information on individuals and violate privacy of users, then target those individuals. 
With this respect, Yahya N. Ali (2015) and Rebwar Ali (2015) revealed that social 
media created personal risks because they provided an opportunity for security agents to 
identify the identity and the political background of the users (Ali, 2015). Even the 
security forces relied extensively on those images published by the activists themselves 
in arresting and prosecutions (Hardi, 2015; Mustafa, 2015; Ali, 2015). To avoid this, the 
protesters established countless pseudonyms and fake accounts25 to conceal their 
identities (Hardi, 2015).  
Social media provided authoritarian governments with resources to launch 
counter-protest strategies and suppress social movements. In the Slemani movement, the 
party security forces benefited from social media to launch anti protest campaign. To do 
so, the KDP and the PUK security apparatus dedicated resources to organize 
counterattacks and demonize the movement.  According to Yahya N. Ali,  
 Security forces understood the power of social media and 
engaged with strategizing social media to suppress the 
protest. During the movement, countless pages appeared 
in Facebook and Twitter as pro KDP and PUK pages. 
These pages defended both parties and attacked the 
protesters and opposition parties by describing them as 
traitors and disloyal to Kurdistan. Party security apparatus 
were monitoring and looking for those activists who run 
																																																															
25 such as (Shorshi Nergiz - Jasmine revolution, Paigi Shaqam – Street Page, Paigi Shahid Rezhwan 
– Martyrdom Rezwhan Page) 
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and opened pages and they try to hack these pages (Ali, 
2015).  
Pro-KDP and PUK pages worked extensively to demonize the movement and 
presented it negatively. According to Rebwar Ali,  
The pro KDP and PUK pages campaigned to portray the 
movement as an Islamic revolution through highlighting 
the picture of the Friday prayers of the protesters. These 
pages also highlighted some pictures e.g. protesters 
praying on wine cardboard boxes to show a contradictory 
picture about the movement, because drinking wine in 
Kurdish society, as part of the Muslim society, was 
considered unacceptable’ (Ali, 2015).  
Similarly, Haval Abubaker highlighted that security agents used Facebook to 
smear the protesters;  
Some pages showed images of young teenagers, male and 
female, standing beside each other then pasted a sexual 
image with it, and wrote that the protest arena is a place 
for romantic dates rather than defending democracy and 
reform (Abubaker, 2015). 
 The KDP and PUK also created fake accounts in the name of the protest 
leaders. These accounts republished messages of the leader, but after a while, they 
published rumours and insults on public officials in their name. Haval Abubaker (2015) 
and Rebin Hardi (2015) revealed that, there were several Facebook accounts were 
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opened in their names that spread rumours, insulted someone and disseminated 
messages supportive to the KDP and PUK. They suspected that party intelligent 
agencies (Parastin for the KDP, and Dazgay Zanyiari for the PUK), supporters and 
members of both parties were behind these online accounts (Abubaker, 2015; Hardi, 
2015).  
 Another drawback is that social media may exaggerate the strength of a 
movement and cause false calculations. According to Rebin Hardi, 
Because of social media, some of the protesters created a 
picture for themselves that the entire people in IK are 
supportive to the movement. However, in reality, not all 
citizens in IK supported it. There were some citizens who 
completely rejected the protests. When the protesters 
witnessed social media support and online solidarity from 
citizens in Erbil, they imagined that Erbil would definitely 
join the movement. This was a mirage and illusion. Social 
media created this imagination, which was unrealistic, 
because ultimately Erbil did not join the movement 
(Hardi, 2015).  
From these perspectives, social media have potential risks for social movements. 
Although social media are positive tools for political participation, they, simultaneously, 
harm political participation because authoritarian governments can also use these online 
resources for surveillance, censorship, empowering authoritarian rule, publishing pro-
government contents and spreading propaganda. In supressing the Slemani movement, 
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in addition to use of force by the KDP and PUK security agents, social media platforms 
were used by KDP security agents to crack down on the movement and further enhance 
their power. Therefore, social media can be risky for social movements and their 
mission to achieve political change and democratic transformation.  
4 Conclusion 
The Slemani movement was a turning point in Kurdish politics. For the first 
time, citizens attempted to fight for democratic transformation in a peaceful movement. 
This movement was a clear indication that Kurdish people desire democracy. It was a 
popular movement organized by citizens rather than political parties, and it was 
valuable for citizens’ political experience. The movement was heavily influenced by the 
Arab Spring uprisings.      
In this movement, social media had a significant role in facilitating 
communication and participation. They assisted participants to construct powerful 
networks and advance solidarity, communication and coordination tools, gather and 
publish news and information, and promote citizens’ journalism. These practices, 
fuelled by regional social movements, are important for enhancing political activism 
and the capacity of populace to influence domestic politics in the IK. Social media 
platforms, as theoretical insights suggest, are important platforms for enhancement of 
political participation as they open new spaces for individual’s engagement in political 
life.  
 On the other hand, the KDP and the PUK realized the power of social media 
and consequently developed strategies to deal with the political consequences of online 
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platforms. Social media had negative impacts for the Slemani movement as they 
increased the capacities of security agents to increase surveillance, censorship, 
formulating counter-movement policies to suppress pro-democratic movements. The 
government policies on social media may discourage some citizens from engaging with 
social media for democratic politics for fear of risks to their personal life. In this sense, 
censorship and surveillance may undermine popular endeavours for democratization 
and political transformations in IK.  
The empirical findings suggest that on micro-level, social media substantially 
influenced the protest organization and citizen’s participation in the protest. It allowed 
them to easily engage with politics and attempted to utilize the online resources to 
influence politics in their favour. However, citizens, through using social media 
platforms were unable to counter the power of the KDP and the PUK or transform 
democratic landscape of IK for the better. Ultimately, social media became an 
additional resource for the KDP and the PUK to counter the movement and waves of 
possible changes in the Kurdish politics. Thus, the pro-democratic Kurdish digitally 
fuelled movement was simply suppressed by the same resources in which the movement 
relied on to achieve democratization. Social media do not necessarily ensure longer-
term political participation and strengthen democratization because authoritarian 
governments can benefit from online resources for practicing surveillance, censorship, 
and monitoring citizens in order to suppress citizens’ collective action. Additionally, 
repressive governments can rely on social media platforms to enhance their rule and 
strengthen their control of power through spreading propaganda, demonizing political 
participation such as protests and demonstrations; the online resources also allow the 
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publication of pro-government content. From this perspective, the Internet and social 
media have ambivalent implications for political participation and do not necessarily 
enhance democratization.    
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Chapter 5 
Social Media, Political Discussion, and the Kurdish Political 
Parties: The Case of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) 
 
1 Introduction 
Political discussion and interactivity between citizens and the party leaders, 
representatives, and the policy makers is considered a crucial condition for a genuine 
democratic political system. As Benjamin Barber observed, “there can be no strong 
democratic legitimacy without ongoing talk” (Barber, 1984: 136). A strong democracy 
requires productive and fruitful discussions between citizens and government officials 
regarding policy issues. Conducting open discussion provides citizens with the means to 
actively engage in politics in open, rational, and informed discussion, the major themes 
which have preoccupied democratic theorists since the birth of democracy (Dahl, 1989; 
Grigsby, 2012).  
In IK, political parties and their leaders used the Internet and social media 
platforms to establish party websites, pages and accounts belonging to party leaders; 
countless pro-party pages and accounts were made by followers. Increasing the online 
presence of political parties and their leaders is a  significant development which could 
have substantial implications for the nascent Kurdish democracy. This chapter addresses 
	 165	
how the Internet and social media contribute to generating political discussion and 
activity between the Kurdish citizens and political parties. It also discusses the 
implication of online resources for democratic discussion and democratic politics in the 
nascent Kurdish democracy.  
This chapter explores the use of social media in relation to the concept of 
‘political participation as political discussion’. Current theorizations of social media in 
this regard suggest that firstly, the Internet and social media are good tools to facilitate 
political discussion. The Internet and social media can establish two-way 
communication and interactivity among users. Social media provide access to 
information, which will lead to better-informed political discussion, active political 
participation and will ultimately enhance democratization. Additionally, online 
platforms provide open and free expression of political views, a pluralistic environment 
for open discussion about politics and a medium for informing citizens about politics. 
This chapter also argues that the Internet and social media have a limited impact on 
enhancing political discussion. They reinforce the current status of politics rather than 
enhancing democratic politics. Furthermore, they may damage democracy by 
simplifying political discussion and lowering the levels of rational public debate. 
Additionally, having access to information may not lead to active participation of 
citizens in politics due to lack of sufficient knowledge, skills, and interest. To support 
these two key arguments, this chapter studies the websites, social media pages, and 
accounts of two Kurdish political parties and their leaders: the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU). This is in order to assess the 
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degree to which these websites and online accounts promote political discussion and 
democratization in IK.  
This chapter consists of five sections. Section two presents a brief background 
about both political parties. The third section describes the online background and 
presence of both parties. Section four compares the websites and social media accounts 
of both parties to assess the degree to which they facilitate political discussion. In the 
concluding section, the findings of this chapter will be presented with theoretical 
consideration. The findings suggest that the Internet and social media resources do not 
necessarily generate genuine democratic deliberation and effective interactivity between 
citizens and political parties; consequently the online interactivity does not have a 
powerful influence on enhancing democratization and democratic consolidation in IK.  
2 A Brief Background about the PUK and the KIU       
2.1 The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), or colloquially Yaketi, is a secular, 
social democratic, and leftist political party. It was established by some leaders who left 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1975, after the KDPs defeat under the 
leadership of Mustafa Barzani by the Iraqi regime. The founding members of the PUK 
included Ibrahim Ahmed, Jalal Talabani (the former president of Iraq after 2003), 
Nawshirwan Mustafa, Ali Askari, and Fuad Masum (the current president of Iraq, since 
2014). The PUK describes itself as a social democrat party and works to rebuild and 
redirect Kurdish society along modern and democratic lines (BBC News, 2003; The 
Kurdish Project, 2015). Depite its ideological background, politically, the party’s 
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policies are mostly compatible with the Iranian political strategy in the region, while the 
KDP’s political vision is closer to Turkey’s (Mills, 2016). Since its establishment, the 
party was led by Jalal Talabani until he suffered a heart attack in December 2012 (CNN, 
2015). After Talabni disappeared from politics, the PUK failed to elect his replacement 
as the PUK secretary general.   
Since its establishment in 1975, and after the 1991 Kurdish uprising against the 
Baathist regime, the PUK played an important role in the Kurdish liberation movement 
and Kurdish politics after the 1991 uprisings. In the first parliamentary election in 1992, 
the PUK obtained 43.61 percent of the votes and it formed the Kurdistan regional 
government with the KDP.  
Recently, the party has faced two big challenges. In 2009, the PUK witnessed 
some internal political developments. The deputy of secretary general, Nawshirwan 
Mustafa announced his separation from the PUK and formed another political party 
called ‘the Change Movement – Bzutnaway Goran’. This separation was detrimental to 
the party: the party’s seats in the 2013 Kurdistan parliamentary elections reduced to 18 
seats and Change movement gained 24 seats. The majority of Goran’s seats were 
believed have been previously PUK seats (The Kurdish Project, 2015). In the formation 
of the KRG eighth cabinet, the PUK lost some important ministries to the Goran bloc in 
parliament, including the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Peshmerga. However, the 
PUK kept its de facto dominance over its Peshmerga, security forces, and other 
administrative positions in Slemani province.  
The second change is the aforementioned loss of Jalal Talabani, the former Iraqi 
president and General Secretary of the party. This has also reflected sharply on the PUK 
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leadership. It resulted in the emergence of internal problems for the party and 
disagreement among its leaders. This demonstrates the lack of institutionalization of the 
party and its reliance on one personality. IK’s citizens have benefited from social media 
by publicly speaking about the party’s crisis; a lot of top-secret information about the 
party has been leaked to social media accounts. 
The PUK’s headquarter is based in Slemani, and it has branches and centres in 
Erbil and Duhok. The party’s membership distribution is mainly in Slemani, although it 
has members and supporters in other cities. 
2.1.1 The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) 
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), colloquially referred to as Yekgirtu, defined 
itself in the party’s 2012 internal manifesto as ‘a patriotic and reformist party that 
strives for a developed society and establish a rightful authority in the Kurdistan region’ 
(Kurdistan Islamic Union, 2012). The party considers the principles and values of the 
Islamic religion and authentic human values as references of its political action. They 
recognize the social, cultural, and political rights of non-Muslim minorities, and 
denounce religious, political, cultural, and social-based discrimination (Kurdistan 
Islamic Union, 2012).  The KIU established on February 6, 1994 and did not participate 
in the on-going civil war at that time. This party was in opposition during the period 
2009-2013 and after the 2013 election it entered a coalition with other parties to form 
the eighth KRG cabinet. 
 It is believed that the KIU has connections with the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ikhwan Al-Muslimin) in Egypt; some leaders deny this whilst some acknowledge this. 
Hiwa Mirza Sabir, stated that ‘KIU is an extension of the school of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood. It inspired most of the ideas on which the Kurdistan Islamic Union builds 
itself’ (Rudaw, 2014). However, according to Mohammad Rauf, the chief of the KIU 
leadership council, ‘we do not have any organizational links with them, and we are a 
Kurdish party’ (Rudaw, 2014). Thus, it can be concluded that the KIU ideologically 
benefited tremendously from the Muslim Brotherhood’s political intellectual school, but 
KIU is not part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational structure, nor is it an 
international branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The KIU’s headquarters are based in Erbil, capital of the Kurdistan Region 
(offices of Secretary General - Amindari Gshti - Council of Leadership, and Politburo). 
The party also has branches in all other governorates and districts. The party’s 
popularity or membership is nearly distributed equally throughout IK (Rauf, 2015). This 
could be recorded as a strong point for the party, because other political parties in IK, 
such as the KDP and PUK, do not have the same distribution of popularity and 
membership across IK.    
Since its establishment in 1994, the KIU have engaged in peaceful political 
action and have actively participated in the Kurdistan Region’s politics, including 
parliamentary elections, provisional council elections, and the Iraqi parliamentary 
election. In the 2013 parliamentary election, the party received 10 seats in the Kurdistan 
parliament and formed part of the eighth KRG cabinet by receiving three ministries: 
ministry of social affairs, ministry of electricity, and ministry of parliamentary affairs. 
They also gained two directorates: the directorate of NGOs and directorate of disputed 
areas (Mohammad, 2014). The party played an important role in the Kurdish political 
process due to ‘the general perception that the KIU neither corrupt nor militarily 
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threatening, particularly since they do not control oil revenues or have their own 
militias’ (Natali, 2014).  
Despite their peaceful political approach and distancing from being armed, they 
received backlash against their political action by nationalist political parties, especially 
the KDP. In the 2005 Iraqi and Kurdistan parliamentary elections, KIU’s offices in the 
Duhok governorate were attacked and burned down by the KDP members and 
supporters: four members of KIU were killed including two high ranking leaders (Finer, 
2005). Jaafer Eminky, a member of KDP politburo confessed in a Kurdish talk show 
that the KDP supporters burned down the KIU offices in Duhok in 2005, but the KDP 
reimbursed the KIU and the family of leaders who were killed (Eminky, 2015). Once 
more, in 2009, the KIU offices were attacked and burned down in Duhok province, 
where KDP has strong administrative and military presence (Natali, 2014). Surprisingly, 
in both cases, law and judiciary authority did not play any role in prosecuting the 
perpetrators of these attacks.   
It is worth mentioning that the KIU is the first Kurdish political party that 
through a democratic process made changes to its leadership: during the party’s sixth 
congress in 2012 the secretary general was changed. Other political parties in IK, 
including the KDP and the PUK, did not change its leadership since their establishment. 
This indicates that the KIU is the most institutionalized of Kurdish political parties and 
contrasts sharply to the PUK. 
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3 The PUK, the KIU, the Internet, Social Media, and Political 
discussion  
3.1 The Online Background of Both Parties 
3.1.1 The PUK  
After its establishment in 1975, the PUK engaged in armed confrontation with the 
Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hussein. From its inception, the PUK used the available 
information technology at that time such as radio and typewriters to rally, mobilize, and 
recruit Kurdish citizens as fighters (Peshmerga) in the Kurdistan Mountains (Salih, 
2015). At that time, it was not easy for the party to establish a television (TV) because it 
was prone to be targeted by the air strikes of the Iraqi army. 
After the 1991 uprisings, it was easier for Kurdish political parties to use 
communication technologies on a wider scale. The PUK has established a specialized 
media communication office named Maktabi Ragayandn (the Information Office). 
Under this office, the party established the first local TV channel in IK (Salih, 2015). In 
the 1990s the party founded a newspaper: Kurdistani New (the New Kurdistan), and 
established several local and satellite TV channels including Kurdsat Satellite TV, 
Kurdsat News, and Gali Kurdistan. These party-media outlets provided different media 
programs, which show news, social and cultural programs, talk shows, sports, and 
documentaries. Through these communication channels, the party aimed to broadcast 
pro-secularist political discourse in Kurdish society.   
With the arrival of the Internet in the IK, the PUK started to engage and integrate 
the Internet into its communication strategies. At present, most of the party’s traditional 
media outlets have moved online. For example, the party has websites dedicated to its 
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newspapers and satellite TV channels.26 Besides that, the party has two other websites, 
which operate as the official mouthpieces of the party.27 These websites also provide 
online contents in several languages. 
The invention of the social media, especially Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
encouraged the PUK to revise its online communication strategies, because the party, as 
Berham Ahmed Salih, the deputy general-secretary and former KRG prime minister, 
highlighted, ‘the PUK was lagging behind in terms of digital technology’ (Salih, 2015).  
The party now has a strong social media presence. The party’s newspaper, satellite TVs, 
and websites, have direct links in social networking sites and each account has 
thousands of likes and followers.28 
In addition to these online presences, PUK leaders have their own social media 
accounts. It is possible to identify three types of party engagement with social media 
and the Internet: 
Level (1): 12 prominent leaders of the PUK29 had individual social media 
accounts or pages. There are some Facebook pages in the name of Jalal Talabani, the 
																																																															
26 (Kurdistani New – the New Kurdistan) newspaper website: http://www.knwe.org/  
Kurdsat News Satellite TV website: http://www.kurdsatnews.com/  
Gali Kurdistan Satellite website: http://www.gksat.tv/  
27 PUK online website: http://www.pukonline.com/ and PUK Media website: 
http://www.pukmedia.com/ 
28 Kurdistani Nwe Newspaper in Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/Kurdistani-Nwe-
209026845834974/?fref=ts), Kurdsat News in Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/kurdsatnews/), Twitter: (https://twitter.com/KurdsatNews?lang=en), 
Youtube: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F14vtOPp4pA). Kurdsat Broadcast Corporation in 
Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/Kurdsat/?fref=ts), Twitter: 
(https://twitter.com/Kurdsat?lang=en), YouTube: (https://www.youtube.com/user/TheKurdsat), Gali 
Kurdistan Satellite TV in Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/pages/Gali-
Kurdistan/104036909632178?fref=ts), YouTube: 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=niEvK5MVmkE). PUK online wesite in Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/PukOnline/?fref=ts), Twitter: (https://twitter.com/PUKonline?lang=en). 
PUK Media website in Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/pukmedia1975/?fref=ts), Twitter: 
(https://twitter.com/pukmedia?lang=en).  
29 Qubad Talabani, the member of PUK leadership council and deputy prime minister of KRG, 
Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/qubadtalabaniofficial/?fref=ts), Twitter: 
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PUK secretary general, but it seems that he is not running the pages due to his ailment.30 
Other leaders also have Facebook and Twitter accounts.31 
Level (2): A majority of the PUK organs, branches, and centres also have their 
own social media account and pages. These accounts and pages share their own 
activities on social media. The accounts and pages do not represent the PUK’s formal 
position; they simply update their followers on their activity.32  
Level (3): the pro-PUK online groups are especially present on Facebook, there 
are countless accounts, pages, and groups established by the party members, fans, and 
																																																																																																																																																																	
(https://twitter.com/qubadjt), YouTube: 
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCcZCIml0JBx7WPqZaoLkxcA). Mala Bakhtyar, chief of the 
PUK politburo Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/Mala.Bakhtiar/?fref=ts). Sadi Pira, PUK 
member of politburo Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/Sadi-Pire-307023045162/?fref=ts). 
Azad Jundyany, PUK chief of information office, Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/Azad.Jndyany/?fref=ts), Kosrat Rasul Ali, Second PUK deputy 
secretary general, Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/pages/Kosrat-Rasul-
Ali/112368685441396?fref=ts). 
30 Jalal Talabani Facebook pages: (https://www.facebook.com/mam.jalal2011/?fref=ts), 
(https://www.facebook.com/pages/Jalal-Talabani/108370732520502?fref=ts)  
31 Qubad Talabani, the PUK member of leadership council and deputy Prime Minister of KRG; 
Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/qubadtalabaniofficial/?fref=ts), Twitter: 
(https://twitter.com/qubadjt?lang=en). YouTube: 
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCcZCIml0JBx7WPqZaoLkxcA). Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, the 
PUK politburo member; Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/Hero.ibrahimA?fref=ts). Barham 
Ahmed Salih, the PUK deputy secretary – general; Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/Barham-
Salih-112851263139/?fref=ts), Twitter: (https://twitter.com/BarhamSalih?lang=en). Kosrat Rasul 
Ali, the second deputy of the PUK Secretary-General, Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/Kosrat.rasul/?fref=ts), Twitter: (https://twitter.com/Kosrat?lang=en), 
Sadi Pira, Member pf the PUK politburo, Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/Sadi-Pire-
307023045162/?fref=ts). Mala Bakhtyar, spokesman of the PUK politburo. Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/Mala.Bakhtiar/?fref=ts). Hakm Qadir, Member of the PUK politburo, 
Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/hakim.qadir.hamajan/?fref=ts). Adel Murad, Member of the 
PUK central council, Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/AdelMuradOfficial/?fref=ts). Fuad 
Masum, Member of the PUK politburo and President of the republic of Iraq, Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/PresidentMasum/?fref=ts), Twitter: 
(https://twitter.com/Dr_Fuad_Masum?lang=en). Arez Abdullah, Head of the PUK bloc in Iraqi 
parliament, Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/Arez.Abdullah.Official/?fref=ts). Adnan Mufti, 
Member of the PUK central council, Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/Adnan-Mufti-
598276936912766/?fref=ts), Twitter: (https://twitter.com/AdnanAlMufti?lang=en). Fared Asasard, 
Member of the PUK central council, Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010210380476andfref=ts).   
32 PUK Koya center (14), Facebook: (https://www.facebook.com/malbandi14koya/?fref=ts). 
Leadership council of PUK: (https://www.facebook.com/pukpbYNK/?fref=tsandref=br_tf). Central 
council of PUK: (https://www.facebook.com/AnjumaniNawandPukcc/?fref=ts).  PUK politburo – 
Erbil: (https://www.facebook.com/MktbySyasyYktyNyshtmanyKwrdstanHwlr/?fref=ts). 
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probably the PUK security intelligence (Dazgay Zanyari). These online groups engage 
with different activities; they primarily support and defend the PUK policies, enhance 
the PUKs political image, republish the online content of the PUK prominent leaders, 
and engage in competition with other online groups from other political parties.33 The 
PUK media outlets connect its online contents with these accounts. 
3.1.2 The KIU 
It is possible to claim that the KIU’s political operation in the Kurdish political 
arena started with the adoption of information and communication technologies 
available at that time. Since its establishment in 1994, the KIU began to communicate 
with the Kurdish citizens to share its message and political perspectives. The party 
created a specialized office known as Maktabi Ragayandn (the Information Office) 
(Kurdistan Islamic Union, 2012). Through this office, the party adopted a variety of 
communication technologies to establish communications with society. The party began 
publishing a newspaper: Rozhnamay Yekgirtu (Yekgirtu Newspaper), which acted as 
																																																															
33 PUK: (https://www.facebook.com/PUKofficial.org/?fref=ts). PUK online: 
(https://www.facebook.com/PukOnline/?fref=ts). Slemani Qalay Sawz – Sulaymanyiah a green fort: 
(https://www.facebook.com/akar.sawz?pnref=story). Yaketi Nishtimani – union patriotic: 
(https://www.facebook.com/Yaketi-Nishtimani-124065621113629/?fref=ts). Ganjani Yaketi – PUK 
youths: (https://www.facebook.com/yaketi/?fref=ts). Bas Yaketi Bas – Only PUK: 
(https://www.facebook.com/soranpirababy1?fref=ts). Kcha Sawzaka – the Green Girl, Facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/676324522405539/?fref=nf). Yaketi Ayindaya – PUK is future: 
(https://www.facebook.com/YeketiAyndaya/?fref=ts). Mn yaketim Khwenm Sawza – I am puk and 
blood is green: (https://www.facebook.com/yaketim/?fref=ts). Yaketiw Khabati Sakht – PUK and 
difficult strive: (https://www.facebook.com/YktyWKhbatySkht/?fref=ts). Yaketiw Mardayati – PUK 
and Braveness: (https://www.facebook.com/mamekurdd/?fref=ts). Layangranu Hawadarani Yaketi 
la Facebook – PUK fans and supporters in Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/p.u.k.talabani/?fref=ts). Mn PUKim – I am PUK: 
(https://www.facebook.com/mn.Yakitym/?fref=ts). Dwangay PUK – the PUK platform: 
(https://www.facebook.com/541331179357680/?fref=ts). Ganjanu Lawani PUK – PUK youths and 
adults: (https://www.facebook.com/ganjani.yaketi/?fref=ts). Peshmarga derinakani PUK – Old PUK 
meshmarga: (https://www.facebook.com/peshmarga.derin/?fref=ts). Gardaluli Sawz – the Green 
Storm: (https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010434760585andfref=ts). Ganjani PUK – 
the PUK youths: (https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100008538273918andfref=ts).  
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the official mouthpiece of the party. Additionally, the party established local TV and 
radio channels in all three provinces and districts of Erbil, Slemani, and Duhok. 
Recently, the party opened a satellite channel known as Speda Channel.34 This satellite 
channel broadcasts different programs such as political talk shows, 24-hour news, news 
analysis, family programs and drama, religious shows, cultural and educational 
programs, economics programs, and reporting and covering the party’s political 
activities (Speda Channel, 2015). According to Mohammad Rauf, the KIU chief of the 
leadership council, media tools are essential to establishing communications with 
society, thus, the KIU ‘opened 13 local TVs, and 14 radio stations. These platforms 
were the prime ways of communication with the Kurdish citizens and have had direct 
contact with them’ (Rauf, 2015). Through all these channels, the party created a 
political discourse empowered by a modern understanding of the basic principles of 
Islam. 
With the arrival of the Internet in IK in the 1990s, the majority of political parties 
in IK were interested in establishing online communications. In 1999, the KIU opened 
its first website known as Kurdiu35 which offers online contents in five languages. 
These online multi-language contents cover the political, social, cultural, economic 
sectors, publish the official political perspectives and positions of the party, and are 
regularly updated with the latest news on political developments in IK, Iraq and the 
Middle East (Kurdiu, 2015). Additionally, the KIU’s satellite channel (Speda Channel) 
also has its own website, linking its live broadcast with the Internet.  
																																																															
34 Speda Channel (http://www.speda-tv.net/)  
35 Kurdistan Islamic Union website (http://www.kurdiu.org/)   
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The advent of social media applications enabled the Kurdish political parties to 
interact with these social networking sites differently. The KIU does not have an official 
Facebook page or Twitter account. These facts been confirmed by the party leaders who 
were interviewed for this study. However, it does not mean that the KIU has no 
connections with social media. Instead, like the PUK, the KIU social media presence 
can be divided into several categories: 
Level (1): accounts and pages owned by high-ranking political leaders of the 
party: the Secretary General of the party (Mohammed Faraj) has an official Facebook 
page36 linked with the party website (Kurdiu). In addition to the KIU Secretary General, 
the majority of the KIU leaders have their own Facebook pages.37  
Level (2): The party’s organs, local offices, branches and institutions; on this 
level, party institutions, branches, and centres opened separate accounts from those of 
the party leaders to publicize their activities in the areas in which they operate.38 These 
																																																															
36 Mohammed Faraj, KIU Secretary General (https://www.facebook.com/m.farajahmad/?fref=ts)  
37 For example, Mohammad Rauf Mohammad, speaker of KIU leadership council 
(https://www.facebook.com/mohammad.raoof.3?fref=ts), 
Hiwa Mirza Sabir, Spokesman of KIU Politburo 
(https://www.facebook.com/hiwamirza.sabir?fref=ts), Saeed Ali Abo, the KIU Secretary General 
assistant for KIU internal affairs (https://www.facebook.com/SeidEli.Ebo?fref=ts), Nohammed 
Ahmed, the KIU Secretary General assistant for Government and parliament affairs 
(https://www.facebook.com/MuhammedZerony?fref=ts)  
Khalil Ibrahim, member of the KIU politburo (https://www.facebook.com/khalil.badini?fref=ts), 
Abubaker Ali Karwany, member of the KIU politburo (https://www.facebook.com/Abubakr-Ali-
Abubakr-Karwani-152421998162279/?fref=ts),  Sherwan Shamirani, member of KIU leadership 
council (https://www.facebook.com/-708121349313361/?fref=ts). Muthanna Amin, member of KIU 
leadership council (https://www.facebook.com/Dr.Muthanna.Amin/?fref=ts), Mohammad Hawdiani, 
member of KIU leadership council and minister of Social affairs – KRG 
(https://www.facebook.com/mohamed9hawdyani/?fref=ts), Omer Abdul Aziz, former member of 
KIU leadership Council (https://www.facebook.com/145931072179944/?fref=ts), Bayan Nuri, 
Member of KIU leadership council (https://www.facebook.com/bayan.tofiq.5?fref=ts), Hasan 
Shamerani, chief of KIU monitoring and follow up office 
(https://www.facebook.com/HasanShamerani/posts/766936090078975?fref=nfandpnref=story), 
Muthanna Amin, member of the leadership council: 
(https://www.facebook.com/Dr.Muthanna.Amin/?fref=ts).      
38 For example, KIU Sulaymanyia center 
(https://www.facebook.com/malbandislemany.yakgrtu?fref=ts), KIU Erbil Centre 
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accounts and pages do not formally represent the KIU, but they represent their centres 
and branches and operate as their mouthpieces. 
Level (3): informal groups and individuals related to the party; on social media, 
there are many informal online groups orchestrated by the party members, individuals 
and supporters. The majority of these informal accounts and pages were established and 
administered by youth groups inside and outside the party. These unofficial pages 
engage with several pro-KIU activities including reposting the message of the KIU 
Secretary General and online activities of the high leaders of the party, support and 
advocacy of the party’s policies and political position and, sometimes, criticism of their 
political party for the KIUs political performance in the political climate of IK.39 
																																																																																																																																																																	
(https://www.facebook.com/malbandedu.hawler), KIU Halabja Center 
(https://www.facebook.com/malbandi.penj?fref=ts), KIU Garmyian Center 
(https://www.facebook.com/malbandi4/?fref=ts), KIU Chamchamal Center 
(https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010059787333andfref=ts), KIU Mosul center 
(https://www.facebook.com/malbandi.hasht?fref=ts), KIU 14 center 
https://www.facebook.com/320941634783092/?fref=ts), KIU Kalakchy Branch 
(https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010934496229andfref=ts),  
39 For example, I am Erbil - KIU and I am transparent 
https://www.facebook.com/yekgrtoihawlerm.shafafm/?fref=ts, Kurdistan Islamic Union 
(https://www.facebook.com/Kurdistan.Islamic.Union?fref=ts), Youth of KIU 
(https://www.facebook.com/lawany.yakgrtuy.islamy/?fref=ts), A New KIU 
(https://www.facebook.com/kiu94/?fref=ts), KIU is our crown 
(https://www.facebook.com/yakgrtw.dllmana?fref=ts), we are KIU and we succeed 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/712032122191101/), KIU closed Group 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/yakgrtu.ayndaya/),  we are KIU 
(https://www.facebook.com/emayekgrtwin/?fref=ts), KIU youths 
(https://www.facebook.com/yakgrtu.hiwawainda?fref=ts), KIU youth in Chamchamal 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/311617085566294/?ref=br_tf), KIU youths in Sulaymanyia 
(https://www.facebook.com/?fref=ts), KIU youths in Garmian 
(https://www.facebook.com/garmianyagrtw?fref=ts), KIU youths leadership 
(https://www.facebook.com/balesan.sane?fref=ts), Brave KIU youths 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/211243912317060/), Insurgents 
(https://www.facebook.com/nawakiu/?fref=ts), Shaqam ‘Street’ 
(https://www.facebook.com/Shaqam0/?fref=ts), Chalakwanani Yakgrtw la Facebook (KIU activists 
in Facebook) (https://www.facebook.com/groups/301133600052448/)  
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3.2  The Internet, Social Media, and Political Discussion: the PUK and 
the KIU in Comparative Perspective 
A key aspect of democracy is the citizens’ ability to engage with politicians, 
political representatives and policy makers to discuss policy issues. One encouragement 
for participation is the citizens’ need for sufficient information and knowledge in order 
to make an informed decision or make suggestions and propositions for party leaders, 
representatives, and government officials (Dahl, 1989). With the advancement of social 
networking sites, the status of online interactivity between individuals, institutions and 
politicians has transformation tremendously. The interactivity is the prominent issue 
enhanced and empowered with the Internet and social media in our contemporary era 
(Speakman, 2015). In the new digital age, it is possible to have a new style of the 
citizens’ engagement with politics in contemporary societies. The use of interactive 
features online has transformed political involvement and created implications for 
democratic politics (Xenos, 2008; Flanagin and Metzger, 2008; Westerman et al, 2014).  
For political parties, policy makers, and citizens in IK, social media promise a 
new era in political discussion and generating new tools to yield citizens interactivity 
with the party leaders and government officials. It is possible to assess the impact of the 
party’s online resources on political discussion and democratization politics on three 
main levels:   
3.2.1 Party Websites 
The majority of political parties in IK have websites, which are part of their 
communication strategies with citizens. The PUK and the KIU have more than one 
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website40 which have several functions. The websites of both parties act as official 
mouthpieces, and are used to publish different sorts of information about activities of 
party leaders, their parliamentary bloc and ministers in the KRG cabinet, in addition to 
information on economic, social, educational, regional and international issues. These 
websites are managed and supervised directly by both parties’ media offices. The 
websites also have links to social networking sites connecting the online contents with 
them. In this way, the social media users receive a wide range of information from the 
party news agencies. 
From examining PUK and KIU websites, it is possible to assess the websites’ 
contribution to generating political discussion. It is noticeable both parties’ websites 
contain a huge amount of information. For example, the Kurdiu website, as 
Mohammad Rauf41 and Hiwa Mirza Sabir42 explain, is composed of several 
informative parts. The first part publishes data about the party, the leadership council’s 
political positions, formal statements from party representatives, information on the 
party’s participation in parliament and government, the activities of the party’s 
parliamentary bloc and ministers, the opinions of the party and party leaders about 
Iraqi Kurdistan’s political issues, and general news on Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq, and the 
Middle East (Rauf, 2015; Sabir, 2015). However, information on party websites has 
limited success in establishing political discussion. The information on the website is 
mainly the same information broadcasted and disseminated from the parties’ 
																																																															
40 PUK Online: http://www.pukonline.com/kurdish.aspx, PUK Media: http://www.pukmedia.com/, 
Kurdsat Media Corporation: http://www.kurdsat.tv/, Kurdsat News: http://www.kurdsatnews.com/. 
The KIU websites: The Kurdiu website (www.kurdiu.org), and Speda TV website 
(http://www.speda-tv.net/)     
41 Leader and Chief of KIU leadership council 
42 Leader and Spokesman of the KIU politburo  
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traditional media outlets. Therefore, political parties are occupying the online domain 
by disseminating old contents across websites and networks: their use of the Internet 
to promote their party is not innovative. Furthermore, both parties appear to have more 
control over the websites’ content than citizens, and the majority of the websites’ 
content support the parties’ vision and political strategy. An observer seldom finds 
articles and columns that are critical of the party’s strategy and leaders’ performance. 
However, this does not mean that other leaders and social media users do not criticise 
the PUK and its leaders. For example, on December 15, 2017, Farsat Sofi, the KDP 
parliamentarian harshly criticised PUK leaders on October 16, 2017, accusing them of 
treason when the PUK Peshmarga withdrew from Kirkuk city and left it for the Iraqi 
army and Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)43 44. Using websites in this manner and 
with this inflammatory language seem to be not supportive of political discussion and 
democratisation.   
Another issue is related to the design and structure of websites of both parties: 
they are unsupportive for establishing political discussion. Although PUK and KIU’s 
websites allow users to write opinions, columns and blogs, in order to ‘be creative by 
opening the space to represent diversified perspectives’ (Rauf, 2015), there is no 
evidence to show that party leaders listen to views and opinion expressed through 
website blogs. There is no clear evidence suggesting that the blogs and writings of users 
have any substantial effects on the policy outcomes, or whether policy makers and party 
leaders actually read the citizens’ input and consider them for policy making.  
																																																															
 43 Farsat Sofi account   
(https://www.facebook.com/hevar.gazna?hc_ref=ARSltn0yAk8niORtyUFUN4jwjJr4y5K3Phi_tNQkn
TFJUCCt2FRpXO_uqhAnKRisFss&fref=nf)  
        44 PMUs are Iraqi militias and supported by Iran 
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Additionally, there is no forum on either parties’ website for citizens and online 
users to discuss political party programs, policies, plans, law drafts and proposals, or 
citizens’ own ideas. The same observation can be recorded on the PUK and the KIU 
websites. Ultimately, the party’s website plays a very limited role in generating 
democratic political discussion because they do not transport citizens’ views and 
opinions to the party leaders or policy makers. In IK, the democratic role of the party 
websites is still in infant stage and the Kurdish political party websites have a minimal 
role in enhancing political discussion. The party websites are essentially a vehicle for 
publishing propaganda. Generally speaking, political parties integrate websites in 
already established communicative and political practice and they do not explore the 
full potential of the Internet and online resources, especially in terms of political 
discussion and interactivity. 
3.2.2 Party Leaders’ Pages and Accounts 
Alongside the party’s websites, majority of the party leaders in both parties have 
personal pages and accounts on social media, particularly Facebook.45 The party leaders 
use their own social networking accounts to establish direct political communication 
with the Kurdish online users. They use the online tools to publishing their own 
information and news. For instance, Mohammad Faraj46 regularly posts information in 
																																																															
45 For Example: the PUK leaders, Barham Ahmed Salih, (https://www.facebook.com/Barham-Salih-
112851263139/?fref=ts) Twitter account: (https://twitter.com/BarhamSalih) Sadi Ahmed Pira 
(https://www.facebook.com/Sadi-Pire-307023045162/?fref=ts) Kosrat Rasul Ali, 
(https://www.facebook.com/pages/Kosrat-Rasul-Ali/112368685441396?fref=ts) Adnan Mufti, 
(https://www.facebook.com/Adnan-Mufti-598276936912766/?fref=ts).  
The KIU leaders, Mohammad Faraj (https://www.facebook.com/m.farajahmad/?fref=ts) Abubakr 
Karwani (https://www.facebook.com/Abubakr-Ali-Abubakr-Karwani-152421998162279/?fref=ts) 
Abubakr Haladni (https://www.facebook.com/Abubakr-Haladny-392936154216756/?fref=ts) 
Salahaddin Babakir (https://www.facebook.com/Salahaddin-Babakir-457228687637746/?fref=ts) 
46 The KIU secretary general (https://www.facebook.com/m.farajahmad/?fref=ts) 
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his Facebook page about his activities, such as meetings with other party leaders, 
meetings with delegations of other political parties, welcoming foreign consulates and 
embassies, special envoys of international non-government agencies, for 
communicating political messages to party members and Kurdish citizens, and reposting 
interviews and statements. Other PUK and KIU leaders use social media as a key source 
for self-promotion, and for publishing information and online reports on their personal 
activities including political statements, interviews with media, party meetings, and 
explaining personal or the party’s specific political positions. For instance, Adnan 
Mufti, the PUK leader, stated that he publishes ‘information relevant to the PUK, the 
PUK’s policies, activities, and meetings covered by the PUK media outlets, formal 
positions of the PUK on daily political developments, and sometimes respond to any 
accusations launched against the party’ (Mufti, 2015). Similarly, Hiwa Mirza Sabir 
stated that Facebook ‘is important in reaching out the party’s voice, ideas, perceptions, 
and perspectives to our members, supporters, political, and intellectual figures inside 
and outside the Kurdistan region in the fastest way’ (Sabir, 2015). Abubaker Karwani, a 
member of the KIU Politburo, sees Facebook as ‘a tool that can be used to communicate 
with citizens’ (Karwani, 2015).  
Despite similarities, there are some fundamental differences between party 
leaders’ use of social media. PUK leaders abstain from publishing sensitive information 
online, especially about financial and corruption issues, and government affairs. This 
may be related to the fact that before the reunification of the KRG in 2005, the PUK 
held an independent government in Slemani, called ‘the PUK Zone’ and is also 
currently in government. Therefore, it is unexpected that a political party leader would 
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publish information on their party and ruin its reputation. However, some KIU leaders 
including Abubakir Haladni47 and Sherko Jawdat48 publish detailed information about 
corruption over the oil contracts and in other governance sectors. Other leaders’ use 
their social media platforms as tools to spread their personal and political opinions 
about political issues in IK. Barham Ahmed Salih, the former KRG Prime Minister and 
PUK’s Deputy secretary-general, stated that he speaks ‘about the issues relevant to the 
citizens’ life and aim to have a permanent connection with them and specifically speaks 
about the internal circumstances of IK’ (Salih, 2015). Similarly, Abubakir Karwani uses 
Facebook to discuss intellectual topics as an Islamic scholar, as well as his ‘personal 
political opinions, political analysis and debate about daily political issues in IK’ 
(Karwani, 2015).  
Additionally, Arez Abdullah, a PUK leader, stated that he uses Facebook to 
publish ‘personal views, perspectives, news, and events of individual leaders. It is the 
most powerful and influential tool in carrying news, messages and information from 
political parties and individual leaders to the public’ (Abdullah, 2015). 
The online resources provided new opportunities for party leaders to learn about 
public opinion more effectively. According to Hiwa Mirza Sabir,  
Through social networking sites we are able to see how 
our members and citizens think about the KIU, assess and 
evaluate the KIU movement in the Kurdish political 
climate and how citizen perceive us. We have benefited 
																																																															
47 Head of the KIU bloc in the Kurdistan parliament 
(https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100008494143652andfref=ts)  
48 KIU parliamentarian and head of natural resources committee in the Kurdistan parliament 
(https://www.facebook.com/sherko.jawdat.mustafa/?fref=ts)   
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tremendously from critiques and suggestions flowing from 
these online channels. We frequently receive propositions 
and suggestions from our members and ordinary citizens 
about the political performance of the KIU parliament 
members, ministers in the KRG cabinet, and our political 
leaders (Sabir, 2015). 
The online accounts and pages of party leaders have positive and negative 
implications for political discussion in IK. The data and statements of party leaders 
indicate that social media allow the appearance of different versions of information 
flowing from the party leaders. Before that, political leaders did not have self-generated 
tools like social networking sites to present their views and perspectives. They were 
only able to do that through political party media outlets. Now, that ability is maximized 
as the party leaders can easily and quickly communicate what they want. This can allow 
party leaders to influence the agenda setting of the media and to reshape public opinion. 
This is important in IK because political parties who rarely allow different perspectives 
to appear on party media dominate the IK’s media. Thus, social media are empowering 
the individual leaders of political parties because individual leaders can independently 
disseminate information, in addition to their own messages and political perspectives to 
citizens without relying on the party’s media outlets. However, this may lead to the 
increased popularity of a single leader rather than the party itself. It could also lead to 
diversification of political views and ultimately increase the citizen’s exposure to 
diversified political perspectives and increase citizens’ political socialization. From this 
perspective, social media are positive forces as they may raise political awareness and 
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socialization trends of the public. Social media also increase party leaders’ ability to 
influence the public political discourse, and educate citizens about different political 
issues. An online statement from a political leader or dissemination of information may 
inspire either public support or outrage in the online domain, attracting the public’s 
attention to specific political issues. However, in IK currently, the online information of 
party leaders does not result in mobilizing citizens to press the government to change its 
behaviour and policies. 
It is noticeable that the online accounts and pages of party leaders are more 
effective in attracting citizens to follow political parties than party website. For 
example, the KIU leaders such as Mohammad Faraj,49 Abubakr Karwani,50 Abubakr 
Haladni,51 and Salahaddin Babakir52 have more followers than the party website. The 
same observation is true for the PUK; individual leaders have more followers than the 
party websites. This means than citizens may prefer following individual leaders rather 
than the party. This is probably due to individual leaders being more likely to address 
the grievances and preferences of citizens in their Facebook postings or they project an 
attractive political brand that motivates citizens to follow them online. 
It is noticeable that the online accounts and pages of party leaders more 
effectively attract citizens to follow political parties than the party website. For 
example, the KIU leaders such as Mohammad Faraj,53 Abubakr Karwani,54 Abubakr 
																																																															
49 Mohammad Faraj (https://www.facebook.com/m.farajahmad/?fref=ts)  
50 Abubakr Karwani (https://www.facebook.com/Abubakr-Ali-Abubakr-Karwani-
152421998162279/?fref=ts)  
51 Abubakr Haladni (https://www.facebook.com/Abubakr-Haladny-392936154216756/?fref=ts)  
52 Salahaddin Babakir (https://www.facebook.com/Salahaddin-Babakir-457228687637746/?fref=ts)  
53 Mohammad Faraj (https://www.facebook.com/m.farajahmad/?fref=ts)  
54 Abubakr Karwani (https://www.facebook.com/Abubakr-Ali-Abubakr-Karwani-
152421998162279/?fref=ts)  
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Haladni,55 and Salahaddin Babakir56 have more followers than the party website. The 
same observation is true for the PUK; individual leaders have more followers than the 
party websites. This means than citizens may prefer following individual leaders rather 
than the party. This is probably due to individual leaders being more likely to address 
the grievances and preferences of citizens in their Facebook postings or they project an 
attractive political brand that motivates citizens to follow them online.  
Moreover, social media are important for citizens to address and report daily 
problems, their feelings on politics and what the political parties should be doing. In the 
case of the PUK and KIU, social media can carry citizens’ sufferings to the party 
leaders and officials in the KRG. Citizens also can express how they feel about the 
political climate, what is positive and negative, and how political parties should deal 
with the political problems in Kurdish society. Citizens, especially those who are 
politically interested, can have broader access to what the party is doing. Social media 
platforms expand the channels for citizens’ political participation and can provide a 
fresh and different version of political views and opinion. Barham Salih highlighted that 
‘it is important not only for politicians to establish communication with the public, but 
to understand the public’s perspective and see what public opinion says’ (Salih, 2015).  
Although flow of information on the Internet and social media is significant for 
democratic politics in IK, the quality of information is problematic. The information 
provided by the party leaders is often about their personal activities and political views, 
rather than a discussion of laws, public policies, and government plans and decisions 
that may affect citizens more broadly. Hence, such information may not be relevant 
																																																															
55 Abubakr Haladni (https://www.facebook.com/Abubakr-Haladny-392936154216756/?fref=ts)  
56 Salahaddin Babakir (https://www.facebook.com/Salahaddin-Babakir-457228687637746/?fref=ts)  
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enough for citizens’ daily lives and needs in order to encourage the public to engage 
with party leaders. Therefore, social media does not always encourage productive 
discussions between the public and policy makers or further democratize citizens-
politician relations.  
Another issue that can be noticed from leaders’ statements is that although that 
social media offers two-way communications among users, party leaders mostly use the 
Internet and social media in a unidirectional way. They rarely engage in democratic 
debate with citizens. For example, the KIU secretary general’s Facebook page and those 
of prominent PUK leaders contain no evidence of conversation with citizens in which 
they explain policy positions or provide information about laws, party policies and 
strategies, or government policies. The online accounts of the PUK leaders also do not 
contain valuable information on policy issues pertinent to the life and interests of the 
public. There are several reasons for this; first, the party leaders mostly see the online 
tools as extra resources for self-promotion and personal gains e.g. promoting the 
political brand of the leader, reporting personal activities, presenting political opinions 
and general statements and messages. They seldom publish information about the 
reasons behind a specific government decision and policies. The party leaders also do 
not post questions about policy issues and do not invite users to have a rational, 
informed debate about them. According to Mohammad Rauf,  
Politicians in IK do not present a deep and clear analysis 
of political, social and economic problems in social media. 
They use social media for manipulation and buying time 
(Rauf, 2015).  
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 Despite online tools enabling citizens’ participation, interactivity, and 
empowerment, online participation and empowerment seems to have a weak impact on 
politicians and political parties’ behaviour, and the KRG’s policy formation. Both the 
PUK and the KIU remain passive or less responsive to citizens’ demands expressed 
online. Recently, the KRG was found to be not providing essential services such as 
monthly salaries to government civil servants (Rudaw, 2015); some prominent bloggers 
and online public opinions demanded the KIU and the PUK withdraw from the KRG 
cabinet: neither party addressed the issue or made any decision to do so.57 Similarly an 
anonymous webpage exposed a document containing the name of 404 female PUK 
members and cadres who had retired and registered on the pension payroll illegally.58 
The document was labelled as ‘the 404 women officers list’ and was widely circulated 
across the social media networks of individuals and PUK rivals. This was embarrassing 
for the PUK, because the party leaders had declared their support for fighting corruption 
on multiple occasions. However, the PUK leadership, judicial authority, and KRG 
officials did not take any procedures to prosecute this scandal. These examples indicate 
that party leaders and policy makers in IK do not take the online opinion seriously.  
																																																															
57 The following links are some examples of Kurdish online users demanding the PUK and the KIU 
to withdraw from the KRG cabinet: 
(https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100002271322034andhc_ref=SEARCHandfref=nf) 
(https://www.facebook.com/kamalchomani/posts/10154172565829145?match=2) 
https://www.facebook.com/sdiq.mustafa/posts/865779223552500?match=2) 
(https://www.facebook.com/abdulsamad.h.a/posts/1248953118454797?match=2) 
(https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=729627703804213andset=a.206520472781608.32795.
100002709706100andtype=3andtheater) 
(https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1435611739789518andset=a.1240969532587074.1073
741828.100000221183195andtype=3andtheater) 
(https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1362726400421821andset=a.136278159733324.20122
.100000534234046andtype=3andtheater).  
58 KDP youths in Sulaymanyia: https://www.facebook.com/GanjaniKDPSlemani/, Rozhana News: 
https://www.facebook.com/Rozhane.Hewal/,  
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 Furthermore, leaders do not use social media for political discussion in the same 
way as citizens. Online accounts of the PUK and KIU leaders show that few leaders 
interact with citizens. Even those leaders who do engage online seldom continue in their 
engagement for a longer period.59 It is premature to see social media as a political forum 
for generating debate, exchange ideas about good governance, policy formation, and 
democratization of decision-making process in the Kurdish political system. Therefore, 
it is hard to see noticeable impact of the Internet and social media on democratising 
political discussion in the Kurdish context. 
Although social media platforms are useful tools to increase citizens’ political 
knowledge and socialisation, but there is no guarantee that raising political awareness 
and socialization may result in better engagement with political discussion and enhance 
democratic consolidation. This is especially true in IK, where the KDP and the PUK 
still control much of the region’s finance, intelligence, and military, which they have 
historically used to suppress attempts at democratization. 
To conclude, party leaders generally use the Internet and social media platforms 
to enhance their position and promote their public political image, rather than engaging 
with productive, fruitful, and influential conversation with online users over IK’s 
critical political and economic issues. Politicians have simply adopted traditional 
political practices to the online domain.   
																																																															
59 For Example, in the KIU: Abuabkir Haladni, Abubakir Karwani, Hiwa Mirza Sabir. In the PUK: 
Qubad Talabani, Barham Ahmed Salih.  
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3.2.3 Pro-Party Pages and Accounts  
In the Kurdish social media, there are countless number of unknown and fake 
social media pages and accounts that support both parties and their leaders. These pages 
and accounts use political party logos and names of political parties in creating their 
online profile.60 Officially, political parties have not confirmed that these pages and 
																																																															
60 For example: for PUK: (https://www.facebook.com/PUKofficial.org/?fref=ts). PUK online: 
(https://www.facebook.com/PukOnline/?fref=ts). Slemani Qalay Sawz – Sulaymanyiah a green fort: 
(https://www.facebook.com/akar.sawz?pnref=story). Yaketi Nishtimani – union patriotic: 
(https://www.facebook.com/Yaketi-Nishtimani-124065621113629/?fref=ts). Ganjani Yaketi – PUK 
youths: (https://www.facebook.com/yaketi/?fref=ts). Bas Yaketi Bas – Only PUK: 
(https://www.facebook.com/soranpirababy1?fref=ts). PUK Koya center (14), Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/malbandi14koya/?fref=ts). Leadership council of PUK: 
(https://www.facebook.com/pukpbYNK/?fref=tsandref=br_tf). Central council of PUK: 
(https://www.facebook.com/AnjumaniNawandPukcc/?fref=ts).  PUK politburo – Erbil: 
(https://www.facebook.com/MktbySyasyYktyNyshtmanyKwrdstanHwlr/?fref=ts). 
60 PUK: (https://www.facebook.com/PUKofficial.org/?fref=ts). PUK online: 
(https://www.facebook.com/PukOnline/?fref=ts). Slemani Qalay Sawz – Sulaymanyiah a green fort: 
(https://www.facebook.com/akar.sawz?pnref=story). Yaketi Nishtimani – union patriotic: 
(https://www.facebook.com/Yaketi-Nishtimani-124065621113629/?fref=ts). Ganjani Yaketi – PUK 
youths: (https://www.facebook.com/yaketi/?fref=ts). Bas Yaketi Bas – Only PUK: 
(https://www.facebook.com/soranpirababy1?fref=ts). Kcha Sawzaka – the Green Girl, Facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/676324522405539/?fref=nf). Yaketi Ayindaya – PUK is future: 
(https://www.facebook.com/YeketiAyndaya/?fref=ts). Mn yaketim Khwenm Sawza – I am puk and 
blood is green: (https://www.facebook.com/yaketim/?fref=ts). Yaketiw Khabati Sakht – PUK and 
difficult strive: (https://www.facebook.com/YktyWKhbatySkht/?fref=ts). Yaketiw Mardayati – PUK 
and Braveness: (https://www.facebook.com/mamekurdd/?fref=ts). Layangranu Hawadarani Yaketi 
la Facebook – PUK fans and supporters in Facebook: 
(https://www.facebook.com/p.u.k.talabani/?fref=ts). Mn PUKim – I am PUK: 
(https://www.facebook.com/mn.Yakitym/?fref=ts). Dwangay PUK – the PUK platform: 
(https://www.facebook.com/541331179357680/?fref=ts). Ganjanu Lawani PUK – PUK youths and 
adults: (https://www.facebook.com/ganjani.yaketi/?fref=ts). Peshmarga derinakani PUK – Old PUK 
meshmarga: (https://www.facebook.com/peshmarga.derin/?fref=ts). Gardaluli Sawz – the Green 
Storm: (https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010434760585andfref=ts). Ganjani PUK – 
the PUK youths: (https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100008538273918andfref=ts). 
For KIU: KIU Sulaymanyia center (https://www.facebook.com/malbandislemany.yakgrtu?fref=ts), 
KIU Erbil Centre (https://www.facebook.com/malbandedu.hawler), KIU Halabja Center 
(https://www.facebook.com/malbandi.penj?fref=ts), KIU Garmyian Center 
(https://www.facebook.com/malbandi4/?fref=ts), KIU Chamchamal Center 
(https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010059787333andfref=ts), KIU Mosul center 
(https://www.facebook.com/malbandi.hasht?fref=ts), KIU 14 center 
https://www.facebook.com/320941634783092/?fref=ts), KIU Kalakchy Branch 
(https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010934496229andfref=ts),  
60 For example, I am Erbil - KIU and I am transparent 
https://www.facebook.com/yekgrtoihawlerm.shafafm/?fref=ts, Kurdistan Islamic Union 
(https://www.facebook.com/Kurdistan.Islamic.Union?fref=ts), Youth of KIU 
(https://www.facebook.com/lawany.yakgrtuy.islamy/?fref=ts), A New KIU 
(https://www.facebook.com/kiu94/?fref=ts), KIU is our crown 
	 191	
accounts are run by or associated with them. These pages and accounts are mostly 
established by members and fans, or unknown individuals.  
There are some differences on how these pro-party pages and accounts related to 
both the PUK and KIU. In the case of the PUK, the pro-PUK online pages are divided 
among party leaders and do not back all the PUK leaders equally. This phenomenon 
could be explained as a result of disagreements and disputes between wings inside the 
party that emerged after disappearance of Jalal Talabani from the political scene and 
party leadership. For example, a page named (Dlsozani Qubad Talabani – supporters of 
Qubad Talabani)61 supports Qubad Talabani but not Barham Salih. In comparison, pro-
KIU accounts and pages generally support the KIU as a party, rather than favouring a 
specific leader. 
These pages and accounts performing several functions: they publish information 
on political parties and their leaders’ activities, on political scandals, and republish what 
leaders have published in their personal accounts and pages in a way that is supportive 
to the party’s policies and image. These pages and accounts are more interactive due to 
the nature of their contents. For instance, the pro-PUK social media pages and accounts 
actively share information on the party’s rivals, particularly the KDP and Goran, or the 
																																																																																																																																																																	
(https://www.facebook.com/yakgrtw.dllmana?fref=ts), we are KIU and we succeed 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/712032122191101/), KIU closed Group 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/yakgrtu.ayndaya/),  we are KIU 
(https://www.facebook.com/emayekgrtwin/?fref=ts), KIU youths 
(https://www.facebook.com/yakgrtu.hiwawainda?fref=ts), KIU youth in Chamchamal 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/311617085566294/?ref=br_tf), KIU youths in Sulaymanyia 
(https://www.facebook.com/?fref=ts), KIU youths in Garmian 
(https://www.facebook.com/garmianyagrtw?fref=ts), KIU youths leadership 
(https://www.facebook.com/balesan.sane?fref=ts), Brave KIU youths 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/211243912317060/), Insurgents 
(https://www.facebook.com/nawakiu/?fref=ts), Shaqam ‘Street’ 
(https://www.facebook.com/Shaqam0/?fref=ts), Chalakwanani Yakgrtw la Facebook (KIU activists 
in Facebook) (https://www.facebook.com/groups/301133600052448/)  
          61 https://www.facebook.com/DlsozaniQubadTalabani/  
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governmental institutions they run in a way that targets their credibility. The 
information is usually communicated aggressively and targets party leaders and their 
political program. On several occasions, Masoud Barzani, the KDP president, 
announced reform projects to the IK governance system. The pro-PUK Facebook pages 
attacked his program and described him as the illegitimate regional president of 
Kurdistan, dysfunctional in doing reform, and questioned his credibility.62 Three pro-
PUK online pages also published information on corruption in the oil sector and the 
Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), run by the KDP. They accused the ministry of 
not being truthful with the KDP by concealing the real data and oil revenues from the 
public.63  
These pro-party social media pages and accounts have some implications for 
political discussion and the democratisation process. On one hand, they could have a 
positive impact on generating political discussion. Citizens can rely on social media for 
networking, organising online groups, addressing politicians, and participating in the 
party leaders’ online activities.  
On the other hand, these pro-party pages and accounts play a negative role in 
terms of damaging democratic politics in Kurdish society. The unknown and fake 
accounts damage democratic deliberation because of the unpleasant and sinister political 
language that is often used in framing political issues. These accounts were not initially 
established for democratic purposes, but to launch attacks on political rivals. 
Consequently, politicians may not be interested in engagement with this style of 
political language. Rizgar Hamajan, a PUK leader, asserted that the ‘PUK will not pay 
																																																															
62 PUK is the Future, I am PUK my blood is green; Youth of PUK) 
           63 Ibid. 
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attention to these fake accounts when they address our party because it is not telling the 
truth and do not represent real individuals’ (Hamajan, 2015).    
With respect to the pro-party accounts and pages of the PUK and the KIU, it can 
be noticed that the information from these accounts may be counter-productive to 
democratization. Both parties carry out the same practices to different degrees: the pro-
PUK accounts and pages are more active than the KIU’s. The information 
communicated by these accounts is unsuitable for rational and informed democratic 
debate among users. They publish incorrect, misleading, unfiltered, information that is 
often rumours, in addition to propaganda. They also manipulate the contents and 
original meaning of leaders’ political statements, in order to present information 
provocatively. They also encourage a culture of intolerance among users and political 
forces and encourage useless talks rather than rational and democratic debate. They 
organise attacks on the personality of leaders, political activists, and prominent figures. 
These accounts and pages aim to provoke online war between political parties, which is 
incompatible with democratic politics. For example, On 7 February 2017, the KIU’s 
secretary general, Salahaddin Mohammad Bahauddin, organised an open debate with 
journalists and intellectuals in IK. In this debate, he criticised a parliamentary speaker, 
Yousuf Mohammad Sadiq from Goran, for not correctly dealing with the Kurdistan 
presidential crisis.64 Consequently, Goran leaders, including Yousuf Sadiq responded to 
the statement, and accused him of supporting the illegal presidency of Masoud Barzani. 
Instead of debating this issue rationally, a pro-Goran online page named (Anjumani 
																																																															
64 see the KIU secretary general Facebook page 
(https://www.facebook.com/pg/salahadin.muhammed/posts/)  
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Bzutnaway Goran la Facebook – Gorran Movement council in Facebook)65 attacked the 
KIU secretary general, labelling him as a coward and pro-KDP figure. Similarly, on 23 
March 2017, Abubakir Haladni, a KIU parliamentarian and a member of the party’s 
leadership council, suggested in the NRT political show that the PUK suspend oil and 
gas exports from the Slemani province, a PUK influence zone, to compel the KDP to 
normalise the political situation in IK (NRT, 2017). Consequently, a pro-KDP page 
called (layangrani Party w Barzani la Kurdistan – Supporters of KDP and Barzani in 
Kurdistan)66 compared Abubakr’s suggestion to the ISIS terrorist mentality; pro-KIU 
pages labelled the KDP as traitors, conspirators with regional states, murderers, and as 
corrupt. These online wars between Kurdish political parties seem do not create a 
culture that is tolerant, civilized, and open to debate and democratisation. Therefore, 
these online practices may negatively influence citizens and the societal social security; 
social media in this situation may not serve democratic politics but could provoke social 
and political unrest.    
Moreover, these pro-party online pages and accounts have a negative impact on 
party relations, inter-party competition, political dynamics, and political settlements. 
The online dynamics around the regional presidency crisis in IK in 2015 is the best 
example to be cited. According to Adnan Muftis, a PUK leader, the political dynamics 
on Facebook has provided opportunities for people to create pages that aim to trigger 
feelings of hatred and aversion; it can ‘play a negative role in the party’s political 
relations’, and can deteriorate relationships and trust between parties, making political 
compromise unattainable (Mufti, 2015).  
																																																															
65 https://www.facebook.com/anjumanygo/ 
66 https://www.facebook.com/layangeranipdklakurdistan/  
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Unknown and fake accounts may influence the course of interactivity in the online 
world. A politician or political leader may receive follow requests from unknown users. 
In IK, anonymity is a big problem for users especially political leader because there are 
countless accounts created by the party security forces (the KDP and the PUK) to 
monitor the online space. Leaders like Abubakir Karwani and Mohammad Rauf set out 
their reasons for being careful with fake accounts. According to Karwani, security 
agents may sometimes ‘use social media in the name of protecting security to monitor 
activists, dissent, and other political parties’ (Karwani, 2015). Rauf highlights that he is 
cautious with friend requests from unknown individuals because ‘I do not know where 
this user tells the truth, where this user hide the truth, and how does the user treat my 
contents’ (Rauf, 2015).  
In the Kurdish social media, fake accounts are a common phenomenon. There is a 
strong suspicion that individual citizens, political parties’ members, political party 
institutions and intelligence agencies of political parties (the KDP and the PUK) are 
behind these fake accounts. A report documents that the KDP and the PUK party 
security forces are monitoring the online communication and putting social media under 
strict surveillance (U.S. Department of State, 2015). A prominent example of an online 
victim is Sardasht Osman, a 23-year-old freelance journalist and student. He was 
abducted on 4 March 2010 in front of Salahddin University because of his writings on 
the Internet about KDP high officials. Two days later, his body was found in Mosul 
city: no one had been arrested or punished for this crime (Human Rights Watch, 2010). 
Several cases of beating, kidnapping or even killing on Facebook posts were recorded 
by the US Department of State report on human rights in Iraq and the Kurdistan region 
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(U.S. Department of State, 2015). Most recently, a policeman named Shivan Azad was 
sentenced for five years in jail for posting a video on his Facebook account criticizing 
KRG officials over poverty, low salaries and lack of provision of essential services 
(Ekurd Daily, 2015).  
When citizens see how security forces treat online dissent and criticism, they may 
abstain from political participation, criticizing the government officials, from exposing 
information on them, or engaging with politicians and developing activism. In this case, 
the Internet and social media become resources to counter democracy and 
democratization.    
The stated intention of party security forces is to prevent the use of social media 
for terrorist purposes, especially since 2014, the IK is at war with so-called the Islamic 
State (ISIS), which relies on social media for communication, recruitment, propaganda, 
and radicalization. Party security forces also put the online sphere under surveillance to 
monitor dissent and online political activism. According to Barham Ahmed Salih,  
Party security apparatuses are buying the most 
sophisticated surveillance software to discover the identity 
of the fake account holders. Party security apparatuses 
have developed a sort of technology to change public 
opinion inside Facebook through amending comments and 
likes of specific posts (Salih, 2015).  
This statement is probably the best explanation for the countless number of fake 
accounts, as fake accounts allow citizens to bypass the party’s security surviellance; 
they can also be used to disseminate information in unaccountable ways.   
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Although social media can stimulate interactivity between citizens and political 
leaders, the party websites, leaders’ pages and accounts in general indicate that the 
Internet and social media play a limited role in democratization. These online resources 
are mostly used like traditional media outlets and in a unidirectional style rather than 
social media usage being used to facilitate democratic deliberation, which, in turn, 
contributes to democratic consolidation. Political parties and leaders tend to use the 
Internet and social media mostly to publicize their political activities, dissemination of 
information, advertising for their political brand, and self-promotion.  
4 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the role of parties’ online resources and websites, leaders’ 
pages and accounts, and pro-party accounts and pages in enhancing political discussion 
between political parties and citizens and its implications for democratization politics in 
IK. Political discussion is a requirement of democracy: democratization cannot happen 
without political debate and discussion between politicians and citizens. The arrival of 
the Internet and social media platforms into IK was an important technological 
development and significant asset for strengthening political discussion. In addition, the 
Internet and social media are valuable online resources for facilitating political 
discussion between Kurdish citizens and politicians. Social media can bridge distance 
and bring people into a domain of communication and connection for democratic 
discussion.  
The empirical findings indicate that the Internet and social media are new and 
vital sources recently adopted by political parties, as they offered users a space for 
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engagement by political parties and party leaders. They allow citizens and party leaders 
to communicate directly with each other without relying on mainstream media outlets. 
These are important developments in the nascent Kurdish democracy as previously that 
kind of connection was impossible to imagine. However, the available online resources 
are rarely used to serve the objectives of strengthening political discussion. The party 
websites are mostly used in ways that resemble the conventional media outlets. The 
party websites mainly share the contents disseminated in conventional party media 
outlets in a unidirectional style unsupportive of rational, informed, and deep political 
discussion. Moreover, the websites contain various kinds of information about the 
activities of party branches and party leaders, but there is no information on government 
policies, law proposals, public policy drafts, and policy issues. These contents are 
unproductive in increasing citizens’ knowledge necessary for engaging in an informed 
and rational political debate with politicians.  
Furthermore, the structure of the party websites also is not designed to generate 
democratic political discussion between the users and the party officials. There is no 
section in the party websites dedicated to invite citizens and online users to engage with 
the party leaders, participate in political debate, discuss, exchange, give opinions, and 
make inputs into the public policy choices, government issues, political strategies and 
party policies. Hence, party websites do not contribute to strengthening political 
discussion. 
The online pages and accounts of individual leaders of both parties play an 
important role in linking citizens with the party leaders outside the party’s 
organizational structure. Previously, that link was less likely to occur without reliance 
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on the party resources. Moreover, the party leaders can freely generate self-produced 
contents and directly communicate with the online users. However, the findings 
indicate that the role of party leaders’ online accounts and pages in political discussion 
and deliberation is weak and limited. The party leaders seldom use their online 
accounts and pages as a forum for establishing discussion and conversation about 
politics. They mainly use the accounts and pages for self-promotion, reporting 
political activities, advertising and enhancing their personal and political brand. It is 
difficult to see high quality, continual, genuine, rational, and informed democratic 
discussion in these accounts and pages. Occasionally, a handful of the party leaders 
individually address citizens’ political preferences, highlight citizens’ daily problems, 
and independently create influential public political discourse. There is little evidence 
that the limited interactivity on these social media sites have an impact on the public 
policy, party strategies, and decision-making process in the KRG institutions.  
The empirical findings also indicate that the online pro-party pages and accounts 
play a negative role in enhancing political discussion. Both the pro-PUK and pro-KIU 
accounts have similar characteristics on this issue. These accounts and pages were not 
designed to achieve democratic objectives: they were established to launch attacks on 
political rivals. These accounts foster hatred, intolerance, and a nondemocratic culture 
among the online users. Therefore, these accounts are damaging political discussion and 
are counter-productive to democratization   
Lastly, it can be concluded that the Internet and social media have a limited 
impact on enhancing political discussion between citizens and party leaders and 
government officials. Political parties and party leaders do not use these online 
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resources for democratic purposes. Political elites and elite-dominated media outlets 
heavily occupy the online sphere, which is supposed to be free. These elites dominate 
online spaces with their traditional practices.  
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Chapter 6 
Social Media, Elections, and Campaigns: The Case of the 
Kurdistan Parliamentary Elections in 2013 
 
1 Introduction 
Since 1991, IK conducted several elections including parliamentary, municipality, 
and Iraqi parliamentary elections. The 2013 parliamentary elections were one of the 
important elections in IK’s modern history: it has changed Kurdish politics and the 
power dynamic among the Kurdish political parties; it was also a significant test for the 
nascent Kurdish democracy. The recent rise of social media platforms in IK has 
significant implications for politics in IK; the Kurdish election campaign witnessed the 
establishment of countless numbers of social media accounts and pages. Candidates and 
political parties used these online platforms for communicating messages and 
establishing communication with Kurdish voters. This chapter will first discusses how 
far social media democratize the campaigns and communication strategies of candidates 
and political parties during elections. Secondly, how social media platforms enhance 
citizens’ engagement with elections and campaigns. Lastly, it will discuss the 
implications of online campaigns for democratic consolidation in IK.   
This chapter uses the theoretical insights developed in Chapter Two under the title 
‘political communication’. Current theorization of political communication, social 
media and electoral campaigns is divided into two lines of argument: the first believes 
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that online resources have many positives for elections and campaigns. Online resources 
increased candidates’ ability to publishing information on parties or politicians’ 
activities, communicating political messages, promoting personality and image, issuing 
statements, raising funds, mobilizing voters to go to voting booths, organizing 
independent campaign from political parties, bypassing mainstream media and 
communicating directly with voters. The Internet and social media also benefit citizens’ 
political participation in elections and campaigns, as these online resources enable 
citizens to learn about politics and support certain candidates; they also increase 
communication and participation by enabling the publishing of information and 
personal opinions on candidates and their campaigns, which reduces gaps between 
citizens, politicians and candidates.  
The second line of argument poses that the Internet and social media negatively 
influence election and campaigns. Online tools further empower large parties and 
candidates over minor parties and candidates, because large parties can dedicate more 
financial and human resources to managing online campaigns. Candidates continue to 
use online resources in a top-down fashion and do not use the full potential of social 
media’s interactivity properties to establish democratic dialogue.  
This chapter concentrates on the 2013 parliamentary elections in IK. It consists of 
four sections: the second section examines the impact of the 2013 elections on Kurdish 
politics; the third section explores how social media shaped the 2013 election 
campaigns; and the final section discusses the findings of the chapter. The findings 
suggest that although social media transformed election campaigns in IK in fundamental 
ways, it is not an influential force in further democratizing elections and campaign. 
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Candidates and politicians use the online resources in unidirectional way, rather than 
encouraging democratic discussion, and to assert their power, manipulate the public, 
and achieve personal and political objectives.  
2 The 2013 Parliamentary Elections: A New Era in Kurdish Politics 
IK does not have a long history or experience with parliamentary elections. Since 
the 1991 uprisings against the Baathist regime, IK has only held four parliamentary 
elections.67 Between 1992 and 2005, no parliamentary election was held due to the civil 
war between the KDP and the PUK from 1994 to 1998 (BBC, 2015).  
 The political parties changed dramatically between the 1992 and the 2013 
elections. In the 1992 elections, the KDP, the PUK and other political parties 
participated as an independent list. Between 1992 and 2009, other political parties were 
established, including the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) in 1994, the Kurdistan Islamic 
Group (KIG) in 2001, and Change Movement (Bzutnaway Goran) in 2009. In the 2005 
and 2009 parliamentary elections, both the KDP and PUK participated in the elections 
under one list and formed government without the participation of other political parties 
(Kurdistan Regional Government, 2015).  
The 2013 election was held on September 21, 2013 in the Erbil, Duhok, and 
Slemani provinces; 25 political parties and political groups participated. More than 73% 
of eligible voters voted on over 1,100 candidates for 111 seats (National Democratic 
Institute (NDI), 2013; Chomani, 2013). In the 2013 elections, all political parties 
participated in the election separately and the whole region was treated as one election 
																																																															
67 1992, 2005, 2009, and 2013 
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zone. Generally, the election was widely judged to be free and fair: all parties accepted 
the results (NDI, 2013). In the final result, five parties won seats68 (The Independent 
High Electoral Commission, 2014). The election result illustrates that there was a 
significant decline in the popularity of both the KDP and the PUK since the 1992 
election (Kurdistan Parliament, 2015).  
The 2013 parliamentary elections seem to be having significant implications in the 
contemporary political history of IK. It drastically changed Kurdish politics and was 
different in many aspects from previous parliamentary elections conducted in 1991, 
2005, and 2009. In the 2013 election, IK’s political environment was completely 
different from that in the 1990s. The 1992 election was the first election and first 
democratic experience in IK. However, the outbreak of civil war in 1994 hampered the 
nascent Kurdish democratic process and resulted in the division of IK into two political 
administrations. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the KDP and PUK signed a strategic 
agreement in 2007 to divide the administrative and government posts between 
themselves (Ahmed, 2014). In the 2009 elections, both parties participated in the 
election under one list called the Kurdistani List, and the Kurdistan region witnessed the 
emergence of an active opposition front coordinated by Goran, KIU, and KIG.  
Another difference in the 2013 election was the amendments to election law.69 
The previous election law allowed political parties to present a closed list of candidates 
to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). It legislated that voters have the 
right to vote for the party list without voting for a specific candidate. Consequently, 
																																																															
68  KDP: (37.79%) - 38 seats, Change List: (24.21%) - 24 seats, PUK: (17.8%) - 18 seats, KIU: 
(9.49%) - 10 seats, KIG: (6.01%) - 6 seats, Ethnic minorities e.g. Turkmen and Christians: 10 
unchangeable seats Source: Kurdistan Parliament website: http://www.kurdistan-parliament.org/   
69 Law No 15 – 2013 (http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/files/articles/080713065045.pdf) 
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political parties were responsible for running political campaigns rather than the 
candidate; the old version of the law granted extensive powers to the political parties to 
nominate candidates and identify their sequence in the party list. In the amended 
version, the law adopted a proportional representation system. According to the new 
law, the voter can ‘tick the name of one candidate in the list of the political entity, or the 
voter can only tick for a political entity’ (Law No 15 – 2013).  
The new amendments to the election law have both advantages and some 
disadvantages. The amendment created an opportunity for the electorates to reshape the 
sequence of candidates in the list. This made candidates compete fiercely to gain votes 
to secure a seat in parliament. Therefore, the law, indirectly, placed the responsibility of 
campaigning on the candidates. According to Mohammad Ali Taha,70 ‘it encouraged 
candidates to think about reaching out to the constituencies’ and forced them to actively 
campaign and appeal to the electorate (Taha, 2015). Similarly, Rewaz Faeq Hussein,71 
noted that the candidate’s ‘qualifications and capacities of candidates played roles in 
gaining votes’ (Hussein, 2015).  
Moreover, the proportional representation system not only placed the 
campaigning responsibility on the candidates, it also transformed candidates’ relations 
with voters. According to Begard Dlshad Shukrullah,72 it ‘created a direct contact 
between voters and candidates. It can be argued that MPs are truly representatives of 
their constituencies because they have been chosen by the direct votes of electorates’ 
(Shukrullah, 2015).  
																																																															
70 Member of Parliament (MP) and spokesman of the KDP bloc in Kurdistan Parliament 
71 MP in PUK bloc 
72 MP and head of PUK bloc in Kurdistan Parliament 
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From these perspectives, the election law amendment in IK induced candidate-
centred campaign on inter-party basis. The same trends have also been documented in 
other countries such as Ireland and Indonesia (Ahmad and Popa, 2014; Suiter, 2015). 
The 2013 elections transformed the two-dominated party dominated system and 
changed the political map of the region. According to Serhat Erkmen, the ‘political 
dynamics stemming from the conflict and/or collaboration between the KDP and the 
PUK have been replaced by a multi-equilibrium game and a more complex structure’ 
(Erkmen, 2013).  
Furthermore, the election results contributed, to some degree, in diminishing dual-
administration de facto in the region. Currently five political parties constitute the 
political process instead of the monopoly of two political parties (Abdullah, 2015; Salih, 
2015).73  Contrastingly to previous elections, in the 2013 elections, political parties did 
not form any sort of political coalitions. Consequently, as Farsat Sofi Ali, the KDP 
parliamentarian remarked that  
The election produced a political diversity. As a result, the 
formation of the KRG eighth cabinet was delayed for 
more than six months because the balance of power 
changed and no political party gained a majority of the 
votes’ (Ali, 2015).74  
Additionally, the election changed the position of opposition parties: it 
transformed the position of opposition parties and turned them into a significant force in 
forming and stabilizing the KRG.   
																																																															
73 Abubaker Omer Abdullah - MP and head of KIU bloc.  Ali Hama Salih, MP - Goran bloc 
74 Farsat Sofi Ali, MP - KDP bloc 
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These statements indicate that the traditional players or kingmakers in the Kurdish 
politics no longer exist; nowadays other political parties can dramatically redirect the 
course of the political process in the region. The best example for this indication can be 
drawn from the latest political developments in the region. There is fierce debate among 
the Kurdistan parliament blocs concerning changes to the regional presidency law: the 
KDP aims to prolong the mandate of the Kurdistan regional president Masoud Barzani 
for an additional two years, while the other parties are attempting to prevent this (the 
Journal of Turkish Weekly, 2015).  
Alongside the advantages, the new election law also posed some drawbacks. 
According Farsat Sofi Alis,  
It resurrected and intensified tribalism spirit among 
political parties and voters because each party attempted to 
nominate famous figures only to gather votes like a tribal 
leader (Agha), or religious clerics, rather than 
concentrating on the specific qualifications suitable for 
parliamentary affairs (Ali, 2015).  
Similarly, Abubakir Abdullah noted that voters are easily manipulated, thus there 
‘were many powerful, high-qualified and expert candidates with fewer votes than those 
candidates without professional experience’ (Abdullah, 2015).   
Despite some drawbacks because of the implementation of the semi-open list, it 
was a remarkable achievement for the election process, in that it offered voters a choice 
of candidates.      
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3 Social Media and the 2013 Elections  
In parallel with the advancement of communication technologies and usage of 
social media by the Kurdish citizens, politicians and candidates increased their political 
presence on social networking sites. In the 2013 elections, political campaigning 
witnessed a tremendous increase of social media sites use, primarily Facebook and 
YouTube. Hundreds of uncensored or unverified pages were used as tools for election 
campaigns and many video clips were created and released on YouTube to attract 
Kurdish voters (Mhamad, 2015).  
Through examining IK MPs Facebook accounts and official pages, it is possible to 
argue that candidates employed social media to achieve a variety of goals including 
targeting voters, communicating their message, mobilizing citizens to vote, and 
persuading them to vote in certain ways. It is possible to distinguish between the 
positives and negatives of social media usage and assess their implications for 
democratization of elections and campaign.          
3.1 Positive Implications of Social Media for Elections and Campaigns   
3.1.1 Publishing and Sharing Information and Communicating 
Messages  
Social media platforms have many positive implications for elections and 
campaigns. For the Kurdish candidates, the prime purpose of using social media is to 
distribute information and advertise the candidates’ political branding. Through 
examining social media accounts of candidates in different parties, it was found that 
candidates posted various information about themselves, including an outline of their 
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curriculum vita (CV), their academic qualifications, their aims and priorities when 
becoming MPs, their number and sequence in the election lists, their personal photos, 
photos of their activities and participation in public debate, seminars, local rallies and 
party campaign celebration, their statements and speeches in these activities, and 
reporting party activities in other places are quite obvious. In this sense, YouTube and 
Facebook were important channels for candidates to share short clips and creative posts 
outlining these aspects.75  
Kurdish candidates also shared other information about their personal views on, 
government and politics, political programs and political party’s objectives, and 
information on specific government policies. Rabun Maroof, a Goran MP,  used 
Facebook as a channel to share his political perspectives and vision with voters: he ‘felt 
the impact of his online campaign on voters’ (Maroof, 2015). 
 Some candidates, especially those from opposition parties,76 used social media to 
uncover information related to corruption in the oil and other government sectors. For 
example, on August 23, 2013, Omer Enayat Saeed, a Goran bloc MP, revealed on his 
																																																															
75 Sherko Jawdat Mustafa (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9sy8yLNbrEI) 
(https://www.facebook.com/sherko.jawdat.mustafa/?fref=ts);  Vala Fareed 
(https://www.facebook.com/DrVala-Fareed-337665219702097/?fref=ts); Farsat Sofi 
(https://www.facebook.com/farsatsofi/?fref=ts); Omed Khoshnaw 
(https://www.facebook.com/kandidi.jmare22/); Ari Harsin (https://www.facebook.com/Ari-Harsin-
192565520870248/?fref=ts); Mohammad Ali Taha 
(https://www.facebook.com/MohammedaliYaseenTaha/?fref=ts); Evar Ibrahim 
(https://www.facebook.com/evar.ebrahim?fref=ts); Ali Mohammad Salih (Salih 
(https://www.facebook.com/Ali-Hama-Saleh-Taha-330509840320751/?fref=ts); Brzo Majid 
(https://www.facebook.com/birzo.majeed/?fref=ts); Omer Enayat 
(https://www.facebook.com/Omer-Enayat-H-Saeed-308135834773/?fref=ts); Yousuf Mohammad 
(https://www.facebook.com/yousif.mohammad.14/?fref=ts); Rabun Maruf 
(https://www.facebook.com/rabun.maroof?fref=ts); Munira Othman 
(https://www.facebook.com/muniar.osman?fref=ts); Begard Dlsahd Shukrullah 
(https://www.facebook.com/Begard-talabani-1388322491393034/?fref=ts);  Goran Azad 
Hamagamhan (https://www.facebook.com/goranazad.hamagamhan?fref=ts); Salar Mahmud 
(https://www.facebook.com/salar.mahmud2/?fref=ts)   
76 Goran, KIU, and KIG before forming KRG cabinet 8 
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Facebook page that the KDP and the PUK illegally used government resources and the 
public budget for election campaigning in Garmyan district to buy citizens’ votes 
(Saeed, 2013). Also on September 15, 2013, Yousif Mohammad Sadiq77 published a 
video exposing a series of official government documents. The documents contained 
names of the KDP and the PUK political party officials who, they alleged, had retired 
illegally as ministers in the KRG without ever having been a minister. They received a 
monthly retirement salary of 4800 dollars (Sadiq, 2013). The video was shared 144 
times by users across social networking sites. On September 18, 2013, Sadiq published 
another video about Ashty Hawrami, the minister of natural resources, describing him 
as the Oil Man and accusing him of smuggling Kurdistan oil. The video contained 
official statistics about the amount of oil that had been smuggled since 2006 (Sadiq, 
2013). This video was also shared 172 times across social networks.  
Similarly, Soran Omer, a MP from Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), published 
YouTube videos on his Facebook account and page revealing sensitive information. In a 
video posted on 16 September 2013, he revealed that KRG officials had stolen 4 billion 
dollars from oil contracts profits with major oil companies in addition to other 
corruption cases in the KRG ministries (Omar, 2013). Additionally, Rewaz Hussien 
remarked that  
I disseminated information about two issues; first, 
implanting parliamentary model as a form of political 
system and explaining the concept of legal responsibilities 
of KRG officials, because these two issues are strongly 
intertwined. Second, working on oil affairs and analysing 
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oil contracts signed by KRG to develop energy and oil 
industry in the region. I wanted to publish the most 
detailed information on oil contracts in my Facebook 
account and page (Hussein, 2015). 
Another positive implication of social media for election and campaign is that 
candidates relied on social media as valuable tools to communicate individual messages. 
From this point, the Kurdish candidates approached social media sites to communicate 
their political message with voters. Rewaz Hussein, the PUK MP, stated that she 
explained her ‘personal message to her constituents to vote for PUK and her, a message 
that she wanted to be sent in her own name’ (Hussein, 2015). Her message aimed to 
mobilize voters, and convince them that voting for her and her party will be beneficial 
for them. 
Similarly, Fakhreddin Aref78 repeatedly shared his personal message. He 
concentrated on giving promises and shedding light on corruption in the KRG 
institutions (Aref, 2015). Also, Evar Ibrahim79 stated: ‘I communicated about the 
political program of my party and women issues in the region had priority. I appealed 
for a comprehensive political and economic reform in IK. Unfortunately, injustice has 
covered IK completely’ (Ibrahim, 2015).  
Other candidates in different blocs conducted the same activity80 and concentrated 
on mobilizing voters to vote. Goran candidates put a centralized slogan on their social 
																																																															
78 Fakhraddin Aref, MP from KIG and secretary of parliament 
(https://www.facebook.com/FakhradeeQader?fref=nf)  
79 Evar Ibrahim, MP from Goran bloc and head of women’s affairs committee in parliament 
(https://www.facebook.com/evar.ebrahim?fref=ts)  
80 Begard Dlshad (https://www.facebook.com/Begard-Talabani-1413009472324334/timeline/) or 
(https://www.facebook.com/Begard-talabani-1388322491393034/timeline/),  
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media accounts to encourage voters to vote for change, fighting corruption and 
unfairness.81   
These perspectives suggest that social media have had a great impact on 
strengthening candidates’ political campaign. Publishing information via social media is 
an important activity as it can empower parties’ political communication with voters 
and citizens; it is also likely to increase voter turnout. Furthermore, it encourages 
citizens’ interaction with the information because they can contribute to increasing 
familiarity with and deliberating on the information through sharing, posts and 
comments on activities via social media sites (Morris, 1999; Browning, 2002; 
Chadwick, 2006). Research indicates that ‘gaining relevant resonance within social 
media depends on the ability to publish information and campaigns that users will 
forward within their networks, comment on, and recommend to other users’ (Klinger, 
2013: 722). Moreover, the online platforms were significant in promoting diversity in 
political messages. The Kurdish elections had never seen this diversity in political 
messages previously. Additionally, in the social media era, candidates have better 
opportunities to send out their message to the public.  
3.2 Implications of Online Campaign for Traditional Media  
In contemporary societies, mainstream media connect politicians and citizens and 
play an important role in transferring information from politicians to citizens (Curran, 
																																																																																																																																																																	
Ali Hama Salih (https://www.facebook.com/Ali-Hama-Saleh-Taha-330509840320751/timeline/) or 
(https://www.facebook.com/ali.salh.96?fref=ts),  
Abubakir Abdullah (https://www.facebook.com/Abubakr-Haladny-392936154216756/) 
81 Evar Ebrahim (https://www.facebook.com/evar.ebrahim?fref=ts)  
 Ali Hama Salih (https://www.facebook.com/ali.salh.96?fref=ts)  
 Rabun Maruf (https://www.facebook.com/rabun.maroof?fref=ts)  
Omer Enayat (https://www.facebook.com/Omer-Enayat-H-Saeed-308135834773/?fref=ts)   
Yousif Mohammede Sadiq (https://www.facebook.com/yousif.mohammad.14/?fref=ts)  
	 213	
2011; Norris, 2011; Curran et al, 2012). However, mainstream media cannot establish a 
two-way communication; it can only work in a one-way fashion (Shirky, 2008). On the 
other hand, social media allow candidates to communicate directly with voters (Towner, 
2012: 193).  
Although, IK recently witnessed significant growth in media outlets (BBC, 2014), 
the main problem with the media landscape in IK is politicization of the majority of the 
media. Every political party has its own media, which is financed and administrated by 
the party’s prominent politicians. This traditional media operates in a unidirectional 
fashion: the Kurdish media represent the parties’ views and they are official mouthpiece 
for them (BBC, 2014). In this environment, it is difficult for independent media to 
thrive and operate (Chomani, 2014). 
 In the 2013 election, the political party media were engaged with campaigning 
for the party list and candidates alike, and hosting political debate among candidates. 
The party media integrated their engagement with campaigning with social media 
platforms as well (Rudaw, 2013). However, party media did not sufficiently amplify 
candidates’ campaigns; the party media could not dedicate all their time and resources 
to a single candidate: each party had nominated 100 candidates for 100 seats (National 
Democratic Institute (NDI), 2013). Therefore, candidates were forced to use social 
media to enhance and promote their campaign and gain visibility.   
The advancement of the Internet and social media influenced the relationship 
between the dynamics of political campaign and mainstream media in many respects. 
Firstly, it allowed candidates to develop, generate and broadcast a political message in a 
way that it was difficult to be done on mainstream media. Social media were also 
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enabled candidates to amplify their campaign and provided extra opportunities to be in 
constant communication with voters. Rewaz Hussien found that ‘Facebook did not limit 
her time and allowed her to post as much as messages she desired’ (Hussein, 2015). 
Similarly, Begard Shukrullah used Facebook to compensate for a lack of traditional 
media coverage for her campaign’ (Shukrullah, 2015).  
Furthermore, Ali Hama Salih argued that candidates would be unwise ‘to rely 
heavily on mainstream media to organize their political communication and campaign, 
because in the mainstream media, a candidate cannot communicate his message 
perfectly due to time constraints’ (Salih, 2015). 
Some of Kurdish candidates have a stronger social media presence than on 
mainstream media, relying on online resources as prime tools for their campaign. Evar 
Ibrahim preferred to use social media to organize his campaign independently, and thus 
‘did not organize any campaigns on mainstream media and did not dedicate any budget 
to political advertisement’ (Ibrahim, 2015). Abubaker Abdullah highlighted that 
‘throughout the election campaigning period I dedicated $15300 to my campaign and 
spent $11300 to campaign on social media and websites’ (Abdullah, 2015). Social 
media appears to enable candidates to attract the coverage of mainstream media for their 
campaign and dissemination of political messages and information. Consequently, 
candidates may reach out constituencies more efficiently. Ali Hama Salih reported that 
his writings on political issues on his Facebook page and account were republished and 
shared with other audiences 5 times, including by pages of famous news agencies like 
Rudaw and NRT (Salih, 2015).  
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Additionally, to further attract voters and maximize the echo of the campaign, 
candidates commonly linked their activities on traditional media with social media. 
According to Rewaz Hussien she uploaded her ‘TV shows and debates into her 
Facebook page to offer voters extra chances, especially those who missed her TV 
presence during live-time broadcasting, to re-watch the program’ (Hussein, 2015). 
Similarly, Mohammad Taha commented,  
I uploaded my visual media videos on my social media. 
Visual media are very effective and influential, and I think 
that without the videos that I made, my campaign would 
have remained ineffective (Taha, 2015). 
However, not all candidates are equal in doing that, as the quality of information 
broadcasted by candidates is an important factor in attracting media attention for the 
campaign. Additionally, in IK, due to the lack of a nationalized media, all party-
sponsored media provide coverage for their party’s candidates, and exclude other 
candidates; however, the coverage provided for candidates is still limited due to the 
large number of candidates. 
Social media could be vital resources for politicians to control their political 
messages and disseminate specific information to their public. However, some Kurdish 
candidates criticized traditional media for changing the contents of their statements and 
messages. For instance, Evar Ibrahim highlighted that media can damage a campaign; a 
website or TV might ‘change an interview’s contents in order to attract citizens’ 
attention, and ultimately attack the candidates’ personality and prevent them from 
winning the election’ (Ibrahim, 2015). Similarly, on September 4, 2013 Sherko Jawdat 
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Mustafa posted a Facebook message informing his fans and followers that he was 
prosecuting Chrpa magazine for distortion of one of his statements with respect to the 
KRG’s responsibility to protect security in Slemani city (Mustafa, 2013).  
These statements suggest that social media enables candidates to bypass the 
limitations of party-sponsored media and communicate directly with voters. This is 
important in IK because the main parties control the majority of the mainstream media 
and they give limited access to candidates from other parties. In this sense, social media 
compensates candidates for the lack of coverage by mainstream media. Bypassing 
party-sponsored media also enables candidates to be independent of party machinery in 
organizing their campaigns. Before widespread social media, candidates were 
dependent on their parties for resources in campaigning, which was insufficient to reach 
all voters and were limited to those candidates favoured by party leaders.  
Additionally, social media campaigns enable candidates to broadcast their 
message more efficiently than mainstream media does; they are also not limited by the 
available time and resources as they are with mainstream media. However, social media 
provided privileges for candidates rather than citizens and further empowers candidates’ 
communication strategies.  
3.2.1 Implications for Networking and Interactivity 
With respect to establishing networks during election campaigns, candidates and 
politicians also are concerned about keeping and maximizing their relationships during 
election campaigns. Social media give candidates the capacity to form a network of 
supporters with minimal cost, effort and assistance from campaign staff (Towner, 2012). 
In the 2013 elections, some candidates built networks via social media with potential 
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supporters outside formal structures and organs of political party. Regarding this, 
Mohammad Taha found that while his target audience is based in Duhok province, 
voters in in Erbil and Slemani shared his content on Facebook without making any 
campaign on the ground. In both cities together, he received 5000 votes, which is 
interesting. He would say that a huge part of that was related to the social media, 
especially Facebook’ (Taha, 2015). Interestingly, on September 13, 2013, Goran Azad 
Hama Gamhan, a PUK MP told his online followers how to take part in his campaign. 
He wrote: ‘Dear brothers and sisters of Facebook; if you want to participate in my 
campaign and support my candidacy, please contact my team in every city and district 
of IK’ (Hama Gamhan, 2013). Rewas Hussien also assessed that without social media, it 
would have been difficult ‘to access unreachable election zones’ (Hussein, 2015). Evar 
Ibrahim also found that she gained followers without any effort because people saw her 
‘photos in Facebook and shared it with her messages in their Facebook accounts’ 
(Ibrahim, 2015). Ali Hama Salih found that his ‘online campaign was a good factor in 
attracting voters in unreachable towns and districts. Through his page, tens of voters 
became part of his team and campaigned for him (Salih, 2015). As aforementioned, 
online campaigns can overcome geographical borders and allow candidates to reach out 
unreachable areas. Abubakir Abdullah highlighted that ‘social media allowed him to 
campaign beyond the boundaries of IK, such as the Kurdish diaspora. Social media 
reduced boundaries and saved time’ (Abdullah, 2015). 
These statements suggest that social media are vital tools for candidates to recruit 
new members to their campaign team from outside the formal structure of political 
parties. As Abubakr Abdullah observed, ‘sometimes, citizens through party membership 
	 218	
means will not follow a politician or a candidate. However, in social media they are 
online with the candidate and even support the candidate’ (Abdullah, 2015). Social 
media also benefit citizens, by allowing them to easily connect with candidates. In this 
sense, social media probably energized uninterested citizens to engage with politics 
differently and even assist candidates for campaign on the ground. According to Farsat 
Ali,  
Because of my online campaign, I received countless calls 
suggesting to further energize my online campaign. I also 
received unlimited positive feedback and requests for my 
contact number. The caller joined my campaign, helped 
with hanging posters, gathering people and voters to listen 
my speeches, and organized public seminars. Facebook 
assisted me to organise a network of supporters in a way 
that I did not imagine (Ali, 2015).  
Additionally, social media offer opportunities for citizens to connect with and 
follow specific candidates, and search for their political preferences. Social media 
opened the door for ordinary citizens to be part of a candidate’s campaign without 
membership in political parties. According to Abubakir Abdullah, because ‘an online 
friend may have countless friends and links with unlimited networks the scope for 
familiarity with candidates will expand. It is not only that the candidates communicate 
with them, but also these online friends bring candidates access to unlimited online 
networks’ (Abdullah, 2015).  
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This also suggests that social media can potentially challenge established 
hierarchies within political parties. Citizens have the opportunity to use the interactive 
features offered by this technology, and political parties have a new way to open 
themselves up to interested citizens who might not have had the time or capacity to 
become involved in the more conventional forms of party membership (Rommele, 
2003). In this way, social media open a space for a new type of connection between 
citizens and candidates not based on traditional forms of party membership, but based 
on networking connections, which do not recognize any bureaucratic and hierarchical 
barriers. 
With respect to interactivity, in democratic contexts, many scholars have studied 
the level of established interactivity between citizens and candidates generated by social 
networking sites during election campaigns. They mainly argue that social media 
enhances dialogue and democratic debate between politicians and citizens during 
election campaigns (Bruns and Burgess, 2011; Bruns and Highfield, 2013; Skovsgaard 
and Dalen, 2013; D’heer and Verdegem, 2014; Bode and Dalrymple, 2014). In the 2013 
parliamentary elections in IK, social media provided opportunities to establish a 
dialogue and conversation on campaign generally. Through social media, users made 
suggestions, criticism, and express their impressions about the candidate and the 
campaign. The online conversation tended to surround the candidate’s campaign and 
personality rather than specific political issues in Kurdish politics. Regarding this, 
Abubakr Abdullah argued that ‘while some users proposed positive comments or 
directed critiques about the nature of the campaign, highlighting strengths and 
weaknesses of the campaign and how to empower it further. He did not fully utilize 
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online tools (Abdullah, 2015). Similarly, Mohammad Ali Taha found that he responded 
to ‘countless messages during the election campaign’ (Taha, 2015).  
It is possible to highlight several types of online interactions in the Kurdish 
campaigns. First, interaction may occur over online contents generated by candidates 
during election periods. When candidates launch their online campaigns, they may 
receive likes, comments and shares of their contents. For instance, Rabun Maroof82 
Gorran PM published contents to communicate messages, political marketing, reporting 
his political activities related to elections.  His contents and messages were on fighting 
corruption and encouraging voters to vote for Goran to punish corrupt officials and 
received tens of hundreds of likes, comments, and shares. From  these perspectives, the 
online content is important in generating interactivity and attracting users. It provided 
citizens with different political views about the Kurdish political issues. 
Besides the importance of online content for interactivity, sometimes the political 
character of candidates encourages online users to interact with the online candidates. In 
this sense, candidates are not equal in their political character, and citizens may find 
their political preferences for a certain candidate. According to Abubakir Abdullah, KIU 
MP, his ‘campaign influenced undecided voters’ (Abdullah, 2015). Even within one 
political party, some candidates received countless followers and likes for their online 
campaigns in comparison with other candidates. For example, Ali Hama Salih’s83 
Gorran MP, campaign was far more popular than the rest of Goran’s candidates.  
These statements indicate that conversation was mainly about candidates’ 
campaigns rather than genuine democratic debate on transparency and accountability in 
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83 Ali Hama Salih ((https://www.facebook.com/ali.salh.96?fref=ts)  
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government institutions, citizens’ daily problem and sufferings, economic developments 
and job opportunities, and rational debate on political program of political parties and 
candidates. The online archives of campaign pages and accounts of Kurdish candidates 
generally indicate that Kurdish candidates tend to avoid interaction with the Kurdish 
citizens on these critical issues. Additionally, interaction between candidates and 
citizens remains superficial and candidates do not continue with engagement activities. 
The candidates’ statements documented previously do not show that they engaged in 
‘sustained engagement’ with voters (Edgerly et al, 2013). The majority of candidates 
broadcasted content with which citizens interacted, but only engaged with constituents 
superficially. However, this may still be significant to the democratisation of IK 
compared with the pre-social media campaigning era.  
To sum up, online resources enabled candidates to promote their election 
campaign more effectively. Social media platforms empower candidates and their 
campaigns in terms of publishing information and promoting personal image, 
communicating political message, issuing statements, mobilizing voters to go to voting 
booths, bypassing traditional media and establishing independent campaign. The online 
resources are also useful to involve citizens with elections and campaigns, so that they 
learn about different candidates and politics generally, spread news, information and 
alter political opinion. Social media have limited implications for democratic 
consolidation in IK, as these online resources are mainly empowering candidates rather 
than citizens in allowing them to achieve their political objectives more effectively.          
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3.3 Negative Implications of Social Media for Elections and Campaigns 
Despite the usefulness of online resources for elections and campaigns, some 
authors argue that social media does not necessarily democratize elections and 
campaigns. They highlight that online tools further empower large parties and 
candidates over minor parties and candidates, because large parties can dedicate better 
financial and human resources to manage the online campaign. It is common among 
candidates to use online resources in a top-down fashion and not fully use the potential 
of social media interactivity properties to establish democratic dialogue. Citizens do not 
have equal access to the Internet and social media geographically, and there is no 
guarantee that those who do have access to the Internet and social media will use them 
for political purposes. Social media news may be subject to information bias, 
manipulation, and exclusion of unwanted information (Chadwick, 2006; Grant et al, 
2010; Towner, 2012; Graham et al, 2013; Jacobs and Spierings, 2016).  
In the 2013 parliamentary election in IK, it is possible to observe some negative 
implications of the Internet and social media for elections and campaigns, which seems 
to be incompatible with democratization. While social media increase the ability of 
users to share information, it is not always possible to verify the quality of that 
information.  
Mohammad Taha, a KDP parliamentarian, states that ‘you cannot trust these 
social networking sites’ (Taha, 2015). Similarly, Fakhraddin Aref, KIG parliamentarian, 
stated that on ‘Facebook, users publish countless misleading items of incorrect 
information with unknown sources’ (Aref, 2015). However, data is not available to 
show whether citizens and activists corroborate the views of these two parliamentarians.  
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Moreover, candidates mainly used social media in a unidirectional and top-down 
manner rather than in an interactive way. Their statements and online accounts indicate 
that their use of social media resembles mainstream media usage for campaigns. Social 
media platforms simply allow candidates to make their campaigns more effective by 
improving communication with the public and bypass party-sponsored media. These 
perspectives are also in-line with the findings of other studies suggesting that social 
media is mostly used in a unidirectional way (Bimber and Davis, 2003; Towner, 2012; 
Enli and Skogerbø, 2013; Bayraktutan, et al., 2014; Suiter, 2015). Moreover, as 
Mohamad Taha highlights, candidates can manipulate the content of their social media 
sites by blocking ‘specific users who want to disturb candidates by asking unwanted 
questions’ (Taha, 2015).   
Furthermore, candidates’ presence on social media was temporary for the duration 
of the elections and nowadays the majority of candidates, even those who gained a seat 
in parliament, seldom write on social media for their constituencies. This indicates that 
candidates only had short-term objectives, winning a seat, rather than long-term 
democratic objectives and full utilization of online resources to enhance citizen 
engagement. There is no evidence to suggest that citizens can exercise leverage over 
candidates and campaign direction. Again, online resources further empower candidates 
and their political strategy rather than citizens.   
Moreover, the social networking platforms can be used for online battles and 
attacks on candidates’ character and campaigns. Several candidates expressed their 
resentment about attacks launched from fake and anonymous accounts. Fake and 
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anonymous accounts and pages in the Kurdish social media seem to be a dominant 
phenomenon during and after the election campaign period. These accounts are 
problematic for the candidate’s political communication strategies. Evar Ibrahim’s 
revealed that there are countless accounts and pages in her name, which published 
‘moral accusations and unpleasant contents. Some of these pages insulted the Barzani or 
Talabani families’ (Ibrahim, 2015); she had to frequently denounce these pages 
(Ibrahim, 2015). Rewaz Hussein also had this problem, and, on occasion, it forced her 
to abstain ‘from using social media’ (Hussein, 2015).  
Fake accounts may constitute extra resources to launch counter campaigns on 
candidates; Farsat Sofi highlighted that this ‘inspired feelings of anxiety for candidates; 
take candidates time and may influence a candidate’s popularity and votes’ (Ali, 2015). 
Despite this, some fake accounts and pages may be positive, allowing candidates to gain 
more visibility and enhance candidates’ political reputation. According to Mohammad 
Taha,  
When a candidate informs the public that an account is not 
his or her account, it gives an impression to the public that 
there are some users around the candidate who want to 
employ the candidate’s name in order to attract attention’, 
which increases the candidates’ online following (Taha, 
2015). 
Some candidates turned to social media to reply to rumours and attacks on their 
personality and the reputation of the candidates. According to Farsat Ali, social media 
can be used ‘to organize an attack on individuals and their personalities’ (Ali, 2015). 
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Some social media accounts have attacked candidates, but candidates used the same tool 
to counter them. For instance, Sherko Mustafa84 published online replies to all false 
information and rumours published on his campaign and his party (Mustafa, 2013). 
Moreover, social media can be political tools to discredit rival political parties and 
candidates. Rabun Maroof documented his recollection about political campaign and 
slanders on Facebook:  
In the election campaign the hideous way of campaigning 
is the strategy of switching focus from the concerns and 
problems of the public into attacking on rival candidates 
and exposing secrets of their personal life. Those who 
engage with this strategy should be labelled psychopaths. 
If they reach government institutions they will transfer 
their psychological ailments to these institutions (Maroof, 
2013) 
Similarly, Begard Shukrullah noted that  
Social media are often used for slandering, aspersion, and 
attacking other candidates. If a political party felt 
unbalanced in votes and popularity with other rival 
political parties, the party will start ruining the reputation 
and personality of the strongest candidates of their 
competitors’ (Shukrullah, 2015).  
																																																															
84 Sherko Jawdat Mustafa, MP from KIU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9sy8yLNbrEI and 
https://www.facebook.com/sherko.jawdat.mustafa/?fref=ts 
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Rewaz Hussien revealed that her political rivals sent her insults through her 
Facebook accounts and pages.  
I received insults and unpleasant contents on my family 
and me. Sometimes, when I was receiving comments, 
psychologically they caused anxiety and apprehension and 
made me regret using Facebook (Hussein, 2015).  
Evar Ibrahim also explained that pro PUK and KDP social media users left 
abusive comments on her page.   
Some Facebook pages published moral accusations. Some 
anonymous pages labelled me an Iranian spy. In IK, if you 
have your own opinion and believe in different political 
perspective, then tens of social networking sites will 
blacken your personality. Because of these pages, the 
political bureaus of the KDP and the PUK tended to make 
a legal case against me (Ibrahim, 2015). 
Alongside attacks on personalities and reputations of candidates, social media 
accounts and pages are also vulnerable to cyber-attacks. For example, on 16 October 
2013, Rabun Marrof wrote that during the election campaign, he was subject to cyber-
attacks on his ‘formal Facebook account and pages then the Facebook Company 
prevented him from publishing any content’ (Maroof, 2013). While Rabun never posted 
contents incompatible with the company’s regulations, other users reported his page as 
part of attacks on his online campaign. 
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From these perspectives, the dark side of this process comes from the credibility 
of these contents; because social media are open to everyone and every citizen and 
group may use them for publishing contents. These contents sometimes are biased and 
lack credibility. They could be used for publishing rumours, propaganda, attacking on 
other candidates and politicians in influential ways. Using social media for rumours and 
attacks on political rivals does not abide with democratic principles. These practices are 
more likely to spread an undemocratic and intolerant culture rather than increasing 
democratic civic culture among online users, especially as social media enable citizens 
to become involved in these online battles.    
In addition, the online battles and uncivilized use of social media among Kurdish 
candidates may negatively impact on citizens’ trust in democracy and politics, leading 
them to abstain from politics completely. In this way, social media may fuel political 
polarization and intolerance in Kurdish society rather than contributing as a new 
element in the democratization process.    
4 Conclusion 
The 2013 election was a turning point in modern Kurdish politics. The election 
results introduced new political realities that were unimaginable before the election. The 
prominent political outcome of the election was the transformation in the party politics 
in IK. Kurdish politics were no longer dominated by the KDP and the PUK; they were 
replaced by a more complex structure with multiple parties. Although the KDP and the 
PUK still dominate many of the important sectors in the KRG such as finance, military 
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and security, it is possible to state that the KDP and the PUK are no longer the main 
players in Kurdish politics.    
Arguably, the 2013 election was the first social media election in IK. One of the 
reasons of integrating social media platforms with election and campaign was 
introducing a new election law, which granted freedom for voters to select their 
preferred candidates. Consequently, candidates competed fiercely to secure a seat in 
Kurdistan parliament. Therefore, social media were important resources for candidates 
to organize their personal and self-managed campaign. Social media platforms are used 
for communicating political messages, promoting candidates’ personality, reputation 
and political image, mobilizing citizens to vote, to create networks, make information 
available, strengthen relations between mainstream media and election campaign, and 
increase political interaction.  
The findings in this chapter generally illustrate that social media empower 
election candidates and strengthens their communication strategies. It enabled 
candidates to publish unlimited amount of information to voters. This is an important 
step for the nascent Kurdish democracy because these online tools improve the 
availability of information. Before the rise of social media in Kurdistan, candidates were 
unable to reach a large number of voters. Theoretical considerations suggest that social 
media can positively impact the democratization process as online platforms enable 
candidates to publish information on parties or politicians’ activities, communicate 
political messages, issue statements, mobilizing voters to go to voting booths, organize 
campaigns independently of political parties, bypass mainstream media and 
communicate directly with voters.  
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Social media also benefit citizens, and involve them with elections and campaigns 
beyond the voting process. They can support their preferred candidates, spread 
information, news and personal opinions on candidates’ campaigns. Theoretical 
underpinnings also suggest that the Internet and social media also benefit citizen’s 
political participation in elections and campaigns, as these online resources enable 
citizens to learn about politics, make informed choices about candidates, increase 
communication with candidates and participation in politics by publishing information 
and personal opinion on candidates and their campaigns, and reduce gaps between 
citizens and candidates.    
Although social media have the potential to be a two-way communication 
medium; this chapter found that candidates and political parties mostly use social media 
in a unidirectional fashion. Candidates benefit more than citizens from social media 
resources: even citizens’ involvement benefits the candidates’ campaigns and popularity 
and they cannot practice leverage over online campaign and candidates. Therefore, 
social media are additional resources for candidates for self-promotion, reach out to 
constituents, and gain publicity rather than increase democratic discussion.  
Additionally, social media are widely used in campaigns to smear the 
personalities of candidates and rival politicians rather than attacking them on the basis 
of their policies and political agenda. In this way, social media do not serve democratic 
consolidation in IK.  
On the contrary, by using the online resources in that way, political elites 
contribute to diffusing intolerance, hatred, and undemocratic culture among citizens. 
Moreover, through social media, citizens have become involved in political struggles 
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among candidates, and further polarize citizens and society. Therefore, the use of social 
media in election campaigns does not necessarily lead to democratization.  
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Chapter 7 
Findings of the study 
This study set out to explore the impact of social media use on democracy and 
democratization in IK since 2003. This thesis argues that, although the Internet and 
social media facilitate political participation and political communication in the context 
of IK, signs that democratic politics are being enhanced because of IK’s citizens’ online 
participation seem to be weak. Despite scholarly expectations, the political participation 
and political communication facilitated by the Internet and social media platforms are 
ineffective and may not lead to IK’s democratization. Some scholars assert that social 
media can lead to the rejuvenation of democracy in liberal democracies and claim that 
social media usage played an important role in mobilizing protests, which resulted in the 
end of authoritarian regimes during the 2011 Arab spring events. This thesis has 
explored these claims about social media in relation to politics in IK as a hybrid context, 
specifically in relation to political protests, political discussion and election campaigns. 
IK has a hybrid or transitional political system. The Kurdistan region 
concurrently contains democratic and authoritarian elements of political system. In IK, 
there is political pluralism, elections, civil society groups, and media. Meanwhile, there 
are also some authoritarian features in the region. In IK, the power of political parties is 
bigger and more influential than the power of government institutions. Two political 
parties, the KDP and the PUK, dominate key sectors of power such as the security 
apparatus, finance and economic sectors. The Kurdistan regional government (KRG) 
suffers from rampant corruption, nepotism, and client-patron relations.  
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The advent of the Internet and social networking sites to IK encouraged citizens 
and political actors, such as political parties and politicians, to establish social media 
pages and accounts and to employ the technology for civic engagement, political 
participation, and political communication. Social media started to be influential forces 
shaping the course of politics in IK. This study aimed to understand the impact of social 
media use on the democratization process in the Kurdish case through three case 
studies. The first case concentrated on the influence of social media on the 2011 
Slemani movement and its implication for democratization. The second case focused on 
the impact of social media on political discussion and interactivity between citizens and 
political parties, and its implications for democratizing citizen-government relations. In 
this respect, the study considered two political parties in IK: the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU). For the third case, the study 
concentrated on the role of social media in democratizing campaigning and elections 
during the 2013 parliamentary election in IK. The study sought to answer the following 
questions: 
The Main Research Question: How does the rise of the Internet and social media 
platforms influence the democratization process in IK? 
1. How does the rise of social media influence political participation of citizens and 
what is the value of that participation for democratic consolidation in IK? What are the 
benefits and risks of social media for political participation and the democratization 
process in IK? 
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2.  How do social media platforms facilitate citizens’ participation in social movements 
and collective actions? How do social media influence freedom of expression and 
opinion? What are the implications of these actions for consolidating democracy in IK?  
3. How do the Internet and social media contribute to generating political discussion 
and interactivity between the Kurdish citizens and political parties and their leaders? 
What are the implication of online resources for democratic discussion and 
consolidating democracy in IK? 
4.  How far do social media democratize the campaigns and communication strategies 
of candidates and political parties during elections? How do social media platforms 
enhance citizens’ engagement with elections and campaigns? What are the implications 
of online campaigns for democratic consolidation in IK?   
This study has assessed the impacts of social media use on the democratization 
process by studying the type and nature of social media influence on political 
participation (as influencing attempt and as political discussion) and on political 
communication in IK. It did not seek to establish causal links between social media and 
democratization but rather to identify trends that may suggest the ways in which social 
media could, or could not, contribute to democratization. The study’s justification for 
taking this course of approach is that it is difficult to isolate and gauge the precise 
influence of social networking sites on democracy, as democratization is a long and 
complicated process and may take place in a complex political environment in which 
many political, social, and cultural factors overlap. Furthermore, there are 
methodological limitations in isolating and gauging the political influence of social 
networking sites on social and political phenomena. 
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Alongside finding answer to these questions, this study attempted to achieve the 
following objectives: 
1 . To assess the impact of social media on citizens’ political participation. 
2  To assess the impact of social media on political communication. 
3  To assess the impact of social media on political discussion and democratic 
deliberation between citizens and party leaders and government officials in IK.  
The main empirical findings were summarized within the respective empirical 
chapters. This section will synthesize the empirical findings to answer the study’s 
research questions:  
1. How does the rise of social media influence political participation of citizens and 
what is the value of that participation for democratic consolidation in IK? What 
are the benefits and risks of social media for political participation and the 
democratization process in IK? 
The empirical findings of the thesis chapters suggest mixed results of the impact 
of social media on citizens’ political participation. In the case of the Slemani movement 
in 2011, social media was important in increasing citizens’ participation in protests and 
encouraging them to stay in the protest arena for over two months. Social media 
connected the Kurdish citizens to online communities in the Kurdistan region and also 
connected global citizens with the political developments of the Arab Spring events. 
The Kurdish citizens were initially inspired by these events. They were mediums on 
which citizens built their hopes and aspirations in achieving political projects, 
advancing and defending their interests, asserting their values, organizing and 
constructing networks. Through social media, citizens shared ideas about strategizing 
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collective actions, and mobilization against the KRG. Furthermore, citizens used social 
media platforms as social forums to exchange ideas, launch conversation and 
deliberation. 
Nevertheless, social media had greatly impacted the organization and 
sustainment protest activities such as sharing information and news, coordinating and 
announcing protest activities and locations, and broadcasting the political activities 
directly from the protest arenas without reliance on mainstream media and political 
organization. To a great extent, the online platforms lowered the barriers for citizen 
participation and mobilization. It amplified citizens’ courage, and feelings of public 
support for political causes during the protest. With respect to citizens’ political 
participation as political discussion, the study found that social media offers citizens the 
possibility of engaging with political parties, party leaders, and politicians about 
policies, even just criticize them. Before the rise of social media, these kinds of 
practices were difficult to conduct.  
However, social media have contributed to the undermining of citizens’ political 
participation. Social media facilitate the monitoring and surveillance by the security 
agents, who formulate and develop sophisticated strategies to monitor and control the 
online domain. In the case of the Slemani movement, security agents used social media 
to monitor and arrest activists. Additionally, security agents used social media to launch 
counter-protest campaigns to damage the reputation and question the legitimacy of 
protesters. Together, these measures helped to repress the movements and possibly 
dissuade citizens from participating in political life. Because of surveillance and 
monitoring, political participation empowered by online resources may not lead to 
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democratic consolidation. The 2011 Slemani movement was unsuccessful in compelling 
the KRG to respond to protesters’ demands and in inciting political reform and 
improving the quality of governance in IK.   
Social media are important tools for facilitating political participation, as both 
influencing attempt and political discussion; however, they are also effective tools in 
undermining political participation and may even be counter-productive for democratic 
politics.      
2. How do social media platforms facilitate citizens’ participation in social 
movements and collective actions? How do social media influence freedom of 
expression and opinion? What are the implications of these actions for 
consolidating democracy in IK?  
On the one hand, by the virtue of social media, IK’s information infrastructure 
underwent a substantial transformation. The transformation comes from an increase in 
citizens’ capability to influence the flow of information and their new capability to 
challenge the mainstream media. This can be considered an important development for 
IK: IK’s traditional media are heavily politicized, and seldom allow citizens’ voices to 
be heard. In the case of the Slemani protests, citizens used their own mobile phones to 
record and publish events directly from the protest square to social networking sites. 
Before the development of social media, a small political elite controlled the media 
environment in IK: there was little room for citizens’ contribution; in the age of social 
media, the elites’ control over the media environment is reduced significantly. These 
developments are significant for the nascent Kurdish democracy because social media 
platforms provide a chance to increase diversity in news and opinions. However, the 
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impact of this news diversification on government decision and the KRG policymaking 
seems to be limited. The KRG high officials frequently make the most important 
decisions, which have direct influence on citizens’ life without consulting the public.   
Citizens can contribute by creating, designing, broadcasting information and 
news in videos and photos not only within Slemani, but also in the entire IK. The 
mainstream media and political party media, especially opposition parties, use citizens 
produced videos and images for their news bulletin. The information created and shared 
by users challenge the capacity of political party-run-media by presenting a different 
style version of information; it also undermined the political party-run media’s control 
over the availability and publicity of information. Social media provided a space to 
inform the public about political events in a different way to the party-run media. Thus, 
social media decreased the ability of political party media to control political discourse.     
Additionally, social media brought marginalized voices on board and provided a 
massive opportunity for citizens, especially youths, to use their voices, express and 
present their ideas to other fellow citizens without possessing any financial resources or 
writing skills. In a society like IK, where political authority oppresses individuals, social 
media can be a golden opportunity for individuals to express their feelings about 
injustice, oppression, and common grievances. 
Moreover, social media contributed to the diversification of information sources 
and increasing the range and quantity of information supported by individual efforts. In 
IK’s 2013 parliamentary elections, candidates posted a wide range of information about 
themselves, their political visions, and political programs. Furthermore, candidates 
shared information on their social media accounts and pages separately to the 
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mainstream media. In order to increase their votes and popularity, candidates from the 
oppositional parties posted highly sensitive information about corruption, misuse and 
wasting the public budget by the two main parties (the KDP and the PUK), using the 
government’s resources for election campaigns; they also reported violations of election 
campaign rules and voting fraud.  
Additionally, the party leaders employed social media to perform two basic 
functions. The first to broadcast information about their own political activities rather 
than the parties’. The second is to publicize their own political perspectives and visions, 
propose alternative policy and political actions for party leadership, and post meeting 
minutes about the political issues in IK. The online activities of the leaders contributed 
to increasing the personalization trends in politics, diversification of the range of 
information available for citizens, formulation and promotion of personal messages and 
design a preferred style of communication, and the increase in the capacity and freedom 
of the political leaders to influence the public discourse. Prior to the arrival of social 
media, party leaders had few resources to share their personal political perspectives and 
visions for the public. They had minimal opportunities to promote their own image and 
personality through the party-run media and party organs meetings, while social media 
amplified the opportunities for the party leaders to achieve personal prominence. 
While social media transformed the information status in IK, the online 
information has a number of weaknesses. Firstly, the reliability and credibility of 
information supported by the social networking sites is subject to question and 
scepticism. Not all pieces of information created and circulated by the social media are 
correct and accurate, sometimes; information remains unconfirmed by official sources. 
	 239	
Another drawback is, due to the openness of social media for ordinary citizens, they can 
spread and broadcast whatever they want at low cost and without limitations. Therefore, 
social media can be used for broadcasting rumours, lies, slander, defamation, and for 
organizing psychological war. This has also created problems for journalists in 
Kurdistan. Some media outlets and websites post social media content without properly 
investigating the validity and accuracy of the information. 
Additionally, politicians and political parties can also use social media to 
enhance their political communication and amplify their own political messages and 
activities, at the expense of in-depth deliberation and discussion. Political parties 
integrated their own media with party-run websites and social media platforms and 
broadcast information in a style that serves the party’s goals and political image. These 
have also contributed to the politicization of the social media domain and have created 
polarization amongst social media users. Social media empower politicians in their 
political communication strategies and in achieving short-term objectives such as 
winning a seat in parliament, rather than real engagement with citizens over daily 
political and economic problems relevant to the public. Using social media platforms in 
this way does not serve democratic consolidation in IK.     
As in the case of citizens’ political participation, social media has both positive 
and negative implications for sharing information. It is difficult to assess what the 
overall implications are for democratization and it is possible that any positive effects of 
social media are counteracted by the negative effects of social media with regards to 
freedom of information.   
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3. How do the Internet and social media contribute to generating political discussion 
and interactivity between the Kurdish citizens and political parties and their 
leaders? What are the implication of online resources for democratic discussion 
and consolidating democracy in IK? 
Political discussion and interaction of citizens with politics, representatives and 
party leaders is considered to be a prerequisites of a well-functioning democratic 
system: there is no democracy without genuine and continual political discussion and 
active interaction over political topics, decision making process, and public policies. 
With the arrival of the Internet and social media into IK, the Kurdish political parties 
and party leaders generally adopted the new technologies for political communication 
strategies through establishing websites and tailoring the party-run media with the social 
networking platforms. This study concentrated on two political parties, the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU).   
The empirical findings suggest that the Internet and social media accounts have 
very little influence on generating democratic discussion and interactivity between the 
Kurdish citizens and political parties, party leaders, parliamentarians, and government 
officials. Since the arrival of the Internet, political parties integrated online resources 
into their political communication strategies through establishing a party website. Both 
the PUK and the KIU have websites, which aim to conduct different functions.  
In terms of providing spaces for political discussion and interactivity, neither 
parties’ website’s structure nor design grants sufficient space for citizens to engage in 
democratic discussion and to interact with the party leaders, parliamentarians, and 
government officials in both parties. The PUK and the KIU run their websites like other 
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party-run media outlets: they offer online contents in a unidirectional style and the 
contents are generally reproduced from traditional party media outlets. Therefore, the 
party online contents occupy social media space with mainstream media contents, which 
reduce the diversification of contents. The party website allows citizens to interact with 
the content by liking, sharing, and commenting on content: these forms of engagement 
do not represent genuine democratic discussion with party leaders over the online 
contents. Both parties’ websites, like their TV channels and newspapers, are under the 
financial and administrative control of the political parties. 
The rise of social media has granted the political party leaders more publicity, as 
the majority of the leaders of both parties have a personal online presence. However, the 
online accounts and pages of the party leaders mostly empower the leaders, enhance 
their political brand, and promote their political image. Leaders mostly are using social 
media in a unidirectional fashion, reporting their own political activities and promoting 
personal image. Some do post political ideas and political perspectives in the online 
space, and it is rare that leaders post information of policy proposals, invite users to 
participate in policy planning, discuss about how to address citizens’ problems through 
formulating government decisions. Therefore, while there are countless online accounts, 
they do not generate genuine, rational, informed, and high quality democratic discussion 
from all users. They mostly report leaders’ personal activities and their own 
perspectives and views about political problems in the Kurdish politics.   
With respect to the quality of the interactivity generated online between citizens 
and party leaders, the findings suggest that although social media has been praised for 
increasing democratic dialogue and discussions between citizens and politician, these 
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claims are not supported in this case. The case of the PUK and the KIU illustrate that, 
although citizens are interacting with a handful of politicians based on political brand, 
personal reputation, and the posted contents, the interaction seems to be superficial and 
does not continue for long periods. Democratic theorists dictate that ‘ongoing talk’ is an 
important condition for democracy. When political leaders post online and citizens 
interact with them, politicians seldom engage with the citizens’ comments. Therefore, 
the circle of discussion and interactivity will not be completed and it is less likely to 
continue to establish an effective and productive democratic debate between citizens 
and politicians.  
With respect to the Kurdish pro-party social media accounts and pages, there are 
countless unknown and fake Facebook and Twitter accounts and pages, which support 
specific political parties. Some of these accounts are established by the political parties 
and supervised by the party’s security agents. The KDP and PUK have strong online 
presence under fake and concealed identity platforms. However, members and fans of 
the political parties establish most of the accounts. 
These pro-party platforms are not established to foster political discussion and 
enhance democratization politics instead; they organize attacks and campaigns to 
destroy the reputation and political images of their rivals. During and around the 
election campaign period, these online platforms published rumours, slander, and 
extrusion. These online practices do not serve the democratization process, as they 
contribute to creating an undemocratic culture, with intolerance, hatred, and polarization 
among users, which is ultimately problematic for democratization. 
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Another negative role of these pro-party online platforms is that they do not 
establish genuine, rational, and high-quality democratic debate. They do not present 
valuable information on the KRG policies, and the party strategies. The content is 
mostly the same as that which is produced by the party media outlets: pro-party online 
accounts and pages simply rebroadcast them for the online users. Therefore, political 
parties are indirectly invading social media spaces, which are supposed to be free, open, 
and transparent for all users. Political parties use these features to re-exercise their 
traditional control in the mainstream media domain. Moreover, the party security agents 
have opened some of these pro-party online platforms to put the online domain under 
surveillance and monitor social media accounts of users.  
4. How far do social media democratize the campaigns and communication strategies 
of candidates and political parties during elections? How do social media 
platforms enhance citizens’ engagement with elections and campaigns? What are 
the implications of online campaigns for democratic consolidation in IK?   
Since 1991, a series of parliamentary and governorate elections have been 
organized in IK, including elections for the Iraqi council of representatives. This thesis 
concentrated on the latest parliamentary election in IK conducted in 2013. This election 
is considered to be important, because it led to a change in the balance of power among 
the Kurdish political parties, and transformed politics in IK.  
The election witnessed tremendous use of social media by the candidates of 
almost all political parties. It was arguably the first social media parliamentary election 
in IK. In this election, social media were extensively used for political advertising, 
communicating candidates’ political messages, mobilizing citizens to vote, creating 
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networks of supporters, disseminating information, and attracting the mainstream 
media’s attention.  
The increased use of social media in the 2013 elections was partly a result of the 
changes to the electoral law. Before the election law was amended in 2013, political 
parties largely controlled the election process; they directly nominated candidates for 
parliament in a closed list. In this case, voters could not vote for their preferred 
candidates, they had to vote for the entire list of political candidates. The amendment 
granted constituents freedom to vote for a certain candidate in the list. Consequently, 
the amended law reduced the power of political parties over the sequence of the 
candidates, and political parties reduced their support for candidates’ campaigns: 
candidates had to rely on other campaigning methods. Therefore, social media platforms 
were widely adopted by the candidates for their election campaigns. 
Arguably, the new election law changed the election system from party-centred 
campaign to candidates-centred campaign. With the availability of social media, 
candidates gained more freedom in establishing communication strategies. They became 
responsible for organizing, financing, and running campaigns in online and offline 
space with little reliance on their party’s resources. Through using social media 
accounts and pages, candidates established direct and unmediated political relationships 
by communicating with voters, created networks of supporters and fans, overcame 
budget shortages, attempted to meet voters’ demands and desires, bypassed 
geographical barriers, and shared their campaign activities on the ground. Furthermore, 
they posted highly sensitive information online to influence the public discourse and 
shape public opinion in their favour. 
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The online campaign allowed candidates to reach out to constituencies with no 
prior political affiliations with a candidate’s political party. Thus, candidates became 
semi-independent of political parties’ machinery in organizing their campaigns, as 
social media enabled them to be less reliant on the parties’ resources. 
Social media also altered the relationships between candidates, voters, and 
mainstream media. There is no doubt that the mainstream media play an important role 
in connecting candidates and politicians with constituencies and transporting 
information from candidates to voters. However, mainstream media are unable to 
establish two-way communication between candidates and voters. In IK, social media 
enabled candidates to bypass these limitations and communicate directly with voters. 
This is significant in the contexts of the Kurdish politics, because majority of 
mainstream media are controlled by one of the main parties, which provide limited 
channels for candidates to communicate with voters.  
Moreover, social media enabled candidates to control their political message, 
unlike mainstream media, which mainly belongs to one of the political parties, who may 
distort candidates’ messages, thereby damaging their reputation. This is frequently an 
issue in the Kurdistan region and some candidates took legal action against media 
outlets and websites for changing the statements and contents of their interviews and 
statements.  
However, this does not mean that candidates rejected mainstream media 
completely. Despite limitations, candidates were also active on the mainstream media 
by participating in interviews, political talk shows, making media statements, and 
sharing videos of their whole activity on social media. In this way, social media 
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amplified the campaign and the scope of viewers for the activity. While some 
candidates’ online and offline campaigning may attract coverage by mainstream media, 
this phenomenon is rare in IK because the politicized and party-run media mainly 
focused on candidates’ campaigns within the party. 
However, despite social media’s potential to facilitate discussion and debate 
between candidates and citizens, the empirical findings of this study raise concerns 
about the nature and quality of the interaction online. The findings suggest that this 
interaction is superficial and there is very little deep and rational discussion between 
candidates and citizens. When candidates post information or a political vision on 
social media, and citizen’s comments on the post, candidates rarely reply to the 
comments. Moreover, not all content generates interaction: content, which is relevant 
to citizens’ life, generates more interactivity than more general politically significant 
issues for the public. Candidates also avoid entering protracted discussions with 
citizens and mostly avoid answering questions about sensitive political topics or issues. 
Social media provide an opportunity for dialogue, but the matter is related to the desire 
of the users to use social media in this manner.          
Moreover, the problem of online incivility negatively affected some candidates. 
Fake and anonymous accounts and pages were used to launch online attacks on 
candidates, organize counter campaigns, falsely report candidates’ accounts and pages 
so they will be blocked by the social media companies. These accounts and pages also 
published rumours, propaganda, lies, revealed information about candidates’ private and 
personal life, and made false statements in the name of the candidates and politicians. 
These accounts and pages posed problems for the candidate’s political communication 
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strategies and even their personal relationships. To avoid any possible misunderstanding 
and damage to their reputation and campaign, many candidates were compelled to 
present clarifications and explanations about these accounts and made clear that the 
accounts and pages do not belong to them. These pages also contributed to the 
propagation of a hateful, intolerant and violent culture among online users and citizens.  
With respect to the impact of social media on elections and campaigning, it is 
possible to state that the social media platforms mainly empower candidates rather than 
citizens. After the election campaign, the majority of the candidates completely 
abandoned the online space. This indicates that candidates used the online resources to 
advance their own objectives, winning a seat in parliament, rather than enhancing 
democratic politics. Moreover, the use of social media in election campaigns also 
became an opportunity for spreading incivility and hatred. Therefore, it is difficult to 
see noticeable impacts of the online resources on further democratizing the election 
campaign and contributing to democratization process in IK. 
Overall, the findings of the study have shown that social media do indeed 
provide new opportunities for political participation and political communication. 
Citizens have taken advantage of these opportunities in regard to political participation 
as influencing attempt. However, social media also poses a threat to political 
participation because of party security apparatuses using the online resources to monitor 
activists and put citizens under surveillance to monitor their online activities, which 
may lead to arrest and sometimes killing. In the case of political participation as 
political discussion, the findings were not very encouraging. Party leaders and 
politicians mainly used social media platforms in a unidirectional fashion for the 
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aforementioned achieving personal objectives. In the case of the impact of social media 
on political communication, the findings suggest that candidates mainly use social 
media to achieve short-term political objectives such as winning a seat in parliament. 
Social media platforms empower candidate’s political communication further. These 
platforms enable candidates to do better campaigns, and to target voters and 
communicate their message more effectively. Therefore, the overall impact of social 
media on democratization is inconclusive.       
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
In light of the empirical findings of this study, the theoretical cases for the impact 
of social media on democratisation and the implications of the study of other hybrid 
regime need to be revisited in order to further understand social media practices across 
different political and social contexts. 
The importance of studying the influence of social media platforms in a hybrid 
political system like IK comes from the fact that the system itself is not fully 
democratic. This study of the relationship between social media usage and 
democratisation in Iraqi Kurdistan, whilst not generating universally applicable laws 
and theories, does suggest some implications for understanding the relationship between 
social media usage and democratisation under other hybrid political regimes. 
1. Implications of this Study for the Wider Study of Social Media and   
Democratisation         
Regarding the implication of the study for political participation as an 
influencing attempt in authoritarian contexts, this study does, to an extent, confirm the 
results of research which considers social media as having a positive effect on political 
participation in authoritarian states. Social media and democratisation literatures in 
authoritarian states emphasize on the importance of social media platforms as 
significant resources for increasing political participation (Norris, 2002; Adams, 2009; 
Brundidge & Rice, 2009; Castells, 2009; Rahimi, 2011; Castells, 2012; Colombo et al, 
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2012; Howard et al, 2011; Jensen & Anduiza, 2012; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Towner, 
2012; Howard & Hussein, 2013; Breuera et al, 2014). However, this study also 
demonstrated the limitation of social media platforms in achieving democratisation 
because these online resources are also useful tools for authoritarian regimes and their 
security apparatus to counter democratisation, by suppressing demonstration and 
dissent, monitoring individuals and activists, and countering protest strategies 
(Morozov, 2011). Therefore, this study, to a degree, confirms the result of research in 
authoritarian contexts, as these online resources are also available for authoritarian 
regimes to use it for counter-democratisation. In authoritarian contexts, the potential of 
social media to influence one type of political participation, such as participation in 
social movements and protests, is more observable than how social media works for 
election campaigns and political discussion generally. Nonetheless, participation 
remains constrained by the authoritarian aspects of the hybrid political system; namely, 
a repressive security apparatus and the weakness of state institutions. 
With respect to the study’s implication for the concept of political participation 
as political discussion, this study confirms, to some degree, the results of research in 
democratic contexts. Literature on social media and political participation as political 
discussion in democratic context argue that online resources increase access to 
information, provide a platform for open and free expression and a medium for 
informing citizens about politics. The public obtains opportunities to express political 
views and learn about other views. Social media provides opportunities for citizens to 
openly discuss politics, and criticize, scrutinize and even steer cynicism regarding the 
government and the established media, fulfilling a critical watchdog role. These 
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characteristics are encouraging for democratisation on one hand. But the other hand, 
these online platforms do not enhance interaction between politicians, representatives 
and government officials, and citizens. Politicians and party leaders seldom discuss law 
proposals, policy issues, and critical daily problems of citizens. Party leaders and 
politicians mainly use these online resources to promote their personality and assert 
their power and position rather than enter or generate rational, productive, and deep 
political discussion with citizens (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Noveck, 2000; Sunstein, 
2001; Noam, 2005; Hindman, 2009). This study’s results are consistent with the theory 
debated in a democratic context, but it highlights the importance of also focusing on 
quality of communication in order to enhance political discussion.  
Regarding the use of social media for enhancing political discussion in 
authoritarian contexts, this study has addressed the current gap in the literature.	From 
the case of IK, as a hybrid regime that includes some aspects of authoritarianism, it can 
be hypothesized that online discussion in other authoritarian contexts may also be 
corrupted by security service agents or other actors with intentions to distort and 
undermine the political process in the interest of maintaining the political status quo. 
Additionally, policy makers in IK made very little effort to address and tackle these 
online-framed political problems through formulating effective government policies.  
With respect to the implication of the study for theoretical debates on social 
media and political communication, the results of the study confirmed theoretical 
assumptions in literatures on social media and political discussion in democratic 
context. Literature on social media and political communication in a democratic context 
suggests that politicians and candidates using the online resources for enhancing their 
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position and empowering their communication strategies. Social media platforms 
became additional resources for politicians and candidates to enhance their control. The 
candidates mainly used the online resources as to achieve short-term objectives such as 
winning a seat in parliament rather than for democratic consolidation (Mocan et al 
2003; Chadwick, 2006; Cormode & Krishnamurthy, 2008; Davis et al, 2009; Carlson & 
Strandberg, 2012; Colombo et al, 2012; Jorba & Bimber, 2012; Tewksbury & 
Rittenberg, 2012; Stieglitz & Xuan, 2013; Gainous & Wagner, 2014; Calderaro, 2014;). 
The case of IK emphasizes on the same assumptions that politicians are relying on 
social media platforms to (re-)assert their power and position, without necessarily 
creating discussion and debate between politicians and citizens.  
This study addressed a gap in the current literature on social media and politics 
in authoritarian contexts. The extant literature has ignored the use of social media in 
elections and by politicians. From the case of IK, as a hybrid regime that includes some 
aspects of authoritarianism, it can be hypothesised that the ruling elites in authoritarian 
states can also take advantage of social media platforms to enhance their own position, 
strengthen their hold on power, and shape political communication in a way that serves 
their interests and rule, at the expense of enhancing political discussion with citizens 
and voters. We can assume that incumbent leaders in authoritarian states will tend to use 
social media platforms in undemocratic ways, including through unknown users who 
attack rival politicians and candidates, organise online campaigns to ruin and distort the 
reputation and credibility of candidates, and ignite a virtual battle between political 
parties.  
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2 Implications of the study for studying social media and politics for other 
hybrid regimes 
It is possible to state that the case of IK is the first study on the implications 
of social media for democratisation in a hybrid regime. Whilst the findings of this 
study may be relevant for studying other hybrid regimes, nonetheless a great deal of 
care must be taken in generalising the finds of IK to other hybrid regimes. There 
are several reasons for this judgement; the first one is, although the general 
understanding for hybrid regime is there are both democratic and authoritarian 
elements in states political system, but hybrid regimes are not equal in adopting 
levels of democratic and authoritarian elements. Some hybrid regimes have a 
democratised the army and security forces, strong rule of law, but have problems 
with elections, or vice-versa. It is difficult to find complete similarities among 
hybrid regimes because hybrid regimes vary greatly.   
The second reason is related to characteristics of IK: it is not an independent 
sovereign nation-state; according to the Iraqi constitution it is a federal region with 
some independence in some affairs. This consequently means that the region is not 
fully independent in organizing its democratisation path separately and away from 
direct impact of internal political dynamics and laws of the Iraqi state and 
institutions. It is extremely difficult to compare IK with a sovereign nation-state 
with a hybrid regime, which has full independence in how to move towards 
democratisation. More importantly the geopolitical location of IK is unique and 
there is no other hybrid regime in the world that have similar geopolitical location. 
The Kurdish nation and its land is divided amongst Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. 
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The democratisation process is under the influence of political dynamics of regional 
powers. The democratising impact of social media usage can be understood within 
this regional dynamics but not separately.  
The third reason is, it is vital to note that the impact of social media 
platforms on politics and democratisation should be assessed in relation to the off-
line context and how it interacts with online activity, internal political dynamics of 
a given country as well as regional politics. It is difficult to find a context that 
matches IK in every aspect.  
Despite the aforementioned reasons, the results of this study can be useful in 
hypothesising how social media platforms work for some aspects of a hybrid 
regime. From the case studies of this thesis, it is possible to hypothesise that the 
authoritarian aspects of a hybrid regime, repressive security services, monopoly of 
power and resources by ruling party, may undermine democratic aspects of hybrid 
regimes such as freedom of expression online, and political party pluralism. Social 
media platforms, alongside other resources, may be used for repressing dissent, 
protest, and any other forms of collective action, demonizing social movements, 
undermining political opponents, monitoring and violating privacy of individuals, 
and distorting online public opinion. Additionally, ruling elites in authoritarian 
states can easily take advantage from social media platforms to undermine 
democratisation efforts through re-emphasizing their political position, influencing 
public opinion and public discourse, strengthening their hold on power and 
redirecting the course of political process in a way that serves them. 
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It can also be hypothesised that in a hybrid regime, politicians and election 
candidates capitalize on social media resources to achieve some short-term 
objectives e.g. winning election and gain a seat in parliament rather than using the 
online resources to enhance their relationship with voters and listen to online public 
grievances and address them in policy making. The prominent trend in using the 
online resources is unidirectional fashion usage of these platforms similar to 
traditional media such as TV, and radio. Using the online resources in that way will 
not enhance citizen-politician relations and consequently will not contribute to 
enhancing democracy in a hybrid regime. Nevertheless, the case of IK, similar to 
that of the Arab spring countries, also demonstrates the potential for social media to 
be used to help citizens to organise protests and campaigns to bring about 
democratic political change, even if such a change is not initially achieved. 
Nevertheless, the case of IK, similar to that of the Arab spring countries, also 
demonstrates the potential for social media to be used to help citizens to organize 
protest activities and campaigns to bring about democratic political change – even 
if such change is not initially achieved.  
 
1 Study Limitations   
The study has offered evaluation perspectives on the significance of the social 
media platforms on IK’s democratization status through examining major political 
events in the Kurdistan region. The study’s methodology mainly relied on semi-
structured interviews with activists, parliamentarians, and political party leaders and the 
contents of social media accounts and pages, especially Facebook. As a direct 
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consequence of this methodology, the study encountered a number of limitations, which 
need to be considered:  
1. In the case of the Slemani movement in 2011, some individuals did not want to 
participate in the research. They were cautious about giving information on events that 
happened. Some of the participants on the study did not remember all the details of 
events because the events occurred in 2011 and the interviews were conducted in 2014.      
2. For the case of the 2013 parliamentary election and political parties, the data was 
gathered in summer 2015, in which IK was in the mid of political crisis with both the 
regional presidency, and the war with so-called the Islamic State (ISIS). These two 
crises created some unexpected problems, including numerous cancelations of 
interviews with parliamentarians and political party leaders due to their visits to the war 
front and abundance of meetings among political parties to rectify the crisis of the 
regional presidency. Given the importance of interviews to this study, I rearranged 
interviews at times more suitable to the interviewees. It is probable that in more 
peaceful circumstances, I would have been able to conduct more interviews.  
2 Recommendations for Future Research 
The scale of this debate is extensive and multifaceted even at the local level. To 
generate better understanding for the impact of social media on democracy and 
democratization, more case studies are needed at local and cross national levels to allow 
further assessment of the impact of social media on democratization in the following 
areas: 
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1. Future research needs to concentrate on the impact of social media on political 
parties and political institutions in nondemocratic contexts. The majority of the research 
conducted on social media operation in this context area deals with resisting 
authoritarian regimes rather than the operation of political parties.  
2. There is a need for comparative research in a nondemocratic context to address the 
factors behind generating interactivity through social media platforms. Some scholars 
emphasize the democratic features of social media, such as providing opportunities for 
interactivity between citizens and politicians. In some contexts, social media are capable 
of establishing forums for democratic debate. Research is needed to tackle this issue and 
explore the major factors behind it. 
3. Additionally, research is needed to highlight the more general impact of social media 
on the everyday framing of political and social issues in IK and how social media 
contributes to creating a public sphere and potential impact of the online public sphere 
on the Kurdish society. Apparently, the online use of social media in IK is fast-growing 
and significantly influences non-political issues.  
4. Research also is needed to learn about the influence of monitoring, censorship and 
surveillance on social media and its implications for political participation.  
Lastly, despite what is often reported about the implications of social media 
practice and its uses for democratization in different contexts, the case of IK illustrated 
that, although social media platforms opened new spaces and further enhanced political 
participation and political communication, it does not mean that increased political 
participation will definitely lead to democratization. In a hybrid political system like IK, 
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online resources can be counterproductive for democratization, as the resource can be 
used to hamper democratic endeavours.      
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Appendix 
List of Interviewees  
 
No Full Name Position Interview 
place  
Date 
1 Abubaki Ali Karwani Leader - KIU Erbil 25/08/2015 
2 Abubakir  OmerAbdullah Leader and MP - KIU Erbil 27/07/2015 
3 Adnan Mufti Leader - PUK Erbil 06/08/2015 
4 Ali Hama Salih MP - Goran Erbil 29/07/2015 
5 Arez Abdullah Leader and MP - PUK Erbil 05/08/2015 
6 Asos Hardi Journalist and activist Slemani 28/03/2015 
7 Barham Ahmed Salih Leader - PUK Erbil 28/07/2015 
8 Begard Dilshad Shukrullah Parlamentarian - PUK Erbil 04/08/2015 
9 Evar Ibrahim MP - Goran Erbil 29/07/2015 
10 Fakhraddin Qadir Aref Parlamentarian - KIG Erbil 04/08/2015 
11 Farsat Sofi Ali Parlamentarian - KDP Erbil 05/08/2015 
12 Haval Abubakir Leader - Goran Slemani 29/03/2015 
13 Hiwa Mirza Sabir Leader - KIU Erbil 22/08/2015 
14 Mohammad Ali Taha Parlamentarian - KDP Erbil 12/08/2015 
15 Mohammad Rauf Journalist and activist Slemani 30/03/2015 
16 Mohammad Rauf Mohammad Leader - KIU Erbil 29/07/2015 
17 Rabun Maruf Parlamentarian - Goran Erbil 08/08/2015 
18 Razwan Mhamad Political activist Slemani 29/03/2015 
19 Rebin Hardi Journalist and activist Slemani 30/03/2015 
20 Rebwar Ali Political activist Slemani 30/03/2015 
21 Rebwar Said Gul Leader - KIU Erbil 11/08/2015 
22 Rewas Fayaq Hussein Parlamentarian - PUK Erbil 01/07/2015 
23 Rizgar Ali Hamajan Leader - PUK Erbil 11/08/2015 
24 Samir Salim Amin Leader - KIU Erbil 09/08/2015 
25 San Saravan Jorunalist and political activist Slemani 25/05/2015 
26 Sherko Jawdat Mustafa Leader and MP - KIU Erbil 05/04/2015 
27 Yahya Nawzar Ali Political activist Slemani 29/03/2015 
28 Yahya Omer Fatah Journalist and political activist Slemani 28/03/2015 
  
